Security Sector Change in Georgia, 1985 - 2008

Local Dynamics, Politics of Reform and Paramilitaries

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Abstract

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Keywords: security sector reform (SSR), security sector, paramilitary, Georgia, local ownership, political economy analysis, post-conflict peacebuilding, transitional societies, state-building, police reform

The literature on security sector actors in transitional societies emerging from war and/or authoritarianism has evolved by critiquing local perspectives recently. While the existing literature has extensively analysed transitional societies in Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe, the thesis adds a new geographical perspective by providing a case study of security sector change processes in the Republic of Georgia, 1985 - 2008. More specifically, the thesis examines the local processes and drivers of security sector change in Georgia, and their inter-relationships with donor supported programmes including SSR. The thesis employs a political economy analysis to examine indigenous security sector actors and their characteristics. Based on the approach, the thesis particularly examines processes of change and reform of policing institutions. The paramilitary is identified and examined as a key focus for analysis.

The research shows that political dynamics among a few political elites determined the course of security sector change in Georgia. Despite ample external assistance, domestic political dynamics remained the main driving factor in the SSR agenda-setting process. In the politically-driven security sector change efforts, the restoration and maintenance of regime security remained a priority under both the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili regimes. Overall, the security sector actors played significant role in the political developments. Consequently, the process of changing these actors was a largely domestically driven political process. The role of paramilitaries in relation to regime security

and the security sector change agenda-setting process in Georgia requires the security sector research to treat paramilitary as a distinguished unit for consideration.

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List of abbreviations

AChA	Chilean Anti-communist Action
ACSS	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
BSLW	Border Security Law Enforcement
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Cheyhan
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIPDD	Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CUG	Citizens' Union of Georgia
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DOSAAF	Voluntary Supporters for the Army, Air Force and Navy (*Добровольное Общество Содействия Армии, Авиации и Флоту*)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSBG	Department of the State Border Guards
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENP/AP	European Neighbourhood Policy/Action Plan
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy

EU	European Union
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMS	Financial Management System
GBA	Gender-based Violence
GBSLW	Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEL	Georgian Lari
GNP	Gross National Product
GSSOP	Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program
GTEP	Georgia Grain-and-Equip Program
GTZ	*Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit*
GUUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova
GYLA	Georgian Young Lawyers' Association
ICCN	International Centre of Conflict and Negotiation
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
IPP	Individual Partnership Program
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISAB	International Security Advisory Board
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KGB	Committee for State Security (*Комите́т Госуда́рственной Безопа́сности*)

MAP	Membership Action Plan
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MSS	Ministry of State Security
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Министерство Внутренних Дел*)
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел*)
NSC	National Security Council
NSDC	National Security and Defence Council
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMON	Special Purpose Police Unit (*Отряд Милиции Особого Назначения*)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAP	Police Assistance Programme
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgetary System
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
SDBD	State Department of the State Border Defence

SSOP	Sustainment and Stability Operations Program
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSSG	Special Service State Guard
STAP	Short Term Assistance Programme
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar
WWII	World War II

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction: security sector change and political transition in Georgia

The thesis is an investigative research to provide a better understanding of the political transition in Georgia between 1985 and 2008. During the transition, security sector actors played a pivotal role in Georgian politics and power struggle in society. The thesis thus discusses security sector change in Georgia in the wider political transition. Placing its analytical centrality on the political nature of security sector change, the thesis focuses on security sector actors with policing function, in particular paramilitaries, which have had closely interacted with the overall political transition in Georgia.

Since the Republic of Georgia emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991, it has experienced a socio-political transition from a Soviet republic to an independent and democratic state. It also underwent a number of violent conflicts in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as proper Georgia in the aftermath of the independence. In the transition process, a wide variety of social, economic and political changes took place. Georgia underwent a radical shift from a centralised and controlled economy to market economy. It also needed to depart from the Soviet legacy and develop its own sovereign state institutions.

The transition from a Soviet to a newly independent state meant a need for a drastic change in the security sector, too. In the Soviet Union countries including Georgia, the security sector actors, especially with policing function, played a crucial role in ensuring the security and stability for the regime. In the democratisation process in post-independent Georgia required the security sector to undertake a significant normative transition from an authoritarian to a democratic apparatus. In other words, security sector change in the democratisation reform meant a deprivation of the monopoly over the use of violence for those in power.

Since the mid-1990s, democratic reform efforts such as so-called security sector reform (SSR) began to take place in Georgia under the president Eduard Shevardnadze and then continued under his predecessor, Mikheil Saakashvili. The Western alliance supported the democratisation process by providing external assistance, too. However, the nature of the security sector actors did not alter significantly since the Soviet times. Security sector change in Georgia did not accompany significant normative transformation. Rather, most of them restored the authoritarian nature.

This thesis posits that security sector change in transitional Georgia closely interlinked with multiple of domestic socioeconomic and political factors and dynamics among them rather than norm-based democratic reform and SSR discourses and interventions. If it was not the norm-based reform efforts, then, what determined the course of security sector change in Georgia, and how? To address the question, this thesis investigates the recent history of security sector change in Georgia between 1985 and 2008. The study demonstrates an explicit example of how the social change including institutional change in the security sector that took place in a state-building and peacebuilding context.

1.2 Research questions

This thesis provides a case study of security sector change process in Georgia, and their relationships with SSR as a more normative agenda associated with external donor support and cooperation. The thesis examines a transitional society emerging from an authoritarian regime and violent conflicts, Georgia.

1.2.1 Main research questions

The thesis investigates the first primary research question: ‘What factors determined and/or influenced the course of security sector change in Georgia during the period of political transition between 1985 and 2008?’ The thesis focuses on the political nature of security sector change, and how varying political and socioeconomic factors interact with security sector change in transitional Georgia. The security sector includes a wide range of actors such as military,

police, border control and so forth, as discussed in the subsequent section. As Georgia's example demonstrates, paramilitaries and other security sector actors with policing function are prominent actors in politicised security sector change as well as in an overall political transition, because they are particularly close to the power. The thesis therefore focuses on paramilitaries and examines the following questions: 'What factors have determined or influenced changes in paramilitary groups and activities in Georgia between 1985 and 2008, and how do these changes relate to SSR programmes?'

The second primary question lies on the interplay between SSR and security sector change. In particular, the thesis analyses the following second primary research question: 'What have been the interrelations between normatively-informed SSR agendas and programmes and security sector change in Georgia between 1985 and 2008?' In the analysis, a distinction needs to be made between the two terms: SSR and security sector change. SSR is a normative policy discourse based on liberal democracy norms. Security sector change does not imply any normative issues but just refer to actual changes made in security sector actors. The thesis examines security sector change in the democratisation context in Georgia. The thesis pays due attention to domestic actors that pursued norm-based SSR agenda based on liberal democratic values. The thesis also examines external actors providing assistance leading to certain security sector change not necessarily in line with the normative SSR discourse. By doing so, the thesis explores the interplay between the security sector change process and SSR agendas.

The following sub-questions on more precise issues are addressed in the thesis:

- What roles did key security sector actors played during the key historical phases in Georgia?
- What were the actual driving factors for security sector change and its agenda-setting process?
- How the security sector actors interacted with the political dynamics in the key transitional periods in Georgia?
- What was the interplay between international donors' SSR assistance and actual change in the security sector like?

- Which security priorities were reflected in the security sector change process?

1.2.2 Understanding terms

How to understand terms such as security sector, SSR and paramilitary itself is a contesting issue and directly related to the central discussion of the thesis. Some of the subsequent chapters devote to discuss different views on those terms contributing to varying concepts of SSR and paramilitaries. Before we move on to the discussion, however, it is useful to provide working definitions of security sector, SSR and paramilitaries in this research.

1.2.2.1 Security sector

Security sector actors include a wide range of actors. Although components of a security sector vary among the scholars and literature, they basically agree on including security institutions which are responsible for securing state's and citizen's security. This thesis adopts the OECD DAC's definition of the security sector which refers to a) official security sector apparatus including military, police, border and custom services, intelligence services, civilian management and oversight bodies, paramilitary, judiciary, and penal system; and b) non-official security sector apparatus including non-statutory security forces and non-statutory civil society groups (OECD/DAC, 2005). Some organisations and scholars prefer the term security system to security sector. More specifically, the security sector includes:

- Core security actors: armed forces (including international and regional forces), police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities, and reserve and local security units;
- Security management and oversight bodies: parliament/legislature and its relevant legislative committees, government/the executive, including ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs, national security advisory boards; customary and traditional authorities; financial

management bodies; and civil society actors, including the media, academia and non-governmental organisations;

- Justice and rule of law institutions: justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, the judiciary (courts and tribunals), implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and traditional justice systems, human rights commissions and ombudsmen;
- Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body-guard units, private security companies, private military companies and political party militia; and
- Non-statutory civil society groups: professional groups, the media, research organisations, advocacy organisations, religious organisations, non-governmental organisations and community groups.[1]

Some earlier SSR policy documents limit the scope of the word security sector only to state security actors.[2] However, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate, in conflict-affected transitional environments, non-state actors including of warlords and their irregular non-state armed forces demonstrates significant if not most influential players in societies. Recognising their socio-political dynamics and roles, this thesis not only includes non-state actors in a security sector and uses the wide definition of a security sector but also treats them as one of the main research subjects.

In transitional societies emerging from an authoritarian regime and/or armed conflict, security sector actors are often perpetrators of violence and coerce regime control. In transitional society like Georgia, the security sector is often highly politicised, and so is the process of changing it. Identifying driving factors

[1] Adopted from Kristin Valasek, *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit* (Bastick and Valasek, 2008, p. 2) and OECD/DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance* (OECD/DAC, 2005, pp. 20–21).
[2] For instance, OECD's DAC states that the security sector encompasses:

> "[…] a) state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police, the intelligence services and similar bodies); and b) the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g. Parliament and the Executive)."

DAC 2000, *Security-sector Reform and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Police Coherence* (preliminary paper), OECD, Paris, p.9, cited in *Security-sector Reform in Developing Countries: An Analysis of the International Debate and Potentials for Implementing Reform with Recommendations for Technical Cooperation* (GTZ, 2000).

and analysing dynamics of security sector change is the key to understanding political transition in transitional societies where security sector actors play significant role in power struggle.

1.2.2.2 Security sector reform (SSR)

Transforming security sector actors into democratic actors ensuring security is an acute yet most challenging issue. There have been a variety of topics/issues to discussing security sector change, such as democratic control of armed forces and institutional development of law enforcement institutions. Since the 2000's, the SSR discourse began to emerge and encapsulate the various topics related to security sector change. Liberal democratic values are embedded in the SSR discourse.

Based on definitions used in the existing SSR literature (Ball, 1998, 1988; Chalmers, 2000; DFID, 2000a; GTZ, 2000; Hendrickson, 1999; OECD/DAC, 2008, 2005, 2000), the thesis understands SSR as a norm-based policy discourse aiming to address ill governance in the above-mentioned security actors, and in case of some conflict-affected transitional societies, non-state security actors which are either dismantled or integrated into a formal state security sector.

The objects of SSR usually include strengthening civilian control of security forces; enhancing accountability and transparency in a security sector; and professionalising security forces and civilians in a security sector. Based on these objects, SSR assistance programmes are translated into various components of activities. These components usually include activities such as: strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector (reforming ministries of defence and internal affairs; enhancing the oversight capacity of legislators through training. Establishing independence ombudspersons' offices; initiating public sector reviews of military expenditures; and building the capacity of civil society organisations to oversee the security sector); professoinalisation of the security forces (programmes designed to train soldiers, police and other security sector personnel on democratic accountability, gender issues, human rights,

international humanitarian law and ethnic sensitivity; technical skills training; promoting community policing; upgrading of military or police equipment; and drawing up professional codes of conduct); demilitarisation and peace-building (programmes to reduce the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; and strengthening regional security measures); and strengthening the rule of law (establishing a strong, independent legal framework that provides critical civil-democratic oversight and a better functioning penal system, capacity building for the judiciary; and establishing an independent judiciary) (Bastick and Valasek, 2008, p. 2).

1.2.2.3 Paramilitary

The definition of paramilitary is rather blurred and ambiguous. Recognising the elusive boundary of paramilitaries, *The Penguin Dictionary of Politics* states that:

> "Paramilitary forces are those uniformed, armed and disciplined bodies that exist in most countries to carry out internal security and policing functions which are beyond the capacity of ordinary police forces. Frequently the boundaries between what would be considered an ordinary police force and a paramilitary force are very blurred" (Robertson, 1993, p. 363).

The word paramilitary is often used to refer to non-state, anti-government armed forces rather than state forces, too. Anti-governmental armed groups such as FARC and the IRA are the two most examples referred as paramilitary examples.

Paramilitary is not clearly defined and requires a scrutiny. The blurred definition stems from the phenomena that paramilitary often takes a variety of different types of equipment and composition, institutional affiliation, as well as function and mandate. In order to better understand paramilitary, their interplay with the SSR process and for a refined SSR concept, the varying types and uses of paramilitary need to be unpacked and analysed properly. The subsequent chapters provide more detailed discussions on the issue. In the meanwhile, the

thesis adopts a working definition of paramilitary which refers to non-military armed forces which are equipped with military weapons.

1.2.3 Research focus on Georgia and paramilitary

The case study sets its focus on Georgia. The thesis provides a historical analysis on Georgia's domestic political dynamics and how it affects the security sector change process. Political scientists, including those of security studies, have examined Georgia extensively after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. However, most of these studies merely looked at Georgia along with other former-Soviet Union republics and examined their democratisation processes in comparison with Ukraine and the Baltic States or the ethnic conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia but have not sufficiently focused on the Georgian domestic political dynamics. This led to some weaknesses and gaps in the understanding of political and social developments within Georgia, particularly less studied ethnic minority issues in the territory of so-called proper Georgia.

Against the background, the thesis is based in part on extensive field research as well as and a historical analysis on Georgia as the main case study, bringing deeper understanding of complex security issues in different ethnic groups in communities, as well as the interplay between Georgian politics and the security sector change process. The thesis analyses and examines what domestic and external socio-political factors influenced the agenda-setting processes in Georgia in three key transitional periods: a) between the late 1980 and early 1991: the transition from Soviet to independent Georgia; b) between 1992 and 2003: the stabilization process under President Eduard Shevardnadze; and c) between 2004 and 2008: the "democratisation" reform under President Mikheil Saakashvili. The close look at those key transitional periods offers the readers a set of various socio-political transition samples: from a Soviet to an independent state; from a conflict-affected to post-conflict country; and from a new independent democracy to country with relatively more consolidated democracy.

This way, the thesis is to provide a detailed examination and a political analysis of the security sector change process in Georgia. In particular, the thesis

examines what domestic security, political, political economy, and societal factors influenced the agenda-setting of security sector change during the three transitional phases in the post-independent Georgian history in which Georgia experienced state-building, peacebuilding and social change from an authoritarian state to a democratic state. The thesis presents Georgia's case as an example of challenges, obstacles and resistance in the security sector change process. Although the nature of the security sector and insecurity are country-specific, these challenges are highly relevant to contexts in each society experiencing similar transition such as state-building, peacebuilding and social change. It is therefore feasible to say that many of them are commonly found in other transitional societies.

Another focus in this thesis is paramilitaries. The reason is twofold. First, in post-conflict transitional societies, paramilitaries are politically influential. At the same time, politics influences paramilitaries and their reform process significantly. The intensive analysis on paramilitaries in Georgia provides an example to articulate roles of paramilitaries and their political economy dynamics within the security sector change process in transitional society. Through discussing the example of Georgia, the thesis provides insights to other countries experiencing security building in post-conflict settings, in order to open up a discussion on paramilitary reform.

Second, paramilitary is a less studied subject in the SSR literature. The existing SSR literature have extensively documented on reform efforts on the police and militaries. However, in transitional and post-conflict societies, it is often hard to find clear-cut demarcation between the police, military and other security sector actors in transitional and post-conflict societies. Actual roles and functions of these forces are quite different from what the institutional labels suggest. Furthermore, paramilitaries are often the most powerful security sector actors closely associated with influential political elites and individuals in conflict-affected societies. In such societies, paramilitary forces could be either state or non-state armed forces under prominent political figure and warlords. Such paramilitary forces are sometimes most capable and powerful security sector actors than the military and police. Yet, few SSR studies have been conducted to study actual roles, function and nature of paramilitaries in a post-conflict

transitional context. Similarly, the reform process of paramilitaries has been less documented than the ones for the military and police. Despite their socio-political influence in conflict-affected societies, the dynamics of the paramilitary reform have not been sufficiently addressed in the existing SSR literature.

While argument in the thesis mainly draws its empirical support from Georgia, the issues involved have a salience beyond that context for other instances of protracted post-reconstruction in general. The understanding of the paramilitary dynamics and their interplay with political developments is crucial to understand which factors support and resist SSR in transitional and post-conflict societies. The thesis therefore aims to contribute to knowledge on SSR not only by providing an detailed analysis of security sector change and SSR processes in Georgia between the late 1980s and 2008, but also by focusing on paramilitaries and examining how paramilitary dynamics interplay with socio-political developments in post-conflict transitional societies. This way, the thesis aims at contributing to filling in the gap in the SSR knowledge.

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Research strategy

This research sets its primal objective in investigating security sector change in the state-building and peacebuilding context and what factors brought the change. To investigate the query, the research takes a historical overview of the political transition and security sector change. The period between 1985 and 2008 is chosen to be the timeframe for the examination. In particular, the thesis focuses on the three key transitional periods: a) 1985 - 1991 during the transition from Soviet to independent Georgia; b) 1992 - 2003 under President Eduard Shevardnadze; and c) 2004 - 2008 under President Mikheil Saakashvili. These phases were chosen because Georgia experienced substantial socio-political transitions, i.e., independence movement, state-building and peacebuilding and attempted social change from an authoritarian state to a democratic state.

1.3.1.1 Differentiating SSR and security sector change

It should be noted that in this thesis the terms SSR and 'security sector change' are treated as two different concepts. SSR, a set of reform efforts, either conducted by a country itself and/or the international donor communities, refers to the policy discourse informed by the liberal democratic norms. The word SSR in this thesis is understood as a concept that encompasses a wide range of reform policy agendas and activities based on liberal democratic norms as elaborated in the previous section.

On the other hand, the term 'security sector change' in this thesis refers to mere changes, not norm-based reform efforts, in the security sector. When the thesis employs the term 'security sector change', it looks at the overall security sector transformation and associated socioeconomic and political change process, not limited to the normative reform agenda, i.e., SSR. The investigation in this thesis places its central focus on analysing the overall process of security sector change, in which SSR efforts were included.

1.3.1.2 Single case study and process tracing

To achieve the goal, the thesis applies single case study and process tracing as overall research methods. Rather than applying the process tracing methods in multiple case studies, this research applies a single case study method. This is because the aim of this case study is the objective of this research is to scrutinise a historical process of security sector change; and identify and examine factors that influenced and/or determined the change process, and not to present an archetypal example. 'A goal of a case study is to expand and generalise theories and not to enumerate frequencies' (Yin, 1984), and this goal applies to the research in this thesis. The research thus carries out an extensive examination of Georgia's case rather than listing a wide array of examples from various countries.

The thesis applies process tracing methods to the single case study on Georgia. Process tracing is a qualitative analysis tool often applied to within-case analysis

based on qualitative data (Collier, p. 823). Alexander George and Timothy McKeown explain that the process-tracing method is an analytical tool to "investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial are translated into outcomes" (George and McKeown, 1985, p. 35). The 'process tracing' method is effective in the thesis' historical investigation of institutional changes in the security sector and enables to identify factors that brought these changes. The reason is twofold. First, in-depth studies on security sector change in Georgia over a chronological timeframe are less available in comparison with other countries with similar experiences. By providing intensive research on Georgia offers a case study upon which future research can be built upon. Second, the chrono historical scrutiny on Georgia provides ample data to conduct process tracing over the chronological change process in the security sector.

1.3.2 Research methods

In analysing causation in the trajectories of security sector change (dependent variables), the process tracing approach in this research employs a political economy analysis framework. The political economy analysis examines the following factors: a) structural features in what security sector change took place (independent variables); b) key institutions and individuals, their incentives and motivations for certain (or no) changes in the security sector and decision logics during the SSR agenda-setting process (independent variables); and c) dynamics between key institutions and individuals (intervening variables).

1.3.2.1 Data collection and analysis

The single case study approach in this thesis employs mixed research methods. In the research, different data and methods of data collection and analysis are triangulated. The thesis reviews primary and secondary documents, open and semi-structured interviews relevant stakeholders including Georgian parliamentarians, local and international researchers, officials from local and international organisations, as well as governmental agencies. At community level, focus group discussions were conducted with local community members.

The research employed and triangulated various methods of data collection. Data collection was carried out through a) primary and secondary data collection, b) semi- and un-structured interviews, and c) focus group discussions.

Primary and secondary data were collected from relevant organisations. Quantitative data such as crime rates were triangulated with qualitative data in this study. Secondary data sources were draw from both official and unofficial materials including documentation (such as project progress reports, former studies of the same areas under study, newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in the media) and archival records (such as organisational records such as organisational charts and budgets).

Semi-and un-structured interviews were conducted with Georgian officials from the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, State Security and Defence. Relevant personnel from local and international researchers, non-governmental organisations and international organisations were also interviewed. There are few written documents on paramilitaries as well as records on reform efforts and changes concerning the security sector institutions in the 1990s. Thus, those interviews were conducted precisely to fill in the gap in the literature and to reconstruct institutional memories among relevant personnel. Because of this reason, this research chose interviewees from political figures including parliamentarians and civil society leaders, who had direct involvement in the reform process, rather than governmental officials.

For a closer examination on how socio-political dynamics affected people's security at the community level, the research conducted focus group discussions with selected local community members in three different geographical locations. Sample data were collected from three communities of Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and Zugdidi, considering geographical and social variables. Those communities were extensively studied because, in addition to the national level SSR policy interventions, these communities experienced policy interventions such as border guard training, weapons collection programmes and community policing initiatives.

The other major criterion for the selection of the locations was the demographic composition of community members. Akhaltsikhe was chosen because of the Armenian community. Marneuli was chosen for its Azeri communities. Zugdidi was selected for its internally displaced persons (IDP) communities. The majority of the population in the region is Mingrelians. Therefore, Zugdidi also provided diverse perspectives among Georgians. The participatory methods allowed the research to obtain highly qualitative data including nuanced perceptions on security and security sector actors.

Individual interviews were conducted in English. Focus group interviews were carried out either in Georgian or Russian, facilitated by local facilitators. The reason is primarily my limited abilities of conducting interviews in either of the languages.

The choice of languages used in the individual and focus group interviews pose some research implications and limitations. The choice of the languages for the interviews is reflected in the number and variety of interview samples. Conducting interviews in English resulted in fewer interviews with officials at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security who preferred using in either Georgian or Russian rather than English at interviews. In comparison, most of the respondents from the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministries, NGOs and academic institutions responded to my interview requests positively as they tended to prefer using English to using Russian at interviews.

Table 1 Distribution of focus group interview participants

Location	Gender	Number of participants
Akhaltsikhe	Male	8
	Female	8
Marneuli	Male	8
	Female	8
Zugdidi	Male	10
	Female	9
Total		51

1.3.2.2 Issues of ethics and security

Given the sensitive research topic, an issue of security for the informants and the researcher was well considered. Privacy of the focus group discussion workshops was protected. Upon requests of some key informants, quotations from certain participants and interviewees appeared in anonymous form in any written outcomes of the research. Materials produced during the workshops were removed from the communities, in order to avoid unnecessary suspicion from local authorities.

1.4 Thesis structure

The thesis comprises with three parts. Part I provides an introduction and a literature review. It consists of chapter 1 and chapter 2. Part II consists of five core analytical chapters: chapters 3 to 7. This part of the thesis offers an in-depth, detailed analysis of the security sector change process in Georgia between 1985 and 2008, and examines what factors interacted and/or influenced the agenda and course of security sector change. Part III (chapter 8) examines how the domestic agenda-setting process for security sector change is driven by certain dynamics and factors in Georgia and other transitional societies by placing an analytical focus on paramilitaries.

In the first part of this thesis, chapter 1 aims to establish the base upon which the thesis is built. The objective of chapter 1 is to explain the research background and introduce research questions and methodology employed in this research.

Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 aims at providing a critical review of the existing literature related to the research questions. The chapter reviews the literature exploring issues related to the relation between security sector actors and political developments, by focusing on key debates and critiques in the civil-military relations, the security sector in transitional societies, as well as peacebuilding. By doing so, the chapter engages with the debates in the three literature areas for which the thesis contributes the knowledge to. chapter 2

concludes by justifying the overall research strategy used in this research and introduces a political economy analysis framework applied in the research.

The objective of the chapters in Part II (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) is to investigate the two primary research questions of this thesis. First, it aims to provide an analysis for the first primary research question: 'What factors determined and/or influenced the course of security sector change in Georgia during the period of political transition between 1985 and 2008?' To address the question, it examines the politics and process of agenda-setting of the reform of the security sector actors by applying a political economy analysis framework. By critically examining the relationships between domestic and international reform efforts and the actual changes in the security sector, Part II aims to answer the second primary research question on the interrelation between normatively-informed SSR agendas and security sector change in Georgia.

More specifically, chapters 3, 4 and 6 aim to provide an understanding of security sector change in the three transitional periods: a) 1985 - 1991: the transition from Soviet to independent Georgia (chapter 3); b) 1992 - 2003: the Shevardnadze regime (chapter 4) and c) 2003 - 2008: the Saakashvili regime (chapter 6). Chapters 3, 4 and 6 provide detailed systematic mapping and analysis of security sector change, including domestic reform efforts and international SSR assistance initiatives and identify factors that determined and/or influenced the course of security sector change. Chapters 3, 4 and 6 focuses on exploring what factors influence the course of security sector change in the respective time frameworks in Georgia. These chapters aim at scrutinising actual roles played by the security sector actors and how these actors interacted with the political dynamics during the transitional periods in the three transitional periods. Based on the political economy analysis of the interaction between the security sector actors and the political dynamics, the three chapters examine what factors drove the agenda-setting process of security sector change.

Chapters 5 and 7 aim to analyse interrelations between the domestic dynamics in security sector change and international SSR assistance efforts and interrogate which security priorities were reflected in the security sector change process. External assistance for the security sector began to arrive in key areas in the

Georgian security sector since the Shevardnadze period onwards. Both the chapters aim at examining how the external assistance was actually received and perceived on the ground by focusing on the Shevardnadze period: 1992 – 2003 (chapter 5) and the Saakashvili period: 2004 – 2008 (chapter 7).

Part III consists of chapter 8. Chapter 8 seeks to provide a better understanding on paramilitary in transitional societies. Based on the analysis in the preceding chapters in Part II and the further scrutiny on paramilitaries, chapter 8 analyses what factors contributed to shaping the course of the paramilitary change and how. While the chapter develops its argument by being based on the Georgia case study, it also refers to other countries' examples. For doing so, chapter 8 explores the Georgia example further to demonstrate paramilitaries' roles and its interplay with political dynamics.

The thesis ends with chapter 9 which discusses findings and conclusions in relation to the overall research questions. It presents contributions of the thesis to the respective bodies of knowledge and closes with suggested directions for future research.

Chapter 2 The relation between security sector actors and political developments

2.1 Introduction

The chapter provides a review of approaches to understanding the relation between security sector actors and political developments. Studies on understanding the relation between security sector change and political developments is nothing new in the field of social science. The main research interest of the thesis, i.e., “What factors determine and/or influence security sector change during a political transition?” is built on the key debates and critiques emerged in the relevant literature. By doing so, this chapter places this investigation on the research question in the wider scholarly context. This chapter begins by focusing on existing research on the relation between security sector actors in societies, in particular, societies emerging from violent conflict and/or authoritarian regime. This chapter then proceeds to introduce the political economy analysis framework applied in the case study on Georgia in the subsequent analytical chapters.

2.2 Review of literature exploring the relation between security sector actors and political developments

This section examines the literature related to the overall research question. In particular, the section examines the two bodies of literature i.e. one concerning security sector actors in political developments and another on peacebuilding and identifies gaps in key arguments and analytical approaches.

2.2.1 Security sector actors and political developments

2.2.1.1 Civil-military relations in liberal democracies

The study on the relation between security sector actors and political developments could be traced back as early as the 1950’s. One of the pivotal and

influential studies is Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations* (Huntington, 1957). Placing the security sector actors, especially the military, as the main actor in political developments, Huntington argues that that civilian control can be achieved through "the maximizing of military professionalism" (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). Huntington claimed: "The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involves in institutional, class, and constitutional politics" (Huntington, 1957, p. 83).

Following Huntington's work, the study on the civil-military relationship with special attention the military's role in political developments developed during the 1960's. Some critiques against Huntington's argument that the recognition of autonomous military professionalism leads to the achievement of objective civilian control (Finer, 1962; Janowitz, 1964, 1960). For instance, while Huntington argued for the strict separation between the military and politics, other scholars such as Janowitz employed less rigorous lenses to view the military. Janowitz pointed out the possibility that the military may change its existence, for instance; "the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory" (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418).

When discussing issues raised in civil-military relations, many of the civil-military relations studies place its focus on the military in liberal democracies (Dunlap, 1992; Foster, 1997; Holsti, 2001; Kohn, 2002, 1994; Luttwak, 1994; Weigley, 1993). These studies discussed the relation between the military and politics with the assumption that the military as a relatively centralised and homogeneous national institution (Clapham, 1996; Huntington, 1957; Im, 1987; Kolkowicz and Korbonski, 1982; Maniruzzaman, 1987).

2.2.1.2 The security sector and democratic transition in authoritarian societies

Since the 1980s, the security sector actors have increasingly regarded as active players in state formation in transitional societies, especially in authoritarian

societies. Studies on the security sector in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy emerged since 1980 as the Cold War structure began to dissolve (Linz and Stepan, 1996; O'Donnel et al., 1986; Stepan, 1988). In contrast with the studies on the civil-military relations in liberal democratic countries, these studies on the security sector in authoritarian countries examined the resilience of authoritarian regime (Bellin, 2004; Posusney and Angrist, 2005; Schlumberger, 2007). Unlike the studies on civil-military relations, armed forces are least studied factor when it comes to democratisation process in post-totalitarianism (Stepan, 1988, p. 22).

The close examination of the authoritarian regime maintenance in the studies expanded their analytical scope and included the police and paramilitaries, given their roles in the regime maintenance (Kolkowicz and Korbonski, 1982; Quinlivan, 1999). Furthermore, study on the security sector in authoritarian societies focused on the role of these armed forces as an economic actor (Nassif, 2013) and their interest lied in the maintenance of the regime which secures their economic benefits (Cook, 2007).

These studies examined the regime maintenance functions of the wider range of security sector actors other than the military as well as their multi-faceted and more nuanced roles and critiqued the way the rigid assumption on the nature and role of the military assumed in the classic studies on civil-military relations such as those by Huntington.

Scholars such as Davis and Pereira argue for expanding a research scope to examine:

> "the wide variety of diverse social and political and even economic institutions in which military personnel or other armed forces play a part. These include intelligence agencies, militia, paramilitary forces, police and even veteran associations" (Davis and Pereira, 2003, p. 13).

Emphasising the importance of "unpacking" the military as an institution (Davis and Pereira, 2003, p. 14), Davis and Pereira argue to "reintroduce studies on

irregular or nonconventional armed forces to the literature on politics and state formation" (Davis and Pereira, 2003, p. 8).

2.2.1.3 Paramilitaries in conflict-affected societies

More recently, there are an increasing number of examples that the emergence of paramilitaries, either of state, quasi-state and non-state natures in the former communist countries and Middle East.

The first example is the recent trend in Central and Eastern European countries that have undergone the geopolitical uncertainties triggered by the *de facto* annexation of Crimea by Russia and the influx of refugees escaping from the chronic insecurities in Middle East. A large number of non-state paramilitary forces have fought both on the pro-Kiev and pro-Moscow sides in the violent conflict that broke out in eastern Ukraine in 2014. (Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016) Over the last two years, the Baltic States have increased their state-paramilitary units ("The rise of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern Europe," 2016). Poland also plans to recruit and train civilian volunteers in military skills ("Poland plans paramilitary force of 35,000 to counter Russia," 2016). The aim of this paramilitary recruitment and training is to counter warfare of the kind that was fought by non-state Ukrainian paramilitaries loyal to Russia ("Poland plans paramilitary force of 35,000 to counter Russia," 2016). In the Balkans, a numerous non-state paramilitary have been organised and consisted of "far-right elements" in amidst of the influx of refugees arriving from the neighbouring conflict-affected countries.[3] In Middle East countries, paramilitaries are the major actor in the recent conflict against the Islamic States as well as the one in Syria. In Iraq, civilians reportedly volunteer to form their own defence forces to counter Islamic States fighters ("The Christian militia taking on Islamic State in Iraq," 2015). Syria has a number of influential paramilitaries, including National Defence Force (NDF) with a reportedly number of more than 100,000 fighters ("No peace in sight in Syria," 2016).

[3] Those groups include the Slovenskí Branci (Slovak Recruits) and Vzdor Kysuce (Kysuce Defiance) in Slovakia; the Československenštívojáci v záloz (CVZ, Czechoslovak Reservist Soldiers) in the Czech Republic; the Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (Hungarian National Front) and Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom (Hungarian Self Defence Movement) in Hungary ("The rise of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern Europe," 2016).

The recent warfare fought by other irregular forces such as the case in Ukraine and other countries in the region has attracted scholarly attention to paramilitaries. (Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016) The publication of a special issue of *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*[4]) entirely dedicated to research on militias is one of the examples of the increasing interest among academia in the issue of paramilitaries. More recently, Aliyev provides a comprehensive overview of the definition of paramilitaries, (Aliyev, 2016, pp. 499–501) along with a reference to various paramilitary groups in the world. (Aliyev, 2016, pp. 502–503)

Research on paramilitaries needs to be further developed. For instance, the term paramilitary has still been used elusively. No common definition of paramilitary exists yet. Without providing conceptual clarity, "the term "paramilitary" has been used colloquially as a sort of "catch-all' rather than with any sort of precision or analytic conceptualization." (Mazzei, 2009, p. 4) The term 'paramilitary' has been often used interchangeably with militia, and/or refer to specific anti-government armed forces, namely, the IRA and Colombia's FARC. Built on the anti-governmental paramilitary forces in Colombia, Mazzei defines that:

> "Paramilitary groups are political, armed organizations that are by definition extramilitary, extra-State, noninstitutional entities, but which mobilize and operate within the assistance of important allies, including factions within the State." (Mazzei, 2009, p. 4)

Yet, as Mazzei herself admits, this definition of does not suffice. Mazzei describes the lack of any definitive meaning "an obvious obstacle to both theory building and policy making." (Mazzei, 2009, p. 4) While the recognition of the need for defining paramilitary has increased, the definition of the term has remained centered on its political and institutional status in relation to a State.

Paramilitaries have still received relatively less attention as a main analytical unit by the academic research.[5] There has been literature on paramilitaries in

[4] *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 59, Issue 5, published in August 2015.
[5] One of the few exceptions was Hills whose research looked at paramilitary forces in Africa in the context of post-colonial policing (Hills, 2000).

Colombia and Northern Ireland that extensively studies the paramilitaries' involvement in the violent conflicts in those two countries. Paramilitary forces in Latin America were examined by Latin Americanist scholars. Mazzei's study on paramilitaries focuses on the emergence of paramilitaries. Its geographical focus is on Latin America.

In order to reach better understanding of paramilitaries, the breadth and variety of paramilitary research is yet to be expanded. On one hand, the geographical scope of paramilitary research is on a gradual rise mainly due to the recent publications on the Ukrainian paramilitary forces, although the number of literatures still remain small.[6] On the other hand, the analytical framework of the current paramilitary research has been largely centred on and limited to paramilitaries' relations with a state. The recent discussions on paramilitaries pay its main focus on their affiliation with state. A group of scholars examine paramilitaries from the perspectives of whether they are associated with states or not (Aliyev, 2016; Mazzei, 2009). For instance, on the difference between paramilitary and other armed forces like militias and elite military factions, Mazzei points out the leverage that paramilitary groups gain from their relation with a state. According to Mazzei, "It is the relationship between the PMG and significant factions within the State itself that both distinguishes PMGs from other violent actors and highlights one of the analytical weak spots in the literature on political violence" (Mazzei, 2009, p. 5).

This relation-focused analysis has been further developed by Aliyev (Aliyev, 2016). Aliyev shows two different types of paramilitaries: a) `state-parallel` militias and b) `state-manipulated` militias. Pointing out that studies on the former type of paramilitaries, or militia, as he uses the two terms interchangeably, Aliyev offers another theoretical approach to think about paramilitaries by terming `state-parallel paramilitaries'. While this observation shows the varying types of paramilitaries, Aliyev's focus remains on the issue of paramilitaries' association with a state (Aliyev, 2016).

[6] For instance, Kuzio T (2000): The non-military security forces in Ukraine. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 13(4): 29-56 (Kuzio, 2000) and Malyarenko T and Galbreath D J (2016) "Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolitions. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16 (1), pp. 113-138 (Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016) and Carey et al (2013) lists paramilitary case study literature on death squads in Latin America, political party organisations in Indonesia (Carey et al., 2013).

While those paramilitary studies' analysis on the viewpoint of the paramilitary-state relationship is important, there are a few analytical gaps. First of all, it needs to be pointed out that the studies are mainly drawn from the paramilitaries active in Colombia and other Latin American countries, where the states have a long history of sponsoring armed groups that are not formally affiliated to state structures yet executing violence by targeting anti-government actors. Paramilitaries are often active in societies where no strong state apparatus exists. In such societies, this paramilitary-state relationship based analysis may not have sufficient explanatory leverage.

Another issue of the paramilitary-state relationship based analysis is its assumption that paramilitaries are non-governmental actors. By focusing on anti-government armed groups in Colombia and elsewhere, the research by Mazzei and Aliyev focuses on non-governmental paramilitaries, either the state-manipulated and state-parallel paramilitaries. This approach consequently excludes state paramilitary forces.

The paramilitary-state relationship based analysis reveals another assumption that the paramilitary scholars seem to hold, i.e., a government is a static entity. Carey et al introduces a database on pro-government militias. (Carey et al., 2013) The introduction of the dataset stemmed from a question "why governments with regular forces delegate to informal groups." However, governments in conflict-affected societies are often subjected to constant power struggle and governments. Their work on producing the dataset refers to a difficulty in identifying governments in some countries heavily affected by violent conflicts such as Lebanon and Somalia.

2.2.2 Liberal peacebuilding and SSR

Since the mid-1990s, a body of literature discussing the security sector institutions as subject for being reformed or developed has emerged in fields of peacebuilding, state-building and nation-building.

Since the end of the Cold War structure, the international community began to engage in efforts to reconstruct conflict-affected societies. UN- and/or US-led nation building interventions took place in various war-affected societies such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia, El Salvador, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, Mozambique, Somalia, and Timor Leste. The emergence of the concept of 'state-building' in peacebuilding context emerged as early as 1992 when the UN's An Agenda for Peace proposed "reforming or strengthening government institutions". (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992)

The concept of 'failed states' (and 'fragile states') was often employed in developing policy discourses for such international interventions and studies on such interventions. (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Helman and Ratner, 1992; OECD/DCD, 2005) In the state-building and peacebuilding literature, state security sector actors became to be treated as subjects to be reformed and developed. As discussed more in detail later in the section, the SSR concept is an example of policy discourses which regarded the security sector actors as institution rather than political entity which can influence and interact with local politics significantly.

The concept of SSR emerged in the late 1980s in the development assistance context. Initially, in response to the wave of democratisation in Africa, scholars such as Ball discussed the issue of re-organising the security sector from a public spending point of view, in a wider context of structural adjustment. (Ball, 1988) Since then, the body of SSR literature has grown significantly both in terms of its volume and variety. Since the end of the 1990s, the international assistance community in Europe started to apply the SSR discourse in post-conflict reconstruction and democratisation contexts by international assistance agencies and think tanks including Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), the UK Government and its Department for International Development (DFID), the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). (Ball, 1998; Chalmers, 2000; Chanaa, 2002; Hendrickson, 1999; Wulf, 2000a, 2000b)

During the early 2000's, SSR discourses were further developed by international development assistance agencies. The main drivers of the SSR discourse development included the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), the British Department for International Development (DFID) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische (GTZ). These development assistance bodies started to link the issues of development and security, and significantly contributed to the development of SSR discourses by regarding SSR as a possible tool for establishing good governance and security in assistance recipient countries SSR. (DFID, 2000a; GTZ, 2000; OECD/DAC, 2000) In 2004, OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), chaired by the UK at that time, stated endorsed the policy statement and paper on security system reform. (OECD/DAC, 2005) Subsequently, OECD/DAC developed standard policy guidance and operational handbook that provide a comprehensive and systemic policy overview of SSR as an international assistance policy option. (OECD/DAC, 2008) The European donor community spearheaded the SSR policy development process, followed by other international community members such as the United Nations and the United States.

The conceptualisation of SSR had been refined further and contextualized by being applied to varying settings not only in development but also in post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts. (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004) For instance, in post-authoritarian context, SSR policies have been adopted by the EU and NATO in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. (Ebnöther et al., 2007; Ebnöther and Gustenau, 2004) Those SSR efforts were often implemented along the other EU and/or NATO partnership frameworks under the overall eastern expansion of those regional organisations. SSR assistance was implemented in the spheres of defence, police and justice.

Since the late 2000's, SSR has increasingly become a policy discourse in peacebuilding context. In particular, the United Nations developed its own SSR policy framework by placing it as a key component within their peacebuilding policies and activities. (United Nations, 2014, 2013a, 2013b, 2012a, 2012b) Reflecting policy frameworks set out by the OECD/DAC, the UN's SSR efforts in the peacebuilding context focuses on justice and capacity development of justice institutions. While the European countries and donor communities spearheaded in the formation of SSR discourses, the United States has developed their SSR approach by building on the US government's foreign assistance experiences in security, peace and governance fields. In 2009, their policy framework and

guiding principles were jointly published by the Department of State, Department of Defence and US Agency for International Development (USAID). (USAID et al., 2009)

While the diverse assistance providers and policy makers have involved in the SSR policy discourse development, the SSR discourses within the assistance community can be divided into three approaches.

2.2.2.1 Military-focused SSR approach

The military-focused SSR thinking takes a static, institutional approach to the reform of security sector agencies, particularly the defence system. Their emphasis in reference to this type of SSR is on civil-military relations and development of military capacity of a country in concern. The establishment of democratic control of armed forces, in particular, military forces, is the aim of military-focused SSR discourse. In short, the building of military institutions is the central agenda of this category of SSR discourse.

Since the end of the Cold War structure, SSR has been increasingly implemented in the former Communist bloc, particularly in the eastern European states. Such SSR often takes a form of modernisation of the defence system.[7] By enhancing the civil-military relations in the NATO standard, the chain of command and operation will be smoothened once Partner country joins in co-operation. As prioritising and focusing on 'professionalisation' of armed forces,[8] merely military, in a country of concern, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched in January 1994, with a purpose to integrate Central and Eastern European countries into NATO, aiming at increasing transparency in national defence

[7] Since the late 1980s, NATO has engaged in military reform in the eastern European countries. The end of the Cold War brought more opportunities for the Western allies to deal with Central Eastern European countries. NATO focuses on military issues, under the auspices of the PfP (NATO, 1994). The PfP has developed with a strategic aim to support democratisation of the Central Eastern European countries, supporting for "reforms to establish democratic systems of government based on the rules of law and the respect for human rights" (NATO, 1991). NATO assists the former socialist counties establish democratic civil-military relationship and enhancing the military capacities of the partner countries in those countries.

[8] The professionalism, however, often does not include comprehensive education and training on international humanitarian law, which are significant to differentiate irregular bandit-type of armed forces and legitimate military forces.

planning and military budgeting; ensuring democratic control of national armed forces; and developing, over the longer term, Partner country forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO members (NATO, 1994).

Outside Europe, bilateral donors are the main military assistance providers through technical assistance. They are often narrowly focused on transfer military equipment and skills. Such military assistance often targets less developed countries in Asia and Africa. For instance, the USA provides military assistance to foreign countries through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programmes in strategically crucial countries including Georgia and the Philippines. The UK's British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) has provided support to several Southern Africa countries such as Namibia and Zimbabwe in the transformation of various armed forces into a united national force. (Bennett, 1990) In Namibia, BMATT personnel developed training curricula for military officers and trained the trainers. The UK also helped to set up the Zimbabwe Staff College when the unified Zimbabwean force was created. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, BMATT personnel assisted in integration of official armed forces and guerrilla and other unofficial forces into a single entity. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, BMATT personnel assisted in integration of official armed forces and guerrilla and other unofficial forces into a single entity.

Apart from technical assistance, donors also provide assistance addressing institutional reform of the militaries in the transitional state. The main focus in the area is on civil-military relations, in which both civilian and military institutions engage in assistance (USAID, 1998). The British Ministry of Defence (MoD), for example, has provided technical assistance for education of democratic control of the armed forces in the Eastern European countries (DFID, 2000a, p. 67). Through its Outreach Programme, the British MoD has provided technical assistance for studies of democratic control of the armed forces, defence management practices, and planning and budgetary processes (DFID, 2000a). The UK also provides similar technical assistance to African countries through BMATTs and the secondment of military and civilian personnel from MoD to ministries of defence in Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The US Department of Defense finances the Africa Center for Strategic Studies which

is aimed to promote transparency, accountability of resource allocation of the defence sector and civil oversight of the armed forces (DFID, 2000a).

The main aim of this military-oriented SSR assistance is thus to enhance professionalism and capacity of military personnel. Technical assistance strictly focuses on the defence system and national security concerns, not community-based insecurity and individuals. Compared with previous military assistance as seen in the Cold War period, this military-oriented SSR assistance has not changed its focus and contents. The security concerns in this military-oriented SSR thinking is military threats to state, rather than non-military threats to states and individuals. In fact, there is a strong sense of rejection of people-oriented security thinking among some defence officials. For example, a British military officer said he was against integrated SSR discourses involving police and other non-military security agencies and claimed that SSR should concern only military organs.[9] A security sector is defined narrowly and the justice and penal systems are often looked over in the military-focused SSR discourse.

2.2.2.2 Development- and governance-focused SSR approach

The second group of the SSR thinking takes a development and governance approach. This category of SSR discourse evolved from the fields of development and governance assistance. Compared with the military-oriented SSR thinking, scholars of the development SSR camp such as Ball and Hendrickson regard SSR not as mere military matters, but more of a governance agenda (Ball, 1998; Hendrickson, 1999). Ball regards SSR as a critical component of sustainable economic and social development, good governance, conflict management between and within states, and arms limitation (Ball, 1998). Focusing on the economic, social and governance aspects of SSR, the main target of this school of SSR is developing countries.

Having its conceptual genesis in the development studies, this school of SSR encompasses human security perspectives in its principles. For the interests of particular donor agencies, there are several prominent literatures concerning the

[9] Private communication, January 2002, Brussels.

development/governance SSR thinking. A few policy recommendation papers have been published recent years as to more extent development assistance agencies commit human security-related issues in developing countries and the demand of conceptualisation and guidance of practical implementation are increasing.

Hendrickson deepens the argument on empirical framework of SSR programme on security- and military-related issues, expanding the scope of SSR from state security to human security. Hendrickson sets the goal of SSR as not simply the establishment of civilian control over the military. Hendrickson claims that SSR will ultimately entail changes in bureaucratic cultures that are less dependent on the acquisition of new skills those on changes in attitude and patterns of interaction between civilian and military actors (Hendrickson, 1999). Thus, according to Hendrickson, it requires development agencies to simulate local initiative and to build consensus among relevant actors on the rationale for change. The governance approach that is narrowly and short-term focused on only strengthening the rule of law and civilians in managing and monitoring security sector is, therefore, regarded as counter-productive.

Ball claims that SSR involves fundamental issues of human security, including respect for human rights and international law. Ball has its significance in bridging between the commitment of development agency and SSR as the first and most comprehensive security sector-related survey (Ball, 1998). It also covers the experience of security sector-related issues in various countries, and the recent trends within the international community and among donor agencies both of development and of humanitarian. Linking security and poverty agendas, Ball claims that poverty reduction cannot succeed without SSR. Putting an emphasis on implementing good governance, Ball includes a broad range of organizations in a security sector, including judicial, legal and penal systems, and claims that there is a need of the attention to civilian institutions related to SSR, not only to armed forces (Ball, 1998).

In this wide range of SSR agenda, objectives of development- and governance-focused SSR are more than the modernisation of defence system, but more of governance agendas. Those objectives include the establishment of good

governance in security sector with transparency and civil control. The focus is put on more management and administration matters such as budgetary accountability of those institutions, the enhancement of professionalism and transparency of security sector agencies. Reflecting the variety in the areas of SSR assistance, SSR actors also include a wide range of institutions. For instance, the UK's SSR assistance shows one of the most comprehensive approaches to SSR in transitional societies. The UK's inclusive SSR policies include a wide range of actors such as the MoD, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Home Office. The labour distribution is the following: the FCO sets the political framework, the MoD can provide direct help to the military, and the Home Office is to help with police reform. Sierra Leone serves as a pilot case of the joined-up SSR programme.

This development- and governance-oriented SSR approach has enabled development agencies to participate in security sector-related issues including political, social and economic matters, rather than solely focusing on security- and military-related issues. Consequently, the development/governance SSR discourse has rapidly developed in the recent years by development actors such as OECD/DAC, UNDP and DFID, reflecting the human security concept in the process. For instance, governance and poverty issues in Sierra Leone justify the DFID's SSR intervention, which were formerly military-led agendas.

At a policy level, awareness of the implications of SSR policies to post-conflict societies has been growing among some donors. OECD/DAC, for instance, acknowledges the link between efforts to "support participation, democratisation and peacebuilding, through strengthened institutions of governance" in post-conflict societies (OECD/DAC, 1997, p. 37). In its new approach to SSR, OECD/DAC has increasingly integrated a human security concept into working principles of SSR policies. Adopting the human security concept, the OECD/DAC emphasises the nexus between security and development issues. Unlike other SSR policy guidelines, OECD/DAC clearly regards SSR as a key component of the human security agenda (OECD/DAC, 2005). The narrow scope of human security, i.e. the 'Freedom from Fear' approach, is adopted in these policies with focus on direct physical insecurities. Within its policy report, *Security System Reform and Governance*, OECD donors provide several working principles for

this human security oriented SSR (OECD/DAC, 2005). Reflecting human security in policy principles, the OECD/DAC report *Security System Reform and Governance* states that SSR should be:

- people-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear;
- seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations through more integrated development and security policies and through greater civilian involvement and oversights;
- founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based upon a broad assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state;
- developed adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform such as transparency and accountability; and
- implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively (OECD/DAC, 2005, p. 12).

The OECD/DAC principles have been increasingly adopted by policy makers and practitioners in the international community both multilateral and bilateral donors.

Whilst focusing on the human security approach, SSR policies include a wide range of works interlinking social, economic, and military agendas. Those works include conversion of military resources to civilian use, gender-analysis of SSR policies, DDR, and the issues of child soldiers and war economies (OECD/DAC, 2005, pp. 42–44). There is also an increasing claim in this governance SSR camp that more attention and sustainable efforts should be paid to reform judicial and penal system reforms such as the promotion of the rule of law, which requires long-term commitment and effort (Popkin, 2000). Development aid agencies such as the World Bank and UNDP have increasingly involved in the judicial system reform. The World Bank implements programmes in the area of administration of justice, primarily as regards legal reform. UNDP operates police reform

programmes in various post-crisis societies.[10] UNDP/BCPR provides the police in conflict-prone countries with technical assistance to develop “an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights respecting public service” (UNDP, 2002, p. 5).

2.2.2.3 Conflict management based SSR approach

The third group of SSR thinking regards SSR as a set of policy instruments that can contribute to conflict management. This was against the background that a number of conflict-affected countries such as Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had undergone the building of new national army and the police under the policy slogan of SSR. Compared with the development/governance SSR discourse, what can be labelled as a conflict management SSR thinking by Chalmers offers a set of concrete SSR policies related to physical security of individuals unlike the military-oriented SSR. Chalmers has linked peacebuilding and SSR discourses, bringing physical security issues in the SSR discussions.

Chalmers employs a wider concept of SSR which includes socio-economic, governance and security dimensions. But, in comparison with the development and governance oriented SSR scholars such as Ball and Hendrickson (Ball, 1998; Hendrickson, 1999), Chalmers puts more focus on physical security aspects within a framework of SSR, such as DDR and community-based weapons collection programmes. (Chalmers, 2000) Chalmers regards security-related issues such as small arms control programmes as part of a holistic SSR approach, with more focus on individuals rather than institutions and institution-building as in the cases of the military- and development-oriented SSR discourses. (Chalmers, 2000)

While Chalmers’ focus is on direct physical insecurity, his scope of SSR and security sector actors are wider than the two approaches described earlier. By regarding security widely, Chalmers’ argument extends the range of activities of external actors much wider than the conventional militaristic, institution-centred

[10] The countries include: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan

approach. Chalmers defines security sector more widely than the military-oriented SSR thoughts. They include all those organizations which have authority to use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight. It includes a) military and paramilitary forces; b) intelligence services; c) police forces, border guards and custom services; d) judicial and penal systems; e) civil structures that are responsible for the management and oversight of above (Chalmers, 2000).

This view also provides concrete and practical implications for policies in the security dimension of SSR. Chalmers places SSR in a conflict management context, rather than reform merely confined to security sector institutions. Chalmers claims that SSR is to be a mechanism of conflict management, putting an emphasis on conflict related issues such as small arms proliferation, regional security regime building with confidence building through SSR, regarding those measures as pre-emptive actions addressing roots of conflict with less focus on institutions. Chalmers refers to norm-setting initiatives rather than institution-building activities as plausible SSR efforts. For example, Chalmers discusses the recent activities of the EU in those fields, and points out some initiatives by the EU as significant steps including: the adoption of the 1997 EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms; the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; the EU Joint Action on Small Arms agreed in December 1998; the Development Council's resolution on combating the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons which was adopted in May 1999. The implementation of these statements has been implemented by the agreement at the October 1998 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) small arms moratorium with support of the EU member states. According to Chalmers, this initiative is part of a series of capacity-building programmes to support ECOWAS countries by implementing their moratorium and enhancing border controls and SSR as an integral part of their peacebuilding programmes. (Chalmers, 2000)

2.2.2.4 SSR as peacebuilding and statebuilding programme

As the international community's efforts in SSR implementation have amounted, SSR the numerous SSR studies have examined these practices. These studies have placed the SSR debate in the peacebuilding context, as the increasing number of SSR programmes were implemented in conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and so forth (Godwin and Haenlein, 2013; Justaert, 2012; Murray, 2011; Sedra, 2006). The trend was particularly enounced since the United Nations recognised SSR as a key pillar of peace support activities in 2008. The body of the SSR literature produced since 2010's has analysed the SSR practices from programming perspective. Evaluating and monitoring 'impacts' of SSR projects and programmes, budgetary efficiency and effective coordination among relevant assistance providers and donors was the central to their discussion.

The programming-focused research often led to the SSR research to overlook nuanced political and social implications and interactions with and among the actors on the receiving end of the SSR assistance. One of the recent critics, Paul Jackson, for instance, argues that academic studies of SSR have not been linked to the broader debate on liberal peacebuilding as "they have been driven by policy perspectives". (Jackson, 2018, p. 2) Rather, the policy-driven studies have led to what Peake, Scheye, and Hills (Peake et al., 2013, p. 32) refer to a 'benign analytical neglect'" in the SSR studies (Jackson, 2018, p. 2).

Built on the critique, there is a growing trend in the recent SSR studies to distance from the programming- and policy-focused approach. The critical studies by scholars such as Fairlie Chappuis, Timothy Donais and Jackson have been more informed by liberal peacebuilding critiques. These studies stress the resistance from the local actors and their actual roles and dynamics (Donais, 2018; Jackson, 2018; Jackson and Bakrania, 2018) More scholarly attention has been paid on local agencies and domestic politics that provide the context to the SSR interventions. (Sahin, 2017; Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014)

2.2.3 Critiquing norm-informed liberal peacebuilding efforts: perspectives from local ownership, actors and dynamics

In the wider discussion on peacebuilding, a number of scholars have critiqued post-conflict peacebuilding endeavours led by the international community. Oliver Richmond, for instance, termed peacebuilding efforts that accompanies with liberal democratic values 'liberal peacebuilding'. Richmond argues that liberal peacebuilding efforts are accompanied with a set of activities based on liberal democratic values and include "promotion of free markets, democratization and elections promotion, and other reforms, including promotion of the rule of law, access to justice, and human rights" (Richmond, 2010, p. 44). Casting doubt on effectiveness of such liberal peacebuilding based on liberal democratic norms, Roland Paris claimed for 'institutionalisation before liberalisation' by arguing that building institutions need to take before liberalisation (Paris, 2004; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015).

David Chandler argues even further by claiming that "Building a liberal democratic state itself prevents peace from being realised" (Chandler, 2017). Chandler criticises the development aid agencies' technical approach to nation-building and argued that the technical approach overlooked political development process and dynamics in societies emerging from war (Chandler, 2009, p. 85). The stream of the critiques on liberal peacebuilding efforts highlighted the importance of peacebuilding efforts to be based on indigenous actors and had a 'local turn' towards indigenous institutions and their roles in peacebuilding process (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015).

Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty argue for 'hybrid peace' instead of liberal peace. Acknowledging the local actors' structures and network, as well as their abilities to resist liberal peacebuilding efforts, and they argue that efforts to build peace need to be drawn on traditional and indigenous institutions and take a 'bottom-up' approach rather than intervening with liberal democratic values in a 'top-down' approach (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009).

Built on the critiques on liberal peacebuilding debates, the emphasis on the issue of local ownership, local actors and their dynamics have become a research focus in the recent literature critiquing security sector institution development including SSR as briefly mentioned in the previous section.

2.2.3.1 Local ownership

Some critical reviews of SSR practice on the ground have discussed the issue of local ownership (Benedix and Stanley, 2008; Donais, 2008; Gordon, 2014; Nethan, 2007; Panarelli, 2010). Those studies examine SSR from the international assistance perspectives and consider how to operationalise SSR practice in order to ensure local counterparts' ownership, and their subsequent commitment to reform efforts. While they have advanced the SSR studies by extending its scope to include local perspectives, a few analytical gaps still remain to be explored.

The international community has increasingly provided SSR related assistance in post-conflict peacebuilding context. For example, the European Unions have supported various SSR initiatives in fragile and/or post-authoritarian societies in Africa and Eastern Europe. Since the 2010's, the United Nations has engaged in SSR programmes and initiatives in some conflict-affected countries through its peacekeeping missions, namely in sub-Sahara Africa. As SSR policies became implemented on the ground, the literature critiquing the SSR concept, discourses and operations have grew (Born and Schnabel, 2009; Peake et al., 2007; Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005; Schnabel and Farr, 2011; Sedra, 2010). As those studies point out, internationally-supported SSR efforts have often met with difficulties on the ground. In particular, difficulties in garnering fostering local ownership are among the challenges observed by practitioners (Born and Schnabel, 2009; Donais, 2008).

2.2.3.2 Local actors

The argument for the importance of scrutinising local actors' actual roles in the domestic political process has been made in recent literature on SSR as well as the security sector and democratic transition in former authoritarian societies. For instance, some critical SSR studies points out that an analytical gap lies in the understanding of what consists of 'local". As Donais and Manniz point out, it is not clear how the critical SSR studies conceptualise 'local' (Donais, 2008; Mannitz, 2014). A wide range of domestic actors could include various actors

ranging from political elites, state technocrats to the wider population and marginalised social groups. Currently, the critical SSR studies have not developed the clear understanding of what consists of 'local' and domestic actors.

The existing SSR discourses tend to focus on security sector actors in accordance with the Western countries' ministerial and institutional demarcation. The main spheres of the security sector are the military, the police and the judiciary, along with corresponding civilian oversight mechanisms. A blueprint of SSR programme typically has four pillars of the reform. Those pillars usually include 1) military reform, 2) police reform, 3) judicial system reform and 4) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of regular armed group soldiers (DDR). The armed forces in post-conflict societies are linearly divided between military and police, although such a demarcation does not reflect actual situation on the ground. Paramilitaries, which often represent the major categories of armed forces in those societies, do not fall into any of the reform categories and left excluded from SSR planning and implementation. This clear demarcation between the security sector actors does not necessarily exist in other countries, especially those emerging from violent conflict and/or authoritarian regime. In his research on post-authoritarian countries, Pereira argues that the neat division between the military and the police that characterised in northwest European countries is by no means representative in other parts of the world (Davis and Pereira, 2003, p. 388).

Instead of following the existing templates of the security sector actors, scholars such as Hills have focused on actual functioning of the security sector actors. In her studies on police reform in transitional societies in Africa, for instance, Hills examines the interface between the police and the military, and also the relations among domestic factors, i.e., political background, internal insecurity, public order and security sector institutions (Hills, 2000). The strong point of her argument is that it is relatively free from convention approach to examine security sector actors such as the police nominally, but rather focusing on actual functioning. For starting the research, Hills clarifies that it is not the police as organisations but the policing functioning to focus on. Her function-focused approach is useful because, as the definitions of policing in most developing countries are less clearly defined than in Western countries (Hills, 2000, p. 6), and also depending

on the political environment of the country in concern. Focusing on the functioning, this function-based approach makes a distinct difference from other researchers in the SSR studies, who often do not question the natures of the security sector actors and particular characteristics of the indigenous police institutions in each country. Furthermore, by focusing on actual functions by the security sector actors, Hills reviews the relations between armed forces and political environments in the case studies' countries, and finds that regimes' perception on internal security and public order are most significant elements to influence the relations. (Hills, 2000) A function-focused approach is thus a significant step forwards in the SSR studies to deepen its understanding of actual nature and dynamics of local actors.

The function-based approach points out another gap in the current critical SSR studies that lines in the analytical unit: paramilitaries. Not only in conflict-affected countries and authoritarian societies but also in most of contexts, paramilitaries play significant roles in societies. Paramilitaries are often personalised and used to pursuit individual interests than the military and police forces. It is particularly so in post-conflict societies, in which paramilitary is the major political tool to fill in a power vacuum. In this sense, paramilitaries are not a minor actor to substitute military and police forces. Furthermore, paramilitaries are often more functional security forces to provide political elites with efficient force and fight for power than those of the military and police. Reform of paramilitaries therefore needs to be an SSR agenda. However, the SSR studies have not fully placed its focus on analysing paramilitaries yet. As demonstrated by Hills' studies above, a close observation of actual activities, participating individuals and genesis of the organisation helps one to have a clearer idea what nature, activities and roles contemporary paramilitaries convey. Therefore, defining paramilitaries by their actual function, as well as by their official titles and affiliation gives clearer ideas of paramilitaries in conflict-affected and settings.

2.2.3.3 Local dynamics

Reflecting the operational challenges on the ground, some recent SSR studies have started filling the gap by providing critiques by focusing on local agency and

domestic power dynamics. For instance, a special issue of *International Peacekeeping* 21:2 was entirely dedicated to discussing SSR from this perspective. Schroeder and Chappuis note the limited scope of the existing SSR literature that tends to assess SSR against "externally defined mission objectives and interests" (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014, pp. 133–134). The special issue recognises that existing SSR research have neglected "to consider the agency and power of domestic actors" in the SSR and peacebuilding processes (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014, p. 136) and proposes an analysis on "interaction dynamics between external and domestic stakeholders" (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014, p. 134).

For understanding a SSR process in the domestic political process the concept of regime security would be useful to examine the local dynamics surrounding SSR efforts. SSR efforts often take place in weak states, where political elites need to seek for ways ensure their security (Jackson, 2016). Strengthening armed forces loyal to the regime could be one of the strategies to ensure regime security. In such a context, SSR may be adopted to promote regime security whilst security concerns of the wider population may be left unattended. Some recent critical SSR literature indeed looks at this regime-survival issue (Marten, 2014). The phenomena of the security sector in transitional societies being highly political remains under-researched, however, and so does the process of reforming the security sector. The issue of regime security concerns in the SSR context has room for further elaboration.

2.3 Political economy analysis of security sector change process: elements of analysis

As discussed above, the literature on the relation between the security sector actors and political developments both note the need to scrutinise and better understand the indigenous actors and their impacts on the wider socio-political process, i.e., state formation and peacebuilding. The study on the security sector actors and its relationship with the state formation has not fully developed an analytical framework to study the security sector actors. On the other hand, the aid community has developed a political economy analysis to examine external

intervention efforts. This research applies the political economy analysis to the study on security sector change and security sector actors involved in the change process. This way, the research provides a closer look at the local security sector actors and their political roles in the overall socio-political process.

The examination of the relation between the security sector and political developments in Georgia in the following chapters takes the following analytical approaches. First, the research applies a wider scope of security sector actors. In the analysis of the security sector actors, the research employs examines not only the military as in the case of the civil-military relations studies, but also policing institutions and irregular armed forces, especially, paramilitaries, in addition to corresponding civilian oversights bodies. Second, for understanding local actor and their dynamics, the research locates the security sector change process in a wider political development process as in the studies on the security sector in authoritarian societies. In doing so, the focus is placed on political economic dynamics of the security sector actors and relevant actors involved in security sector change. This way, the research in this thesis examines security sector change as part of a wider political development process, such as transition from authoritarianism to democracy and from war to peace, rather than as a separate set of peacebuilding and/or SSR policies. In other words, the focus of the research is placed on the relation between the domestic political developments and the security sector actors, rather than the reform itself.

Based on these analytical approaches, this research conducts political economy analysis of security sector change in Georgia. Political economy analysis has been used in social science research. More recently, an increasing number of development assistance agencies have examined effectiveness of their interventions. Methods of political economy analysis have been developed, tailored and applied by a number of researchers and practitioners engaged in the development assistance field and beyond (Adam and Dercon, 2009; Rocha Menocal, 2014; Williams et al., 2007). While those materials provide varying perspectives in details and no conceptual framework exists, the OECD-DAC, cited in DFID's *Political economy analysis: how to note*, provides a definition that shows a main feature of political economy analysis:

> "Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relations over time" (DFID, 2009, p. 4).

Being highly pragmatic, the method aims at understanding political and economic processes in society such as "the incentives, relationships, distribution and contestation of power between different groups and individuals" that impact on development outcomes (Mcloughlin, 2014, p. 2). Political economy analysis has an advantage in analysing local actors, as it focuses not only on formal but also informal institutions and cultural and social practices. This way, political economy analysis can delve into local dynamics and explain "why formal institutions do not work as intended" (Mcloughlin, 2014, p. 2), so that it cautions "against relying on technical fixes, and assuming that formal institutions can be made to work through the transfer of 'international best practice'" (Williams et al., 2007). Political economy analysis allows the in-depth understanding of the political context in which the international donors provide assistance (Williams et al., 2007).

The method has not been systematically applied in the studies of the relation between security sector actors and political developments yet, but this research employs political economy analysis methods because of the usefulness in analysing and understanding local dynamics in the SSR context. The analytical framework in this research is largely based on the models used in other practical and academic research, but specifically developed and tailored for this research. This research adopts a framework of political economy analysis developed in the development assistance field, in particular, by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (Harris, 2013).

The subsequent chapters examine the local dynamics of security sector change in Georgia (chapters 3, 4 and 6). In these chapters, political economy analyses the following elements: a) structural features in which security sector change took place; b) key institutions and individuals, their incentives and motivations for certain (or no) changes in the security sector and decision logics during the agenda-setting process; and c) dynamics between key institutions and individuals.

In structural diagnosis, key structural features of the socio-political context in which the security sector change process takes place are closely examined from various dimensions. In particular, features relevant to the security sector change process including political dimension, socio-economic dimension, institutional dimension (i.e., the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and security forces including non- and quasi-state armed forces) are key units of analysis in structural diagnosis. In agency (actor) diagnosis, key security sector actors and prominent individuals including the Presidents, paramilitary leaders, security sector institutions, civil societies and external actors are examined. Their incentives for and/or reasons for resistance against security sector change efforts are analysed so that their logic of decision making in the security sector change process can be distilled. Finally, dynamics between key actors, both institutions and individuals, are analysed and the types of relationships and power balance between those actors are identified.

Chapter 3 Security sector change in the transition from the Soviet to independent Georgia between 1985 and 1991

3.1 Introduction

The following chapters take a close look at the three key phases of the transition. The first sets its timeframe between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when various independence movements started to gain momentum. More precisely, this chapter examines the socio-political transition in Georgia between 1985 and 1991 and how security sector actors interacted with the socio-political dynamics during the period.

This chapter seeks to understand what factors play influential roles in shaping the course of security sector change in the socio-political transition in which Georgia became independent from the Soviet Union. The example of Georgia between 1985 and 1991 shows that a certain set of political and socio-economic factors allow paramilitary leaders to become not only influential security sector actors but also dominant political actors. Upon the independence, Georgia began its efforts to create its own security sector apparatus. This chapter examines how in the absence of a clear strategy and functional state institutions the course of the security sector creation was influenced by power dynamics among a few of those political elites, in particular, paramilitary leaders.

The analysis of security sector change takes three parts. The first part provides the background to the transitional period between 1985 and 1991. It reviews the emergence of Georgian nationalism and the independence movement, Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union and the subsequent civil wars in separatist regions and within Georgia. It provides an overview of Georgia's transformation from a Soviet republic to an independent state in its embryo. The second part examines security sector change that took place in Georgia immediately after the independence. The third part applies the political economy analysis introduced in chapter 2 and analyses the security sector change process and examines driving and resisting factors for reform efforts, as well as dynamics within the process of security sector change.

3.2 The examination of the political developments between 1985 and 1991

This section provides an overview of major socio-political changes during the transition period in which Georgia transferred from a Soviet republic to an independent state, the Republic of Georgia, in order to provide essential context for the analyses in the subsequent sections. The chapter covers a seven-year period between the early stage of *perestroika* when Shevardnadze, then the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, left Tbilisi to Moscow to hold a position as the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1985, until he returned to Georgia to fill in a power vacuum left after the ousting of the first President of independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, in January 1992.

3.2.1 Re-emergence of Georgian nationalism and independence movement

The first half of the seven year period coincides with *perestroika*, the sociopolitical reform movement introduced by Mikhail Gorvachev between 1985 and 1989. Georgia was independent for a brief period of time between 1918 and 1921. During the Soviet times and especially since 1956 when a pro-Georgian rally in Tbilisi was violently oppressed by the Soviet troops, Georgian nationalism had not been on the political surface. Under *perestroika*, the Georgian nationalism started to re-emerge and gather momentum. The re-kindled Georgian nationalism led to the independence movement. Nationalistic Georgian intellectuals such as Giorgi Chanturia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostava and Erekle Shengelaia emerged as independence movement leaders.

Jumbar Patiashvili, who replaced Shevardnadze as the Georgian Communist Party in 1985, maintained severe repression of any dissident movements. During the late 1980s, the police broke up pro-independence demonstrations and meetings more frequently, as the Georgian nationalist movement was increasingly gathering popular support. On May 26 1988, the police intervened in various demonstrations and meetings to commemorate the anniversary of the first Georgian independence. This incident was followed by a more violent intervention on April 9 1989. The Soviet troops cracked down on a pro-

independence demonstration in Tbilisi, killed 19 people and injured hundreds. (Keller, 1989)

The violent oppression by the Soviet troops, however, contributed to the popular support for the Georgian nationalist movement leaders. By late 1989, Gamsakhurdia became the most prominent political figure.[11] In 1991, the Georgian parliament declared secession from the Soviet Union. The Georgians voted for a restoration of the independence of Georgia at a referendum in which almost 90 percent of the voters supported the "restoration of the state independence of Georgia". (Suny, 1994, p. 326) Gamsakhurdia was elected with an overwhelming majority (more than 85 percent), as the first President of independent Georgia. (Suny, 1994, p. 326)

3.2.2 Independence and civil wars

The declaration of independence did not, however, bring political stability in Georgia. On the contrary, Georgia became an extremely fragile state and affected by violent clashes in various parts of the countries including its capital, Tbilisi.

Instead of consolidating his power, Gamsakhurdia increasingly become hostile towards his political opponents. Gamsakhurdia drew further hostilities towards him by his ambivalent response to the coup attempt in Moscow in August in 1991. (Jones, 2015, pp. 62–63; Suny, 1994, p. 327) On 22 December, Gamsakhurdia's opponents attacked the parliament building. In January 1992, the first elected President of Georgia was deposed after fighting with his opponents, causing dozens of deaths in central Tbilisi. Gamsakhurdia escaped to Armenia and later to Chechnya, where he remained until his death in December 1993. (Civil Georgia, 2009)

The territorial integrity of independent Georgia was jeopardized. As the independence movement gathered pace, tensions grew between ethnic Georgian and other ethnic groups within the new Georgian state, in particular the

[11] Merab Kostava, the other most popular nationalist movement leader, was killed in a car accident in October 1991.

Abkhaz and Ossetians. The more momentum the nationalistic independence movement gained among the ethnic Georgians, the more distant the non-Georgian peoples became from the Georgian-centric movement. The ethnic tensions led to territorial conflicts, particularly over two regions, i.e., Abkhazia (the former Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) and South Ossetia (the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast). There was another territorial issue with Adjara (the former Adjaran Autonomous Soviet Social Republic) which was predominantly habituated by the Muslim population. Adjara had been largely controlled by its leader, Aslan Abashidze[12] and his clans for a long period of time. Unlike the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the relation with Tbilisi remained relatively calm and the territorial issue did not escalate into a violence conflict.

Since the late 1980s, the Abkhaz had started to demand separation from the Soviet Georgia. The tension between the Georgians and the Abkhaz escalated, especially after a mass Abkhaz meeting in March 1989, demanded for separation. During the same period, violent confrontations were frequent between the Georgians and the Ossetians in South Ossetia, too. In 1989, demands for more autonomy in South Ossetia led to violent clashes between the Georgian and Ossetian militias. Russian peacekeepers were deployed in South Ossetia in 1980. In 1992, South Ossetians voted for independence, although Georgia did not recognise the referendum.

In addition to the ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a civil war erupted in a western Georgian region of Samegrelo. Tbilisi also became a battle field, as inter-militia violence became intensified. In Samegrelo, the Zviadistss fought to take over the power in the capital against Gamsakhurdia's opponents. Street violence in Tbilisi exchanged fires mainly between different youth gangs for their private revenge. State control became virtually non-existent in the western Georgia. By that time, Georgia lost its control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With Adjara having its own paramilitary forces under a personal fiefdom of Abashidze, Georgia's territorial integrity was eroded, leaving Georgia on the verge of turning into a failed state by 1992.

[12] When Georgia became independent of the Soviet Union, Abashidze was appointed as the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara.

By the time when Georgia became an independent state, its society had become highly volatile and militant. The state apparatus of newly independent Georgia was not functional. A Military Council replaced the ousted president, Gamsakhurdia. Having ousted Gamsakhurdia, his opponents and paramilitary heads, Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani invited Shevardnadze, who had resigned as the Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister by then, to return to Georgia. Shevardnadze returned to Tbilisi. The Military Council was transferred to the State Council, and Shevardnadze was appointed the head of the newly formed State Council in March 1992, with the two paramilitary leaders among the four voting members (Jones, 2015, p. 82), then the chairperson of the parliament in October.

In sum, Georgia in the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed massive socio-political changes. Georgia transformed from a Soviet republic to an independent state. However, its territorial borders became contested and the inter-ethnic tension escalated and led to the armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the Soviet Union dissolved, its state apparatus ceased to function. The militarised power struggle among political elites, the armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the absence of functional state apparatus created a political and institutional vacuum in Georgian society. It was in this context that security sector change in the late 1980s and 1990s took place.

3.3 Examining security sector change between 1985 and 1991

Security sector change in Georgia during this period were can be divided into two stages. The first is the period between 1985 and 1991, when numerous paramilitary forces emerged out of the Georgian independence process. The second phase runs briefly between 1990 and 1991, during which independence Georgia started to create new regular armed forces while the Soviet armed forces ceased to exist.

3.3.1 The evolution of paramilitaries affiliated with independence movement leaders

The first phase in this period is marked by the emergence and flourish of various non-state paramilitary forces and their leaders. Since the late 1980s, numerous political associations were created among the Georgian intelligentsia. Several dissident nationalist leaders formed small paramilitary groups since the 1980s. For instance, supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a nationalist movement leader and the first president of independent Georgia, formed a paramilitary group called 'Zviadists'. Those paramilitary forces initially were small in size in 1989–91 and acted "as the private bodyguards or thugs for political personalities and their entourage" (Demetriou, 2002, p. 23). Those militia groups include the Zviadists, a group of supporters of Gamsakhurdia. The Merab Kostava Society also had an armed wing, led by Vaja Adamia, a Gamsakhurdia loyalist. Several other paramilitary forces such as the White Legion and the Forest Brothers were organised by ethnic Georgians, mainly consisting of volunteer civilians who were enthusiastic supporters of Gamsakhurdia.

The Mkhedrioni was not affiliated to any political leader, yet it was one of the most notable and influential paramilitary forces of the post-independent period. Established in 1989 by Ioseliani, the Mkhedrioni had approximately 5,000 members. The Mkhedrioni emerged in 1988 as an illegal armed formation with some links to the Communist nomenclature. Gaining influence in the political scene and criminal activities, the Mkhedrioni and its leader Ioseliani became significant actors in Georgian politics and society in independent Georgia. Those militias consisted of dozens of units of varying size, from a few hundred to several thousands of people (Darchiashvili, 2003a). By the time of the independence, Georgian political elites were mostly heading their own paramilitary forces. By early 1990, one estimates the total number of 60,000 volunteers in such paramilitary groups (Woff, 1993, p. 309).

3.3.2 The creation of Georgian security sector institutions

During the Soviet times, Georgia did not have a national army as all the Soviet republics were prohibited from creating their own military forces.[13] However, as

[13] Georgia had had a national army until 1956, when Khrushchev banned all national units in the Soviet Army.

the independence movement started to gain momentum in the late 1980s, some Georgian independence movement leaders gathered armed supporters and formed paramilitary forces (Darchiashvili, 2005, pp. 5–6).

Following the independence, some security sector institutions started to emerge. One such institution is the National Guards. In November 1990, a law was adopted to ban drafting of Georgian youth to the Soviet Army. In December, the Law on Internal Troops - National Guards was adopted. The Supreme Council of Georgia established the National Guard on 20 December 1990 as the interior troops (Darchiashvili, 2003a, p. 32). The intention was to transform the National Guard to a regular army at a later stage. The National Guard absorbed some paramilitary forces and armed wings of the Georgian nationalist movement[14] (Woff, 1993, p. 71). Kitovani, an independence movement leader and an elected member of the Supreme Council, led the National Guard as a commander. Although some former Soviet officers of Georgian origin joined the guard, most of them volunteered.

The draft into the National Guard began in February 1991. By next spring, the National Guard had some 12,000 officers and enlisted soldiers (Darchiashvili, 1997a). The National Guards at this time was more of paramilitary forces rather than a regular military. Besides the National Guard, there were also a number of other state paramilitary forces in Georgia during this period. In September 1990, for instance, the Mkhedrioni gained legal status and registered as a rescue service. There were also about half legal or illegal paramilitaries with a few thousands of poorly armed and trained recruits (Darchiashvili, 1997a).

During this period, security sector institutions other than the armed forces were also created. The Ministry of Defense was created in 1991. The Information-Intelligence Service was created in the same year. Gamsakhurdia's government merged the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) with the Committee of State Security of Georgia. The creation of those new security sector institutions was accompanied by the President's various reform efforts targeted at the disbandment of the two most influential paramilitary forces: the Mkhedrioni and

[14] One of such paramilitary groups is While Eagle, which had parted from the Mkhedrioni and headed by Ghia Kharkharashvili.

the National Guard. In 1991, Gamsakhurdia ordered the Mkhedrioni to disband and arrested its leader, Ioseliani. In the same year, Gamsakhurdia dismissed the National Guard leader, Kitovani. Neither of the paramilitary forces obeyed the orders, and they remained under the *de facto* control of their leaders.

Table 2 Major security agencies during the Gamsakhurdia period, 1990 - 1991

Non-state	Quasi-state	State
• Forest Brothers • Merab Kostava Society • White Legion • Zhviadists	• Ajara paramilitary forces • Mkhedrioni • National Guards	• Committee of State Security (merged with the MIA) • Ministry of Defence • Ministry of Internal Affairs • Internal Troops (affiliated to the MIA)

3.4 Examining driving factors for security sector change

This section examines in detail why certain security sector actors emerged so prominently and held power during the transitional period. The discussion follows the political economy analysis frameworks introduced in chapter 2. Key structural features (structural diagnosis), power relations between key individuals and agencies and their incentives for security sector change (agency diagnosis) during the pre- and post-independent Georgian society are analysed.

3.4.1 Structural diagnosis

3.4.1.1 Political dimension

During the transition between 1985 and 1991, Georgia went through a radical socio-political change from being a Soviet republic to an independent state. The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought power and institutional vacuums in the Georgian society. The weakening political control of Moscow allowed Georgian

nationalist movement leaders and other prominent figures to emerge as political leaders. To protect themselves, they mobilised armed groups, which eventually became paramilitary forces. Those informal and irregular paramilitary forces gained influence in the political chaos in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. On the other hand, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, so did its state apparatus. The absence of functional state institutions meant that building security sector institutions of its own became one of the major issues for independent Georgia to equip with full-fledged state institutions.

The weakened state capacity and frantic nationalist leadership of Gamsakhurdia led to growing separatist sentiment which jeopardised Georgia's territorial integrity. The examples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are most intense and violent. In the two autonomous regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, separatist sentiments gained momentum at the end of the Soviet times, and especially since the nationalistic Georgian President, Gamsakhurdia, took power. South Ossetia declared its intention to secede from Georgia in 1990, then its independence in 1992. A growing demand for more autonomy in the South Ossetia led to violent clashes between Georgian and Ossetian paramilitaries in 1989. In South Ossetia, a ceasefire was signed in June 1992 and a peacekeeping force consisting of Georgian, Ossetian and Russian troops were deployed.

In the early 1990s, Georgia and its surrounding regions were heavily affected by armed conflicts. In Abkhazia, fighting broke out in Abkhazia between the Georgian troops and Abkhazian forces in August. As both the territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia escalated into violent conflicts, paramilitary forces were heavily involved in on all the sides. Those armed conflicts in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions involved a large number of volunteered citizens. The conflicts reinforced the popular support for Georgian paramilitaries and their leaders.

Even within the territory of proper Georgia itself, various factions among Georgian independent movement leaders resulted in political disputes, often in armed

clashes in Tbilisi and other parts inside proper Georgia, especially the Mingleria region.[15]

3.4.1.2 Socio-economic dimension

Since the late 1980s, a number of paramilitary groups started to emerge as influential actors in society. They were mainly affiliated with independence movement leaders. New independent Georgia started to develop state security institutions in 1991. However, they were far from being professional and capable security sector actors. The development of a number of unprofessional and personalised paramilitary forces can be attributed to several socio-economic factors in Georgia.

Georgian-centric nationalism and inter-ethnic tension

The independence movement leaders cultivated popular support by appealing to Georgian centric nationalism, but this resulted in escalating inter-ethnic tension among various ethnic groups in Georgia. Georgia is an ethnically diverse country. The 1989 census conducted by the Soviet Union shows that ethnic Georgians consist of 70.7% of its population. The other ethnic groups in Georgia include the Azeris (5.7%), Armenians (8.1%), Russians (6.3%), Ossetians (3.0%) and Abkhazians (1.8%). In the multi-ethnic environment, most of the independence movement leaders used Georgian-centric nationalistic discourses in order to consolidate popular support. The most prominent example of such leaders is Zviad Gamsakhurdia. He employed an fanatic Georgian centric nationalism to generate popular support amongst ethnic Georgians. His chauvinistic sentiment fed the independence movement. At the same time, it alienated other ethnic groups in the country. According to one study, many felt that the nationalistic policies of the Gamsakhurdia government oppressed ethnic minorities and increased tension between Georgians and non-Georgians. (Koyama, 2005)

[15] Miglerian belongs to the Kartoveli language group, as is Georgian, but they are not mutually comprehensive.

The limiting, confining concept of Georgian nationalism partially led to, or contributed to escalating inter-ethnic tensions in Georgia as well as the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where paramilitary forces were organised to fight in the inter-ethnic conflicts. In the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, several paramilitary forces were organised by Georgians to fight against separatists in the region. The White Legion and the Forest Brothers reportedly consisted of volunteers from the Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Samegrelo region, and both are active in hostilities against Abkhaz armed forces. Many of the volunteers were the Zviadists - supporters of Gamsakhurdia.

The control of the central government was significantly challenged in other regions, too. State's control was only formal, and real power was "exercised by local fiefs" (DFID, Analysis of Incentives and Capacity for Poverty Reduction and Good Governance in Georgia, p.9). Although not experiencing the full-scale violent conflicts as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the autonomous region of Adjara distanced itself from Tbilisi and its leadership, so did Armenian-populated Javaxeti and Azeri-populated Kvemo Kartli, since the ethnic Georgian centric nationalism leader Gamsakhurdia took power.

Clientelism and informal economy

Headed by prominent social and political figures, Georgian paramilitaries were highly personalised. The personalised organisation of paramilitaries can be attributed to the expanded informal network and strong patron-client connections that had been prominent in Georgia. Centred-around prominent political and social figures, the Georgian elite society connoted clientelism, which formed a dual social structure parallel to the formal Soviet state institutions.

This tendency can be found as early as the Stalinist period between 1924 and 1953, in which a patron-client relationship among the Georgian elites gradually grew outside the governmental structure. The patron-client tie grew into 'fiefdoms', modelled on family and clan, religion, corruption and crime (Fairbanks, 1996). During the Soviet period, being far from Moscow, many Georgians managed to

maintain their 'private' informal economy, by growing own crops and running cottage businesses during the Soviet times (Fairbanks, 1996).

The Soviet Georgia was known for its active informal economy. According to one report, 33% of Georgia's GDP was produced by the illicit sector (Alexeev and Pyle, 2003). The collapse of the Soviet Union increased the patronage power of pseudo-clans and regional bosses even further, undermining the state apparatus and embryonic civil society institutions, by tapping into informal economic activities. The prime example is the Mkhedrioni. The Mkhedrioni emerged as an armed group of members with criminal backgrounds. As the political turmoil escalated in December 1991, many of the Mkhedrioni members were released from prisons and mobilised to fight in the civil war in Georgia against the Gamsakhurdia side and in Abkhazia. The Mkhedrioni members supported themselves by demanding 'tax' from the local population for the war effort and providing 'protection'. They also financed themselves through the control over the distribution of lucrative commodities. Their influence reportedly exceeded the formal governmental institutions those days.[16]

The informal networks thus extended not only in Georgian politics, but also in social and economic life of the Georgians, since it became a crucial survival tool to replace the collapsed planned economy since the beginning of the 1990s.[17] In the absence of functional state institutions, the client-patron nature of the relationship further increased the paramilitary leaders' influence.

Organised crimes and corruption

Organised crimes and corruption are the other key socio-economic factors to understand the emergence of paramilitaries and their leaders during this period. Organised crimes and criminal gangs had existed since the Soviet period. So-called 'thieves-in-law' (*vory-v-zakone* in Russian) originated in the Gulag in the 1930s (Slade, p.12). The Gulag at that time provided an environment in which

[16] Demetriou (2003) and Slider (1997).
[17] One UNDP reports that the informal economy constituted up to 70 -80% of the real GNP in Georgia (UNDP Georgia, 1996).

actors could build network among themselves. Thieves-in-laws consisted of “a criminal fraternity that topped prisoner hierarchies” (Slade, p.12).

Thieves-in-law began to play significant roles both in illicit and non-illicit spheres in society. For instance, these organised criminal groups engaged in various criminal activities such as robberies and theft. Kidnapping, bride-kidnapping, trafficking and drugs were among other criminal activities that sourced these organised criminals (Slade, p.52).

After the independence, thieves-in-law also began to gain benefits from arbitration and dispute dissolution. It is noted that the thieves-in-law had engaged in dispute settlements in the illicit economy that could not have been settled by the police during the Soviet time (Slade, p.46). Their role in dispute settlements increased in the early stage of the independence. In the absence of functioning police and justice systems, thieves-in-law further consolidated their influence in society by offering a certain type of protection and settling disputes for emerging business owners. As confidence in the police was low, victims of kidnapping and bride-kidnapping often turned to thieves-in-law for settling a case. As a result, thieves-in-law often engaged in negotiations between criminals and victims (Slade, p.45).

Georgia at that time was still an embryonic capital economy without functional economic governance institutions nor regulations. As a result, thieves-in-law established their influential profile in emerging business activities of both illicit and non-illicit natures. Slade notes space racketeering and providing protection to enterprises by selling guarantees or cutting profits as thieves-in-law’s profit-making examples during this period (Slade, p.49).

The thieves-in-law were also active in legitimate economy. They engaged in a wide range of economic activities such as offering ‘protection’ to minibus drivers, controlling the supply of goods to marketplaces, and gambling and debt collection (Slade, pp. 54-60).

Arms proliferation

The power of paramilitary forces increased as they increased the level of militarisation by accessing to small arms and light weapons which became widely available especially after 1991. Initially, the availability of small arms was limited in the early part of the period and Georgian paramilitaries were poorly armed. For instance, even for major paramilitary forces such as the National Guard and White Eagle, only 60% of their manpower was armed with small arms and light weapons. Prior to the end of the Soviet Union, the source of weaponry varied. According to Demetriou, there were three major sources of weapon supply. The first was the Soviet police stations which were occasionally raided, and their weapons were stolen. The Voluntary Supporters for the Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF), under the direct supervision of the Soviet MoD, had over 50 local installations in Georgia, and became another source, as their weapons could be purchased or lost. The other source of weapons consisted of WWII-era rifles that had been distributed to protect against a German invasion (Demetriou, 2002, pp. 8–9).

Since 1991, however, this level of weapons proliferation raised drastically. This was due not only to the informal market as well as the lack of strict control of arms leaking from the former Soviet army base, but also to the intentional leakage by the Russian forces. Following the military coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, Russian commanders and officers began to distribute or sell a large amount of weapons to armed groups in Georgia, which resulted in a drastic increase in the scale and the types of weapons circulating in Georgia. (Demetriou, 2002, p. 8) In post-1991 Georgia, it is estimated that about 40,000 weapons were in the possession of armed groups (Demetriou, 2002, p. 20). For instance, the National Guards owned 18,000 weapons for its 12,000 troops. The Mkhedrioni was even more over-equipped: its 1,500 troops possessed approximately 6,250 weapons (Demetriou, 2002, p. 21). The excessive availability of weapons thus contributed to increasing the influence of the paramilitaries and militarising Georgian politics subsequently, especially since 1991.

Public perceptions on security and security institutions

Security concerns among Georgian populations during this period varied, depending on their physical location, ethnic identify and gender. Outside the

conflict-affected areas such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Tbilisi, people perceived that their physical security was significantly affected by economically motivated crimes and violence in their own communities. Money-driven crimes such as abductions of rich business people ran rampant, posing acute security threats in Georgia.[18]

In the regions where non-Georgian ethnic groups were the majority, many felt that the differences in ethnicity among community members had added grievance in communities, fuelling communal tension and violence between the ethnic Georgians and non-Georgians. This was especially the case under the Gamsakhurdia period, due to his extreme, ethnic-Georgian centric nationalism. Responding in a focus group interview conducted in 2005 in ethnic Armenian-dominated Akhaltsikhe, for instance, ethnic Armenian interviewees recalled the Gamsakhurdia period as quite insecure due to Georgian nationalism inflamed by the political leader:

> "The Gamsakhurdia period was really dangerous. There were many discrete armed groups in our region. There are also many demonstrations and meetings against Armenians population."[19]

In Akhaltsikhe, another ethnic Armenian interviewee remembers that during this period many anti-Armenian demonstrations and meetings were organised. The other ethnic Armenian woman remembers that non-Georgians, especially the youth, were often beaten by ordinary Georgians for no particular reason:[20]

> "(During the Gamsakhurdia time) the non-Georgian populations were beaten by Georgians for nothing. There were numerous robberies, abductions, and shootings."[21]

[18] Precise crime data during this period is not available. According to participants at a focus group interview conducted in Marneuli, a district in the Azeri-populated Kvemo Kartli, in 2005, 50 to 60 Azeris were abducted for ransom during this period (Koyama, 2005, p. 6).
[19] A middle-aged Georgian woman, NGO worker, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe. A preliminary analysis was published in *Evaluating human security impacts of the security sector transformation in Georgia* (Koyama, 2005, p. 5)
[20] Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe.
[21] Ibid.

The Azeri communities in Marneuli shared a similar fear of tension between different ethnicities with the ethnic Armenian communities.[22]

The state security sector institutions including the police and justice institutions were dysfunctional and did not attend those security threats. Having low confidence in those institutions, people rather preferred to rely on criminal groups, paramilitaries and/or informal networks such as family and community ties for justice and protection, because "[t]he police take years to investigate a case if they do it at all, while the criminal groups would settle the problem within a matter of hours."[23] Besides *de jure* legitimacy, people in Zugdidi find the criminal gangs more reliable than the police for protection in the daily lives.[24]

In sum, people had little trust in the state security institutions. People perceived that the institutional capacities of state security apparatus declined since the Soviet time. Their lack of confidence in state security institutions drove them to rely on their own private networks, paramilitaries and even criminal gangs, for protection. Unofficial networks based on patron-client relationships, wide spread informal economy and the lack of functional state security institutions paved the way to consolidate popular support for paramilitaries and their leaders during the chaotic period between the late 1980s and the early 1990s.

3.4.1.3 Institutional dimension

Substantial development of state institutions in independent Georgia did not start to be established until after 1995, when the new Constitution was signed. Until then, the government apparatus, i.e., the executive judicial and legislative branches lacked the mutual independence, accountability and capacities.

[22] In Marneuli, an Azeri man recalls how a dispute between different ethnic groups engulfed the whole community: "First it was a quarrel between a Svan and an Azeri guy. Then the dispute broke out between their relatives, then between their streets, then spread to the whole community. Finally, it turned into chaos." Focused group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. On the other hand, the Georgian interviewees did not recall ethnic tension as a serious cause of insecurity. For example, the interviewees in Zugdidi where most of the population is Georgian (to be more precise, Minglerians, as was Gamsakhurdia) shared contrasting views on the security condition during the Gamsakhurdia period. People in Zugdidi recall that this period was the calmest in the last 15 years. Zugdidi, March 2005.
[23] Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.
[24] Ibid.

During the transitional period between 1990 and 1992, Georgia had four legislative bodies consecutively. First, in October 1990, the Supreme Council was established as the highest legislative body, when Georgia was still part of the Soviet Union. The Supreme Council was soon replaced by the Military Council upon a coup d'état in 1991, then the State Council in 1993. Both of the Councils were led by paramilitary heads, Kitovani and Ioseliani. Finally, in October 1992, the Parliament of Georgia was elected and became the legislature body. Throughout the early 1990s, the legislature hardly exercised independently of the executive and suffered from political struggle among different political leaders. The President Gamsakhurdia was both the head of the state and the Chairperson of the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council itself became divided among numerous political functions soon after its establishment, and later became totally dysfunctional when the President himself was ousted by the 1991 coup d'état.

Independent Georgia adopted the Presidency as its executive mechanism and the President's post was introduced in April 1991 (UNDP Georgia, 1997, p. 39). The Supreme Council had elected Gamsakhurdia as its chairperson in November 1990, and he became the first President of Georgia in 1991. As mentioned above, the demarcation between the executive and legislature was blurred. An institutional arrangement of the executive branch was yet to be developed. In the immediate aftermath of the independence, the executive bodies such as the ministries kept the Soviet structure. When the Soviet Union dissolved, those Soviet security institutions ceased to function and were later replaced by newly emerging security institutions. The Prime Minister presided over the Cabinet of 19 Ministries supported by five Deputies (UNDP Georgia, 1997, p. 40).

As for the judiciary, in 1990, the Law on the Judiciary System was adopted. According to the 1990 Law, the judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Courts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Tbilisi Municipal Court and other Regional and Municipal Courts (UNDP Georgia, 1997, pp. 40–41). The judiciary was reportedly *de jure* but not necessarily *de facto* independent of the executive (UNDP Georgia, 1997). Those judicial institutions remained attached to the executive rather than becoming independent of them. The judiciary still carried a negative reputation among the general population which it inherited from the Soviet period (UNDP Georgia, 1997, p. 41).

In the early stage of the post-independent period, Georgia had two sets of state security institutions. The first is the Soviet security forces including the Soviet military and MVD troops. Their primary role was the protection of the Soviet regime rather than its citizens, as violent suppressions of demonstrations by the Soviet security forces in 1956 and 1989 in Tbilisi illustrate.[25] The second set of security institutions is a group of various paramilitary forces, both of non-state and state. The institutional vacuum left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the embryotic security institutions of independent Georgia provided space for informal and irregular security forces to flourish during the socio-political chaos in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Armed groups such as the Mkhedrioni, Imedi, and Merab Kostava Society are among the examples. A newly established security force, the National Guard is another prime example of paramilitary forces during this period. Prior to independence, Georgia did not have its own national army since the Soviet leader Khurshchev had banned not only Georgian but all national units in the Soviet Army back in 1956. When Georgia became independent, the National Guard was established with the intention to transform it into a national military. Its mission was to protect public order and state integrity (Darchiashvili, 1997a). As for institutional capacities, those paramilitaries were far from being able to replace the Soviet security forces as a state security apparatus: their personnel ranged in low hundreds, and none of them was as structured and professional as a regular military. According to Darchiashvili, armed men were acting according to their own desire or at the order of certain charismatic military leaders, and there was little organised framework in those armed forces during the political turmoil in this period (Darchiashvili, 1997b). In some cases, individual soldiers or officers acted voluntarily and they could join and leave the unit whenever they wanted and join in the other (Darchiashvili, 1997b).

[25] In 1956, having succeeded his predecessor Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev made a famous 'secret speech' and denounced Stalin and his "cult of personality" at a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which also commemorated the third anniversary of Stalin's death. Khrushchev's speech, especially his remarks on Georgians, hurt national pride of young Georgians. Following the speech, a demonstration took place in Tbilisi. Initially, groups of students gathered to commemorate the third anniversary of the death of Stalin. As time passed on, an anti-Soviet sentiment grew among the group and leaflets calling for a secession of Georgia from the Soviet Union were distributed. On March 9, the police and military fired at peaceful demonstrators. 106 persons are said to have killed and hundreds were wounded.

3.4.2 Agency diagnosis

During this early stage of the post-independence period, the former Soviet nomenklaturas in Georgia and Moscow continued having close ties. While most of the newly emerged Georgian nationalists had little experience in the state administration, this group of the former Soviet nomenklaturas had a certain level of professional experience. Having been trained in the Soviet system, this group took a less confrontational attitude towards Russia in comparison with the paramilitary leaders and Gamsakhurdia. This group also pursued the creation of a Georgian military. During the early 1990s, those former Soviet nomenklaturas played a key role in the formulation of the National Guard. However, their approach was moderate as they were afraid that forming a national army might cause a sharp reaction from Moscow (Darchiashvili, 2005, p. 6). In parallel, a number of actors emerged as influential figures in the security sector change process during this period.

3.4.2.1 The paramilitary leaders

The first group of such actors consists of paramilitary leaders including Georgian national movement activists and prominent figures in the informal network. Kitovani and Ioseliani are the primary examples. They pursued the establishment of a Georgian state independent of influence from Moscow and territorial integrity with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The nationalist movement leaders appealed for popular support by using their paramilitary forces to enhance the sense of Georgian identify and nationalism. Some paramilitary leaders gathered popular support as a symbol of defiance against the Soviet rule. Java Ioseliani of the Mkhedrioni is one of such icons, because of his record of criminal acts during the Soviet times. Independent movement leaders used paramilitaries among other security forces to reinforce Georgian identity. Paramilitaries and the other security sector actors played a role as an identity symbol for Georgian nationalism and independence sentiment. The sentiment of defiance and pro-independence grew popular in the post-independent Georgia and contributed to mobilising young men to join paramilitary

groups, resulted in increasing the influence of the paramilitary forces and their leaders.

However, establishing professional armed forces was not their primary goal at that time. Instead of disbanding their own forces or building professional military, the paramilitary leaders retained their own paramilitary forces which were mostly young men who had received little or no professional military training. These forces were not under anyone's strict control and did not have particular political motivations to participate in paramilitary activities. Most of them switched their affiliations regardless of the political stances of the groups (Darchiashvili, 2005, p. 6). Irregular armed forces in the post-independence period were therefore quite informal, loose associations of armed volunteers, without proper military training and a strong command and control structure within. In other words, they were not military forces, but rather political and social associations with arms and armed members.

In addition, some of the paramilitary leaders extended their influence. As discussed earlier, so-called 'thieves-in-law' expanded their influence by penetrating their influence both in informal and legitimate economic activities. The Mkhedrioni, "based on the thieves' traditions" (Kupatadze, p. 118), is the most significant paramilitaries that emerged as an influential player in such an environment. In the absence of functioning authority, Georgia was "divided into fiefdoms presided over by warlords and their private armies…gangs and paramilitary thugs roamed the streets and territories towns and villages; corruption and violence were rife" (Ekedahl and Goodman, 2001, p. 263, cited in Slade, p. 127). This way, the paramilitary leaders enabled to retain their own, personalised armed forces rather than giving up their political and economic leverage.

Thus, for the paramilitary leaders, establishing professional regular armed forces was not the main priority but consolidating their own power was. In order to generate and restore support and power, their paramilitary forces needed to remain informal, irregular armed groups. Fragmented, personalised paramilitary forces were necessary to restore the paramilitary heads' political leverage and economic interest in the fragile statehood of Georgia during this period. As a

result, paramilitary forces remained highly personalised along with the individual leaders and they could be used to consolidate their power and occasionally purge political rivals.

3.4.2.2 Zviad Gamsakhurdia: The President

Gamsakhurdia is one of the most prominent figures among independence movement leaders. He is a distinct actor as his position as the President and his relation to other political leaders significantly influenced the course of the security sector formation.

Gamsakhurdia's style in mobilising political support was based on his Georgian ethnocentrism, claiming Georgian culture's superiority over other cultures. Gamsakhurdia regarded that ethnic sentiment was "at a level suitable for helping him to achieve popularity" (Nodia, 1996, p. 77). Born to a famous Georgian novelist, Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a literature lecturer at Tbilisi State University in the middle 1970s, when Georgian intellectuals began the nationalist protest against Moscow. Among the nationalist intellectuals, Gamsakhurdia had the most radical attitude towards other ethnic groups in Georgia. Together with Merab Kostava, Giorgi Chanturia and other intellectuals, Gamsakhurdia protested various Soviet policies on Georgia and the Georgian language. After the death of Kostava in October 1989,[26] Gamsakhurdia became the most popular Georgian politician for his romanticised nationalism, especially among ethnic Georgians, in particular, the Western Georgians or the Mingrelians. As he further pursued for more political influence and support, Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic style became increasingly radical. He refused to stop hostilities by the Georgians against other ethnic groups and pronounced threats against minorities who 'would not behave in a proper manner' (Nodia, 1996, pp. 77–78). His Georgian-centric policies spread dismay among non-Georgian ethnic groups, and incurred conflicts between Georgians and the other ethnic groups.

[26] Kostava was killed in an automobile accident (Suny, 1994, p. 324).

Another characteristic feature of Gamsakhurdia is his populist and (some-said) paranoid personality. Gamsakhurida appealed for popular support by employing extreme nationalist rhetoric resembled to those used by Stalin in the 1930's, such as 'Enemy of the Nation' (Stalin's version: 'Enemy of the People') (Nodia, 1996, p. 80). Such extreme populist rhetoric garnered popular support for Gamsakhurdia on one hand, on the other, it generated an image of Gamsakhurdia as a dictator and other Georgian democrats increasingly distanced from him.

The more he gained popular support, the more his attitude towards political rivals became radical, sometimes even violent. He grew a sense of paranoia, believing other political leaders and 'Tbilisians' were betraying him. Gamsakhurdia's failure to condemn an attempted coup in Moscow in August 1990 increased opposition against him. As one critic states, Gamsakhurdia was "obsessed with the problem of personal loyalty and failed to develop rational political behaviour".[27] The political chaos in the early 1990s in the aftermath of the independence was shaped by the personal rivalry between Gamsakhurdia and his political opponents and escalated to armed struggles.

In 1990 and 1991, Gamsakhurdia's priority was to establish dominance over prominent political rivals, especially Kitovani and Ioseliani. Instead of introducing economic policies to stabilize the economic and other social disturbance in the aftermath of the Soviet dissolution, Gamsakhurdia introduced a number of security sector change that aimed to curtail their influence during the short period of his time in power, until he was ousted by the coup in early 1992. For example, in early 1991, Gamsakhurdia ordered to create the Special Purpose Police Unit (OMON) with an intention to counter the influence of Kitovani who controlled the National Guard. The National Guard was ordered to become a subunit of OMON, but Kitovani refused to follow the order.

3.4.3 Dynamics

[27] Author's interview, October 2000, Tbilisi.

Between 1985 and 1991, security sector change in Georgia occurred in the context of the emergence of the Georgian nationalist movement in the late 1980s and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The emergence and dominance of paramilitary forces were the two most prominent outcomes of security sector change during this period. The multi-faceted structural dimensions mentioned above interacted with the various agencies to produce complex dynamics in the course of security sector change. Which factors shaped the course of security sector change? What incentives drove those agencies to transform the way they did?

3.4.3.1 The emergence of the paramilitary forces in the power and institutional vacuums

The emergence of the paramilitary forces derived from the combination of a number of political, socio- economic factors. As this chapter discussed earlier, the Georgian nationalist movement in the late 1980s centred on a few prominent leaders such as Gamsakhurdia. Their political groups were often accompanied with private armed groups loyal to their leaders. In the absence of a regular military of Georgia itself, the fragmented statehood of Georgia due to the two territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia contributed to justifying the emergency of Georgian paramilitary forces, even though they were no more than private militias of the political elites. Those independence movement leaders often appealed to the general public by using Georgian centric nationalism and garnered popular support.

The vacuum in power and institutions in post-Soviet Georgia could be attributed to the emergence of the paramilitary leaders as the most significant political figures. In terms of economy, Georgia had been known for its flourishing informal economy based on patron-client relations even during the Soviet times (Fairbanks, 1996). In post-independent Georgia, the high degree of informality in the Georgian economy allowed some of the paramilitary forces to generate economic benefits from an informal network based on a client relationship and became an influential actor not only in politics but also in an economic sense. The institutional vacuum could be found in the governance domain, too. Upon the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Soviet institutions ceased to function and left the power and institutional vacuum which the paramilitary leaders eventually filled in. The collapse of the Soviet Union induced the leak of small arms and light weapons from the Soviet military depos, resulting in the further militarisation of the paramilitary forces and the power struggle among their leaders.

3.4.3.2 Power struggle among political elites and the evolution and disbandment of the paramilitary forces

Georgia in the early independence period between 1990 and 1991 in post-independence Georgia saw some efforts to build its own state institutions under the newly elected president, Gamsakhurdia. As discussed in the previous section, the executive and the legislature at this time were far from being functional to political influence of the President or the paramilitary leaders who headed the Supreme Council.[28] The weak state institutions in the early independence period allowed political dynamics to direct the course of the change of the security sector, in particular, paramilitaries. The process was thus heavily influenced by political dynamics and power struggle between the President and his political opponents and paramilitary leaders: Kitovani and Ioseliani.

Initially, Gamsakhurdia accommodated the other political and paramilitary leaders holding crucial positions in the government. For instance, Tengiz Kitovani was appointed as the commander of the National Guard. He also held high-ranking positions such as the Parliamentary Deputy and the head of the Government Commission of Defense.[29] Similarly, Vaja Adamia was close to Gamsakhurdia in the early stage of the post-independence period. Adamia was the head of the Merab Kostava Society and its armed wing. Under the Gamsakhurdia government, Adamia, like Kitovani, held various key positions such as the chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for Defense, Security, Law and Order.

[28] The Supreme Council was established in 1990, then replaced by the Military Council in 1991, then the State Council in 1993.

[29] Similarly, Vaja Adamia was close to Gamsakhurdia in the early stage of the post-independence period. Adamia was the head of the Merab Kostava Society and its armed wing. Under the Gamsakhurdia government, Adamia, like Kitovani, held various key positions such as the chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for Defense, Security, Law and Order.

Eventually, Gamsakhurdia increasingly became anxious about his political dominance and his relationship with the prominent paramilitary leaders grew sour. The relationship between Gamsakhurdia and the Mkhedrioni became the most adversarial one. According to one critique, the Mkhedrioni hated Gamsakhurdia for his populist nationalism as well as "heavy reliance on people from the provinces and Tbilisi's outlying areas" that the Mkhedrioni regarded as "socially and culturally alien" (Darchiashvili, 2005, p. 6). A series of the reform attempts targeting the paramilitary forces took place in 1991. Those attempted paramilitary reform efforts illustrate the power struggle between the President and the paramilitary heads.

In February, Gamsakhurdia ordered the Mkhedrioni to disband. Having met a refusal from its head, Ioseliani, Gamsakhurdia arrested the Mkhedrioni members[30] with the help of the Soviet army, and imprisoned its leader, Ioseliani, without a trial. In August, Gamsakhurida dismissed Kitovani and Adamia. In the same month, Gamsakhurdia ordered a presidential decree to abolish the position of the commander and turn it into a unit called Rapid Reaction Corps, subordinated under the MIA. Gamsakhurdia created another internal troop, OMON (Jones, 2015, p. 68). In September, Gamsakhurdia created the MoD and restored the National Guard's previous status and had it subordinated directly to the president himself. In September, Gamsakhurdia created the National Security Council consisting of law enforcement bodies (Jones, 2015, p. 69).

Despite his official dismissal as the commander, Kitovani continued to lead most of the National Guard. The confrontation between Gamsakhurdia and the paramilitary leaders escalated towards the end of 1991 and led to a violent clash which ousted Gamsakhurdia from power. By the end of 1991, the National Guards and the Mkhedrioni, the two major paramilitaries, thus became not merely armed forces but a dominant player in Georgian politics. Having grown powerful enough to organise a coup and oust the President, they became the most influential political player in the Georgian politics by the end of 1992 (Aves, 1996; Darchiashvili, 1997a; Jones, 2015).

[30] Later in the year, however, the arrested Mhkedrioni members were released to fight in the civil war.

The relation between Gamsakhurdia and other paramilitary leaders further deteriorated after the failed attempt of the disbandment of paramilitaries and the dismissals of their commanders. After having been dismissed, Kitovani and Adamia joined the Mkhedrioni and its leader, Ioseliani, and formed the anti-Gamsakhurdia coalition. The formation of the anti-Gamsakhurdia coalition changed the power balance between Gamsakhurdia and his rivals. At the end of 1991, the latter organized the coup and ousted Gamsakhurdia as the President. The ousting of Gamsakhurdia left the various attempts of security sector change, i.e., the disbandment of the paramilitary forces and the development of national military and other state security institutions incomplete. The coup was an illustrative event to demonstrate the dominance of the paramilitary forces over the democratically elected president. Security sector change during this period suggests that the paramilitary forces became dominant actors not only in the security sector but also in politics and society in Georgia by the end of 1991, rather than being subordinated under the civilian control.

3.5 Conclusion

During the political transition between 1985 and 1991, the security sector in Georgia experienced two major changes. The first change was the evolution of the prominent paramilitaries. In pre-independence Georgia in the late 1980s, a number of paramilitary forces started to emergence and affiliated to prominent individuals such as independence movement leaders. Those paramilitaries were not of a large scale in manpower and weaponry, and their affiliation was rather informal and based on personal loyalty to leaders. The second change is the creation of new state security sector institutions. Towards the end of the Soviet Union, the Soviet state security apparatus started to become fragmented: their last intervention in Georgia was on in 1989, when the Soviet internal troops intervened and violently clashed an anti-Soviet rally. When the Soviet Union ended, the Soviet security apparatus ceased to function, leaving a vacuum in state governance. A number of the paramilitaries emerged to fill in the vacuum and thrived in the early stage of post-independence Georgia. In the absence of professional security sector institutions and civilian control mechanism, the

paramilitaries continued being disobedient against the President and became influential enough to oust him by the end of 1991.

The scrutiny on the local security sector actors and the process of security sector change indicates that the domestic power struggle among a handful of political elites was the key driver for determining the course of security sector change. The appointments of the paramilitary leaders as heads of the state institutions and the frequent dismissals of paramilitary leaders suggest the absence of a systemic SSR strategy.

Moreover, this chapter attributes the emergence and dominance of the paramilitaries to political, socio-economic and institutional factors. As discussed earlier, these factors include a wide range of factors including the emerging Georgian nationalism, widespread client networks embedded with the informal economy, the high accessibility to circulating small arms and low confidence in the existing state security institutions. It is noteworthy that most of these factors are not confined to a narrow definition of security but encompass a wide range of human security concerns.

Based on the analysis of the interplay between those factors, the chapter provides the following observations that seek to further refine the understanding of the relationship between domestic socio-political factors and the process of agenda setting for security sector change.

First, the nature of the security sector process in Georgia during this period appears to be politically driven. The process of agenda setting for security sector change, for instance, the disbandment of the Mkhedrioni and the downgrade of the National Guard, aimed at curtailing political influence of the paramilitary leaders. The SSR agenda was heavily influenced by power dynamics between the president and his political rivals, i.e., the paramilitary leaders.

Second, the executive needed to have enough capacity and political support to carry out SSR agendas. The actual executive power of the President during this period was extremely weak. Although the president initiated some SSR efforts, they were met with severe resistance from the reform targets: the paramilitary

forces. As the latter eventually became prevailing actors, those reform efforts were not realized.

Third, the paramilitaries were not merely security forces but also played various political and socio-economic roles. During the course of the pre-independence period, the paramilitary forces became as a symbol for the Georgian nationalism. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the independence, they provided a socio-economic network through which economic benefits were distributed to its supporting members. On the other hand, the paramilitary forces did not function as state security institutions to protect and promote security of the general public. Instead, they remained de fact private militia and only loyal to their own leaders. In other words, their role was not so much of security issues but more of political and socio-economic nature.

This analysis on the Georgia during this period thus highlighted the importance of understating the political dynamics as well as political, socio-economic and institutional dimensions that surround security sector actors. The next chapter further applies the political economy analysis and examines what factors drive the course of security sector change in a different political period under the President Shevardnadze.

Chapter 4 Security sector change under the Shevardnadze regime between 1992 and 2003

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on examining the security sector change process during the socio-political transition in Georgia during the period between 1992 and 2003. The analysis in this chapter examines key factors in the agenda-setting process of SSR and how they determined the course of security sector change during the Shevardnadze times. During the first half of the phase, Georgia started consolidating its statehood, while territorial conflicts remained violent and contentious. Under Shevardnadze's administration, the security sector development started receiving external assistance from the Western allies. In the second half of the phase, an anti-Shevardnadze government movement began to increase and eventually led to the ousting of Shevardnadze. What roles did the security sector actors play and how did they interact with political dynamics in the transitional period? What were the key factors that affected the course of security sector change?

The chapter consists of three parts. The first part examines political developments relevant to security sector change in Georgia between 1992 and 2003. The chapter proceeds with a detailed examination of the changes in the security sector. The third part of this chapter provides a political economy analysis to examine these changes in the security sector, identifying key determining factors and dynamics among them in the SSR agenda-setting under the Shevardnadze regime.

4.2 The examination of the political developments between 1992 and 2003

As the previous chapter described, post-independence Georgian was at the verge of collapse as a state in 1992. The Georgian state authority in Tbilisi could not control paramilitaries, and the paramilitaries instead filled in the power vacuum, by taking over the crucial security sector institutions. Between 1992 and 1993, Georgia was deep in violent chaos, too, with the two separatist conflicts in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as a civil strife in Georgia itself. This was at the peak of Georgia's being on the edge of sliding into a failed state by the early 1990s.

The return of the former First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shevardnadze, to Tbilisi in March 1993 was a political watershed. Since the mid-1990s, Georgia began restoring its statehood and building state institutions, including security sector ones. Under the Shevardnadze times between 1992 and 2003, Georgia gained a certain degree of stability. This section outlines the main political developments between 1992 and 2003 as a context in which security sector change took place.

4.2.1 Building an independent Georgian state

After having been at the verge of collapse in the early 1990s, Georgia started building its statehood. Shevardnadze, the head of the State Council, was elected the president in 1995. In the same year a new constitution was adopted. A new currency, the lari, was introduced. Narrowly escaping two assassination attempts, Shevardnadze won the election and became the president with stronger executive power, in November 1995. Non-political civic movement grew. By this time, Georgia had avoided the risk of state collapse.

After Shevardnadze became the president in 1995, Georgia started to see a democratic political system evolve. Basic principles of democracy were implemented, and a multi-party system was consolidated, with Shevardnadze's Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG) as the leading party. Civil society grew, so did an independent media both in print and electric formats. By the end of the 1990s, the state-building process in Georgia had significantly progressed.

When it comes to territorial integrity, Georgia barely controlled its own territory in 1993. The violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were monitored by international mechanisms of the UN in Abkhazia and OSCE in South Ossetia, but became stuck in the political deadlock. The conflicts' situation reached a point that was often called 'no war, no peace'. In 1993, Georgia lost a battle in Sukhumi,

Abkhazia. During the Shevardnadze period, Georgia also lost control over South Ossetia as a result of the violent conflicts not only militarily and politically but also economically. In addition to the two breakaway regions, Adjara remained independent of Tbilisi. Its leader, Abashidze, implemented authoritarian, one-person politics. Abashidze consolidated the control of the armed forces in the region and made them into his personal guard to maintain the independence of the region. Though Georgia escaped from a state collapse in the early 1990s, the question of its territorial integration remained resolved during the Shevardnadze period.

Figure 1 Map of Georgia

4.2.2 International recognition and diplomatic shift towards the Western allies

By the beginning of the 1990s, Georgia had become isolated in the international community. However, since Shevardnadze became a state head in 1992, Georgia had gradually gained international recognition as an independent state. Georgia joined a number of multinational organisations and partnerships. Within 1992, for instance, Georgia became a member of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)[31] the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the World Bank. Shevardnadze built a close strategic relation with the Western allies, in particular the United States, whilst keeping 'balance diplomacy' between the newly emerged Western allies and Russia.

As described above, Georgia between 1992 and 2003 transformed from a collapsing state, to a fragile state with significant functioning state institutions and basic democratic frameworks and mechanisms. Although the territorial disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained unsolved, a certain level of security was restored. It became recognised as a state internationally, too, which brought an amount of external assistance to the country, to build its state institutions and systems further. It was in this context that the SSR efforts took place.

Strategic interests in Georgia increased, as Georgia was to become a transit country of the oil pipeline between Baku, Tbilisi and Ceyhan. This enhanced the strategic importance of Georgia for the Western countries. The strategic interest among the Euro-Atlantic allies in Georgia helped Georgia maintained its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

4.2.3 The declining Shevardnadze block and the emerging anti-Shevardnadze alliance

Shevardnadze won the 1995 presidential election with an overwhelming majority. However, popular support for his presidency started declining since the late 1990s, too, as Georgia's economy contributed struggling. Although Georgia recovered from the economic decline in the early 1990s, the economic situation deteriorated again after the economic crisis in Russia in 1998 (The Foundation "Liberal Academy - Tbilisi", 2012, p. 4).

[31] The CSCE became the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE, in 1995

Basic daily life for the general population remained hard to maintain. Even in Tbilisi, electricity and gas supply were not stable except in privileged districts. Prevailing on the informal economy as seen in the previous chapter, the issue of corruption became even more rampant and became a political issue, especially in the second half of the Shevardnadze regime.

Shevardnadze nevertheless continued to enjoy wide support from the general population as well as external actors, both of the West and Russia. Shevardnadze won the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections with an overwhelming majority. However, the stagnated economic condition, along with the widespread corruption, contributed to accumulating frustration among the general public against the Shevardnadze regime. Frustration among the general public reached its peak in the latter half of the Shevardnadze presidency. In late 2000, for instance, people often lit bonfires on the street, and sometimes demonstrated to demand the President to resign even in winter at night.[32]

It was in this context that so-called 'reformists', politicians of a younger generation, led by Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili started formulating an anti-Shevardnadze alliance.[33] Shevardnadze's political protégé and the former justice minister, Saakashvili, had distanced himself from Shevardnadze by leaving the Shevardnadze's government and party, the Union of Citizens of Georgia, in 2001.[34] Saakashvili founded a new political party, the United National movement, and criticised Shevardnadze for corruption, which was notoriously high among the security sector institutions then. The anti-Shevardnadze group became to be called 'reformist`, as they advocated the reform of the Shevardnadze regime and its power basis, the security sector institutions. The security sector institutions had thus become a target for the anti-Shevardnadze coalition's political campaign.

[32] Author's observation, September – December 2000, Tbilisi.
[33] Both Zhvania and Saakshvili were Shevardnadze's protégé until the early 2000's. Zhvania was general secretary of Shevardnadze's party, the CUG, until 2001 when he pulled off in a protest against corruption scandal involving high MSS officials. Saakashvili joined the CUG and was elected the MP. In 2000, Saakashvili became the Minister of Justice under the Shevardnadze government, then resigned next year in the protest against the corruption scandal.
[34] Saakashvili joined Shevardnadze's party and rose as one of the most prominent politicians of the next generation, along with Zhvania and held the position of the justice minister under Shevardnadze's government. Saakashvili had gradually distanced from Shevardnadze, however, as Shevardnadze started losing popular support in the mid-2000s.

By 2003, the opposition had organised mass protests for the last few years. Some civil society institutions, in particular, the Liberty Institute, had been the pivotal in the democratisation process. After a few failed demonstrations, in the year 2003, they managed to become more organised and better financed than the previous years. Popular protests against the Shevardnadze regime started as early as April. Since the election on 2 November, the popular protest became more active. Under the leadership of Kmara! ('Enough!') activists, closely worked with the Liberty Institute, people from other regions than Tbilisi participated in the protest. Protests grew bigger as the movement gained popular support. Ordinary citizens joined the rallies, and the opposition leaders: Saakasivili, Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze put strong pressures on Shevardnadze to resign. In the meanwhile, Shevardnadze sought support from Russia's Putin and Abashidze of Adjara, which the opposition regarded as a symbolic gesture of the authoritative dictatorship of Shevardnadze. This resulted to inflame further disgust against the Shevardnadze regime among the population. Shevardnadze also lost a strong ally, the head of State TV Channel, by criticising him for the channel's media strategy on the protests. On 19 November, Shevardnadze agreed to resign. Burjanadze became an interim president until the presidential election on 4 January 2004.[35]

Thus, the 'reformist' took over from Shevardnadze after his decade-long regime. During the 10 years, Georgia had achieved a certain degree of state building. The territorial disputes over the two separatist regions remained unsolved and the Shevardnadze government's popularity had gradually become waned in the early 2000's. However, in comparison with the time immediately after the independence, Georgia restored a greater degree of stability. In this context, a number of state institutions, including the security sector actors, were built.

4.3 Examining security sector change between 1992 and 2003

[35] Prior to the 'Rose Revolution', Zhvania had resigned as the Speaker of Parliament and split from Shevardnadze's CUG and formed an opposition. Nino Bujranadze had replaced Zhvania as the Speaker of Parliament.

The following section explores two phases of security sector change in the period between 1992 and 2003. It examines how each element of the security sector took different trajectories and degrees of reform implementation. The first phase runs between 1992 and 1998. During this period, a basic legal framework for developing and defining security sector institutions was established. As the major quasi-state paramilitaries became mostly disbanded, the state armed forces, including paramilitaries, became defined by the 1997 Law On Defence ("The Law of Georgia On the Defence of Georgia," 1997). Under the Law on the Defence of Georgia, the security forces in Georgia are divided into two categories: the Military Forces and the Armed Forces. According to the Law, the Military Forces consists of Armed Forces of Georgia, Border Guards of the State Department of Protection, Internal Troops of the MIA and other armed formations created by the legislation order. The Armed Forces consisted of ground forces, air forces and armies of antiaircraft defence.[36]

The paramilitary heads and their followers were replaced with professional security personnel in the process. In the second phase of security sector change 1998 and 2003, the defence and justice sectors made a clear shift towards the Western standards and received external assistance from the Western allies, whilst the reform of the police and paramilitary forces met with stagnation.

4.3.1. Security sector change between 1992 and 1998

In the first half of the Shevardnadze times, a basic legal framework was prepared and the professionalization of the security sector institutions started. During this period, Georgia saw three major changes in the security sector: a) disbandment of paramilitary forces, disarmament of armed civilians, b) state institutions and legal framework started to be developed and/or formalised and c) professionalisation of the security sector personnel and institutions.

4.3.1.1 Disbanding paramilitaries

[36] The Law was amended in 2001 and naval forces were added as armed forces.

The SSR efforts under the Shevardnadze regime began with the disbandment of the quasi-state paramilitaries and the ousting of their leaders. During 1993, the cooperation between Shevardnadze and Kitovani was dissolved and the later was dismissed from the Minister of Defence. Shevardnadze commenced military building process to professionalize armed forces and reduce the individual influence of the paramilitary leaders. The National Guards, which was renamed as the Rapid Reaction Force at the time, was abolished as a separate unit.

However, the annihilation of unaffiliated armed forces was not a smooth process and met with resistance from the paramilitary leaders. In January 1995, Kitovani departed with his 1,000-armed supporters and invaded Abkhazia. After clashes with forces of the Georgian Ministry of State Security (MSS), he was arrested, and his men were disarmed. The National Guard was subordinated to MoD in 1994 as a department. Restricting the quasi-state paramilitaries by the Constitution in 1995, the process of disbanding the National Guards and the Mkhedrioni became complete. However, the politically driven disbandment and lack of systemic DDR process left some negative consequences to the overall SSR efforts, as elaborated in chapter 8.

4.3.1.2 Building civilian control mechanisms

The security sector governance dominated by the semi-paramilitary headers was gradually replaced by a more systemic, civilian control mechanism. In 1994, Shevardnadze created the National Security and Defence Council within the Parliament, along with the Military Consultants Group. These platforms appointed and shuffle high level state security personnel.

Since the mid-1990s, a legal framework defining the relations between and roles of security sector actors started to be built, too. The most significant one is the Constitution that was approved in 1995. According to the Constitution, the President was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, as well as the chairman of the Security Council. State budget including defence and security expenditures was discussed and adopted by the Parliament. The President could not deploy armed forces in emergency situations without obtaining consent from

the Parliament. Furthermore, the then chairperson of the parliamentary defence committee, Revas Adamia, is quoted saying: 'To say that our committee controls the law-enforcement structures would be grossly exaggerated' (Darchiashvili, 1997a). This way, the Constitution set out a foundation of the armed forces based on Western standards based on democratic, civil military relations.

The Constitution guaranteed the independence of the judiciary, too. Subsequently, the penal system was transferred from the MIA to the Ministry of Justice in 2000. This transfer of the judicial power to the Ministry of Justice meant that the law enforcement body would no longer control the justice system, which was the case in the Soviet times.

Besides the Constitution, a series of laws and legislations were developed. They include the Law on Police (adopted in 1993), Law of State Border (1998), State Material Reserve (1998), the Status of the Servicemen (1998), Operative-Investigative Activity (1999) and Defence (2001). These laws contributed to clarifying the role of security sector personnel. For instance, the Law on the Status of the Servicemen restricted the political activity of the military, police and special agency employees. It also prohibits the political activity of the military creation of political party cells within their units. (Darchiashvili, 2004, p. 90) Similarly, any commercial activity was prohibited for the employees of the security sector agencies. The introduction of the new security sector related legislations thus separated the security sector sphere from the political and economic ones.

In the defence sphere, a further effort for civilian control took place. The National Security Council (NSC) was established in 1996. According to The Law of Georgia On the National Security Council, the NSC was:

> "an advisory body of the President for decision-making on strategic questions of the organisation of military construction and defence, international and foreign policy related to the security of the country, maintenance of stability, law and order."[37]

[37] The Law of Georgia On the National Security Council, Article 2, 24 January 1996.

The NSC was in charge of dealing with both defence and domestic security issues. The NSC consisted of the President, the Secretary of the NSC and the Ministers of State, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, State Security and Finance.

4.3.1.3 Professionalising security and justice sector agencies

The reshuffle of the ministers in 1993 initiated the reform of the defence sector. Shevardnadze replaced key management positions in the security sector institutions by appointing professional staff who were trained military experts either at the Soviet (or Russian) or US institutions. This way, the influential yet non-military professionals such as Kitovani were removed from the state security institutions.

Georgia adopted its new security concept with a clear indication that Georgia would form a closer strategic tie with the Euro-Atlantic allies and distance from Russia. In April 1997, the Georgian parliament adopted new foreign-policy guidelines aimed at expediting the country's integration into European structures. The Parliamentary Speaker Zhravia said that the new concept reflected the current state of Georgia's relation with Russia which he termed "the main threat to Georgian security."[38] With an intention to be integrated into the NATO system, Georgia started strengthening its military partnership with the USA and the other NATO ally countries. In 1996, Georgia started the NATO Programme for Partnership in 1996. In order to assist with the organisational reform of the security system, the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) was founded under the provision of the National Security Council in 1998, in order to assist with the organisational reform of the security system. In 1999, the ISAB produced a number of recommendations to modernise the Georgian military. Those recommendations included the elimination of parallel structure in the security sector institutions, the need for a formal national security concept and a White Paper on defence, the reduction of the armed forces and the appointment of a civilian minister of defence.

[38] RFE/RL (1997) "Georgian adopts new security concept", RFE/RL, 4 April 1997.

4.3.2 Security sector change between 1999 and 2003

The second phase runs between 1999 and 2003. The Western allies increased their assistance for the Georgian SSR, in a context where the specific SSR agendas for international assistance were being first developed. It was in this period that different security sector institutions showed different degrees of reform progress.

4.3.2.1 Increased external assistance for the defence and justice spheres

The pro-Western foreign policy of the Shevardnadze regime required the Georgian security sector system to be aligned with the Western standards. Consequently, external assistance from the NATO allies started to increase, particularly in the defence and justice sectors.

Among the NATO allies, the USA was the biggest assistance provider. The USA provided technical assistance to the Border Guards and the Custom Service to enhance their capacity to address border control. The Border Security and Law Enforcement (BSLW) Assistance Program was administrated by the US Custom Service in order to establish the government's control on borders, providing equipment and training (Hoye and Davis, 2000, p. 8). As for developing export control regimes to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile material, the US Department of State and Defence assists the Georgian State Department of the State Border Guards under the Co-operative Threat Reduction Program.

The US assistance became even bigger after the 9.11 attacks in the USA in 2001. The USA started providing bilateral military assistance to enhance anti-terrorist operation capacities and combat capacities of the Georgian security agencies. These programmes included the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance Program; Military/Ammunition Relocation Program; Foreign Military Financing Program; and International Military Education and Training Program. Among these programmes, the biggest programme was the Georgia Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP). The 64 million USD programme involved training of

Georgian troops to enhance counter-terrorism capacities (Darchiashvili, 2004, p. 96).

Turkey, a then close NATO ally, also provided military assistance. For instance, Turkey provided Georgian officers with military training at Turkish military academies and the participation of Georgian servicemen in peacekeeping operations in which Turkey was involved. Turkey also signed an agreement to train a Georgian commando unit and provide Georgia with non-combat materials.[39] With the affluent financial and technical support, Georgia managed built its own national military and modernised the defence system in the latter half of the Shevardnadze times.

The most significant progress in the justice reform was the transfer of the penal system from the MIA to the Ministry of Justice. The penal system was transferred to the Ministry of Justice in 2000, after a number of years of pressure from the Council of Europe and within Georgia itself.[40] This transfer of the judicial power to the Ministry of Justice meant that the law enforcement body would no longer control the justice system, which was the case in the Soviet times. American and European donors actively supported the judicial reform. Training of judges and assistance in the court system was assisted by the European Commission, the United States Agency for International Development, and the World Bank. The transfer provided more constitutional independence of the law enforcement bodies with the justice system.

4.3.2.2 The Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security

In comparison with the defence and justice spheres, the MIA and the MSS underwent few reform efforts. The biggest hindrance to SSR in Georgia was the weak domestic will or support for the reform process, especially from within the security forces and policing organisations, i.e. the MIA and the MSS. In the early period of the Shevardnadze administration, the government did not show much strong will to address problems in those organisations.

[39] RFE/RL (1997): "Georgia, Turkey discuss Military Cooperation", RFE/RL, 22 May 1997.
[40] The Ministry of Justice was headed by an emerging young politician, Saakashvili, appointed as the minister in 2000.

The reform process in the MIA and the MSS makes a sharp contrast with the one in the defence and justice sectors. As discussed above, the Ministries of Defence and Justice saw a certain degree of westernisation with external assistance. On the other hand, the Internal Affairs and State Security ministries remained its Soviet style governance. The MIA, for instance, restored the Soviet style staffing. Instead of appointing a civilian as the Minister, the President appointed police professionals who were either a Police Major-General or Police-Lieutenant-General, throughout his times between 1995 and 2003.

As the criticism against the corruption increased in the general public, in November 2001, the Shevardnadze administration dismissed a number of Internal Affairs and State Security officials (Jones, 2015, p. 165). Besides this, hardly any institutional reform efforts were made in those internal security organs. External assistance towards the MIA and the MSS was quite limited, too.

4.3.2.3 Paramilitary groups

By the late 1990s, all the major paramilitary forces came to under the state structure, mainly the internal security agencies. Around this period, Georgia had a number of paramilitary forces the controls of the MIA, the MSS, the MoD and the State Department of the State Border Defence (SDBD) respectively.

As seen above, the biggest paramilitary forces, the National Guards, were already subordinated to the MoD in 1994 as a department. Those non-defence sector paramilitary forces also had troops and their manpower numbered in thousands. For instance, the MIA had several armed forces under its control, i.e., Interior Troops, Assault Brigade and OMON. The MIA and the Special Service of State Protection include 3,000 to 3,500 officers and soldiers. The SDBD consisted of 5,500 personnel. State Safeguard Service had approximately 6,000 personnel in the Service. The MSS also had armed units. However, the size and mandate of their paramilitary forces were unclear as such information was almost inaccessible form the MSS at that time.

The mandates of some of the paramilitaries duplicated and/or sometimes conflicted. The Special Service of State Protection's mandates mainly concerned of the protection of boarders and strategic state assets such as the President's office and oil industry infrastructure. The MIA's paramilitary forces had the tasks of maintaining law and order, fighting terrorism and other forms of organised crime, defending state installations, protecting special cargo transportation, and supporting the military in wartime. The SDBD were to defend the country's long borders and had the task of apprehending smugglers, drug traffickers, poachers, and illegal immigrants amongst other things. The Coast Guard was in charge of coastal border control. State Safeguard Service had the role of protecting all key strategic state assets such as the President's office, the Parliament and the component parts of the oil industry infrastructure. While to the paramilitary forces in the early 1990s were mostly serving for their individual leaders and networks, the paramilitaries in this period became mandated to protect state assets (Koyama, 2002, p. 7). As discussed in depth in chapter 8, reflecting the lack of reform at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Securities, the reform of the affiliated paramilitaries had unsolved issues, i.e., overlapping mandates and ambiguity over the concept of 'public order'.

In sum, the SSR during in the late 1990s made a significant progress but left unsolved issues. The quasi-state paramilitaries were disbanded and their leaders were replaced with professional security personnel. The defence system had been created from scratch and opened to foreign assistance for institution building. The transfer of the justice system was a significant step to establish the justice sector's independence of the police. On the other hand, few reform efforts succeeded in so-called 'power ministries', i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. Although the paramilitary forces became under the state control, their mandates were left ambiguous and sometimes conflicting among themselves.

Table 3 Major security agencies during the Shevardnadze period, 1992 - 2003

Non-state	Quasi-state	State
(Mostly disbanded/dissolved)	• Ajara paramilitary forces	• Internal Troops • Ministry of Defence • Ministry of Internal Affairs • Ministry of State Security • National Guards (subordinated to the MoD as a department in 1994) • National Security Council (established in 1996) • Special Service of State Protection • State Department of Border Defence

4.4 Examining driving factors for security sector change between 1992 and 2003

The security sector institutions and governance system evolved significantly during the Shevardnadze period between 1992 and 2003. Yet, the degrees of reform progress varied among the defence, justice, internal affairs and paramilitaries actors. This section discusses how the divergence in the course of the reform efforts emerged. As in the previous chapter, the discussion follows the political economy analysis framework and examines key structural features, power relations between prominent individuals and agencies, as well as their incentives for security sector change during the Shevardnadze times.

4.4.1 Structural diagnosis

The security sector institutions and governance system evolved significantly during this period. This section applies the same analytical framework applied in the previous chapter and identifies driving factors for security sector change.

Political, socio-economic and institutional perspectives surrounding this period are examined.

4.4.1.1 Political dimension

The domestic political context remained volatile and involved a high-level power struggle among the top leadership figures, Shevardnadze and his political rivals. Having succeeded Gamsakhurdia and been elected the President, Shevardnadze struggle to consolidate his power in a political rivalry at the Georgian leadership. During the first half of the Shevardnadze times, a power struggle involving Shevardnadze, as well as high-ranking officials of his power platform, the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Defence and State Security, took place. The competition over power among political elites sometimes took a violent form during this period. For instance, a number of prominent figures, including Shevardnadze's close allies, Giorgi Chanturia and Soliko Khadeishvili, were assassinated between 1994 and 1995.[41] The assassination target not only included politicians but also other prominent figures of the security sector ministries. In April 1994, the deputy minister of internal affairs, Giorgi Gulua was killed. An attempted assassination against the former minister of defence, Giorgi Karkarashvili, took place in the same month and killed his deputy. This shows how closely the state security sector was involved in the political disputes during this period.

The territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia were far from reaching the settlement. The central government in Tbilisi had had no control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the vacuum of functioning state apparatus, armed criminality set in, allegedly engaged in trafficking of tobacco, drugs, weapons and humans. The residents in the two regions increased their economic activities with bordering Russia. In Abkhazia, the majority of the Abkhazians possessed Russian passport. The local currency was replaced by ruble. Residents in South Ossetia, both Georgians and Ossetians, engaged in trading

[41] In December the same year, Chanturia, who by then became the leader of the National Democratic Party, was shot and killed in Tbilisi (Jones, 2015, p. 89). In June 1995, Khabeishvili, the head of the Democratic and Revival Fund, was also shot and killed ("Mkhedrioni member confesses to involvement in political assassinations," 1997). Assassinations were attempted on Shevardnadze himself in 1995 and 1998 (Chicago Tribune, 1998; The Guardian, 1995).

with Russia through Roki Tunnel which connects Russia and North and South Ossetias.

As to its external relations, Georgia established and maintained relatively stable relations with all the major strategic players in the region. During the first half of his presidency, Georgia adopted pro-Euro-Atlantic policy and increased its strategic partnership with the Euro-Atlantic allies, namely, the USA. Turkey, the immediate neighbour and a NATO member state, increased military and economic cooperation, too. In 1996, NATO's Programme for Partnership between Georgia and NATO began and a political and strategic regional grouping of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was launched. In 1999, Georgia left the security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and reached an agreement with Russia to withdraw four Russian military bases from Georgia at the OSCE Istanbul Summit.

The Georgia-Russia relation deteriorated as Georgia became involved a closer relation with the USA and other Western allies. The Georgia-Russia relation soared in 2002 when Russia bombed the Georgian villages near Pankisi Gorge in 2002. Under the pro-West strategic shift, Shevardnadze's Georgia managed to manoeuvre a delicate diplomatic relation with Russia. Shevardnadze sought Russian support to curtail nationalist upheavals in the western region and Abkhazia. In return, Georgia agreed to join the CIS at the end of 1993. Also, Georgia accepted the presence of Russian military bases and border guards in the country, as well as Russia's leading role in peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Shevardnadze's government maintained the balance diplomacy between Russia and the West.

4.4.1.2 Socio-economic dimension

<u>Organised crimes and corruption</u>

The most prominent socio-economic phenomena related to the course of security sector change during this period are corruption and organised crimes. Corruption among political and economic elites still very much remained in post-revolution

Georgia. State budgets were constantly tight and salaries for law enforcement personnel were not only low but also often delayed or underpaid.

As discussed in the previous chapter, rampant corruption and organised crimes had not been a new phenomenon in Georgia. Since around 1995, the link between organised criminals, corruption and the state increasingly become even closer. A number of observers point out that state organs' and/or high-ranking governmental officials' involvement in corruption. The MIA reportedly controlled the retake and the wholesales in the cigarette and oil businesses (Darchiashvili, 2003, pp.8-12, cited in Kuparatdze, 2012, p.123). Kakha Targamadze, the Minister of Internal Affairs (1995-2001), reportedly opposed the transfer of pre - trial detention centres to the Ministry of Justice because "he would lose opportunities for bribes from the prisons" (Stefes, 2006, p.109). During his term as the minister, Targamadze involved in various organised criminal activities, namely in the tobacco and illicit fuel businesses as well as the kidnapping business (Kupatadze, 2012, p.125).

An example of Tariel Oniani, a prominent thief-in-law, illustrates how close and tight the tie between the government and organised criminal spheres had become under the Shevardnadze regime. Oniani had developed a close tie with the government structure and business figures, including Shevardnadze's relatives. Utilising his extensive networks both in the state and the world of thieves-in-law in and outside Georgia, Oniani played a pivotal role in settling disputes between large businesses (Kupatadze, 2012, p.125). The extent and degree of his influence was vividly demonstrated when he facilitated the release of three UN observes who had been taken hostage in the Kodori Gorge in western Georgia in 2003. (Slade, pp.5-6). Shevardnadze's plenipotentiary did not hide but rather proudly announced his connections with Oniani and his 'rescue methods' to the press (Slade, p.6).

As the earlier section of this chapter discussed, the issue of corruption ignited a political dispute within the Shevardnadze block and eventually led to the split between Shevardnadze and anti-Shevardnadze politicians. Corruption was widespread in the security sector institutions, too. Wide spread corruption involved high-ranking officials at the Ministries of Internal Affairs, State Security

and Defence. A number of corruption scandals involved high-ranking officials of those ministries, despite the introduction of Laws banning state officials from engaging in economic activities.

The Autonomous Republic of Adjara was a primal example of economic and political activities determined by nepotism. Adjara's leader, Abashidze had strictly controlled the law enforcement bodies in the republic, especially the customs point on the Georgian-Turkish border.[42] Security and law enforcement officials owned a graphic design company called Basri Limited. Directed by Soso Gogitidze, the brother-in-law of Abashidze and the Minister of State Security of Adjara, the company was involved in drug trafficking and car smuggling from Chechnya into Adjara.[43] Gogitidze was one of a few examples of Abashidze's family clan members. In fact, 57 percent of the executive and 54 percent of the legislature in Adjara were close relatives of Abashidze and his wife at that time.[44]

Smuggling was another phenomenon that involved corrupt security sector actors. For instance, local community members in Zugdidi, a region bordering with Abkhazia, expressed a strong discontent against the governmental officials' involvement in smuggling.[45] Paata Zakalaishvili, a civil society expert on the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, told that the local authorities in the border regions were involved in illicit trading of commercial goods and weapons. According to Zakalaishvili, Shevardnadze promised unofficially to the local authorities that Tbilisi would not prosecute them for trafficking in exchange for remaining within the Georgian territory.

People's confidence in the executive body, in particular the police, was low (Koyama, 2005). They did recognise the role of the police and their armed forces under the Shevardnadze period for stabilising the country. However, their confidence in the law enforcement body declined immensely soon after the country restored relative stability in the mid-1990s. The major reason was an

[42] Kupatadze, A. (2010): *'Transition after transition': coloured revolutions and organized crime in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan*, a thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St. Andrews, http://hdl.ahndle.net/10023/1320, p.122.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Kikadidze, K. and Losaberidze, D. (2000) "Institutionalism and clientalism in Georgia", Series of discussion materials, UNDP, pp.40-41
[45] Author's interview, October 2000, Tbilisi.

increasing rate of corruption in the form of bribery. Bribe-taking by the traffic police on street became rampant, and people stopped consulting the police as they were allegedly prone to bribe. Rather than turning to the police, people increasingly relied on their own informal network when they needed to solve community crimes. Interviewed on people's perception in the police at that time, one local community member put, "People had to defend for themselves against the police" (Darchiashvili, 1997a).

Civil society

Civil society in Georgia had emerged as a distinct player by the end of the Shevardnadze times. In the process of SSR, some civil society organisations and think-tanks contributed to SSR-related discussions. For instance, experts at organisations such as the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) produced a number of detailed analyses on issues concerning security sector governance and reform efforts. Human rights organisations such as the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA) had been actively involved in critiquing the governance and performance of the justice and penal system institutions over years (Hiscock, 2005).

Some non-governmental organisations such as the Liberty Institute became prominent organisations in the field of political movement in the early 2000's. In particular, one of the leading members of the Liberty Institute, such as Gia Bokeria, was a close ally to Saakashvili and played a pivotal role in organising anti-Shevardnadze movement by the youth, Kmara! ("Enough!").[46] The anti-Shevardnadze driven by civil society eventually led to the change in the power.

4.4.1.3 Institutional dimension

The development of legal framework as well as the state institutions in the security sector proceeded significantly, especially by the adaptation of the 1995 Constitution. However, the level of confidence in the state institution among the general public stayed low.

[46] Personal communication, November 2000, Tbilisi.

Under the new Constitution adopted in 1995, Georgia's legislative system adopted a semi-presidential system and unicameral parliament. Under the arrangement, the Parliament became the supreme representative body which exercises legislative authority. The Parliament is chaired by its Speaker. The Georgian Parliament is the country's Supreme representative body which effects legislative authority, determines the main directions of the country's home and foreign policy, controls the activity of the Government within limits defined by the Constitution and exercises other rights. The parliament had several committees which were supposed to control the security sector actors. The Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs was responsible for the Internal Affairs, and the Committee on Defence and Security responsible for paramilitary forces including Border Guards and Internal Troops. (The Georgian Parliament, n.d.) Although the Parliamentary Committees existed, in reality, the executive bodies did not always respect their guidance.

The executive institution development saw some progress. The 1995 Constitution established a strong Presidency similar to the American style which accumulates the executive power under the President. According to the 1995 Constitution, the President decides foreign and domestic policy, issues presidential decrees, and presents budgets to the Parliament. The President is elected by universal suffrage and serves a five-year term, for a maximum of two terms. In relation with the other executive actors, the 1995 Constitution provided a more influential role to the President. Prior to 1995, Georgia had a cabinet of ministers with a Prime Minister as a head. This system was then replaced with a new arrangement under which a Minister of State, subordinated under the President, serves as a State Chancellery and heading line ministries, including the Power Ministries, Ministries of Internal Affairs, State Security and Defence (The Georgian Parliament, 1997).

The 1995 Constitution laid out the judicial institutional framework, too. According to the 1995 Constitution, the Georgian judiciary consists of the Constitutional Court, the general courts and the General Prosecutor's Office. The Constitutional Court is the main body responsible for ensuring constitutionality. There are nine judges in the Constitutional Court: three selected by the President, three by the Parliament and the other three by the Supreme Court. The General Persecutor

was to be nominated by the President and approved by the Parliament. The judiciary's independence of the executive power during this period was rather weak. There was a lack of qualified judges yet, and the executive power often intervened in judicial proceedings. Corruption was widespread within the justice system and most judges were believed to be prone to bribes. As within the executive, confidence in the judiciary among the general public was low.

The state armed forces were further institutionalised and affiliated under the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and State Ministries. Efforts to establishing the democratic control of those forces started to be introduced. For instance, in 1997, the Law on the Defence of Georgia was adopted and laid out the civilian control structure for the defence armed forces. According to the Law, the President was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, whilst the Parliament was responsible for defining the state policy in the sphere of defence, approving the military doctrine and the construction of the military forces, and passing laws in the defence sphere. The Parliament was also tasked to approve the defence budget and the numerical strength of the Military Forces. The President could hold dominant power under a newly introduced semi-presidential system. The armed forces affiliated to the MoD were therefore under the strong influence of the President. This was also the case for the other armed forces affiliated to the other Ministries, since the ministries the security forces were affiliated with were directly under the President.

4.4.2 Agency diagnosis

4.4.2.1 Eduard Shevardnadze: The President

Given the concentration of executive power under the president, as well as his position in the Soviet times, Shevardnadze was one of the most influential actors that shaped the course of the security sector change between 1992 and 2003. Unlike his predecessor, Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze had a long track record of serving as a Soviet bureaucrat and communist party leader since the time of Soviet Georgian. Shevardnadze was appointed the Minister of Internal Affairs of Soviet Georgia in 1965 and became the First Secretary of the Georgian

Communist Party in 1972, before he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991.

The close tie with the Soviet state institutions, in particular of the MIA, enabled him to generate political influence without relying on fanatic nationalism like his predecessor Gamsakhurdia did. Instead, Shevardnadze kept a moderate stance in relation to the Georgian nationalism. His moderate nationalism, combined with his Soviet nomenklatura background, contributed to reducing the tension in the Georgia-Russian relation that had become volatile under the Gamsakhurdia government, too.

His background as the Minister of Internal Affairs during the Soviet times provided Shevardnadze with a close tie with the MIA. Because of the network, Shevardnadze did not need to seek his authority and power from quasi-state paramilitaries. The close tie with the MIA also enabled him to counterbalance the power relation with the MSS, the MIA's rival agency. In return, the Shevardnadze government's reform efforts in the MIA and its paramilitary forces were significantly compromised, and the Ministry remained almost immune to substantial changes.

4.4.2.2 The 'power ministries': the MIA and the MSS

The Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security played significant roles in Georgian politics. These two institutions played the central role to control internal security in the Soviet Georgia, by having been directly supervised by their headquarters in Moscow. Those ministries were called 'power ministries', due to a legacy from the Soviet times in which both of them had military characteristics.

Although they were both called 'power ministries', they have sometimes found in a rivalry relation. In post independent Georgia, the MSS, the former KGB, intervened the domestic politics and maintained its Soviet-style governance after the independence. Some critiques argue that pro-Moscow dissidents of Shevardnadze used some of the former KGB officers to try to turn over his government and install a pro-Moscow government.

The relation between Shevardnadze and the MSS had never been a smooth one. According to one observer, Shevardnadze distrusted the MSS.[47] Shevardnadze tried to weaken the political influence of the MSS and some individuals officially and unofficially affiliated to the organisation and counterbalance the influence by replacing officers with his supporters at the MSS. (Aves, 1996) The tension between the Shevardnadze and the MIA versus the MSS persisted in independent Georgia. Many critics regarded the two assassination attempts in 1995 and 1998 were examples of attempts to remove Shevardnadze from the President's position.[48]

4.4.2.3 The paramilitary leaders

The paramilitary leaders play significant roles in Georgia. As discussed in more detail in chapter 8, their influence became significant both in political and social spheres. The two paramilitary heads, Kitovani and Ioseliani, remained influential figures in the early 1990. They played a pivotal role in ousting of the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the return of Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Upon and right after Shevardnadze's return to Georgia in 1992, Shevardnadze needed the paramilitary heads' political support to re-establish himself as a political leader. This way, the paramilitary leaders were not merely armed group commanders but more importantly key political actor influencing the course of the security sector change trajectory.

The paramilitary leaders increased their political influence through personal links. For instance, Ioseliani, the leader of the Mkhedrioni, was reported to have a close tie with a formerly Soviet Communist Party elite, Guram Mgeladze, who was widely viewed as a leading 'party-economic mafia' and considered as a close ally with Shevardnadze (Kupatadze, 2012, p.118). After the ousting of Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze relied on them for providing security and used "them as parliamentary security guards" (Kupatadze, 2012, p.119).

[47] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.
[48] Author's interviews, October 2000, Tbilisi.

To keep paramilitary leaders and their forces on his side, Shevardnadze appointed the paramilitary leaders and their subordinates to high-ranking government positions. Shevardnadze appointed Kitovania was the Defence Minister, and Temur Khachishvili, a close ally of Ioseliani as the Deputy Internal Affairs Minister in 1992. One observer notes that, through this arrangement, spheres of "control of illicit profits were divided by giving the Mkhedrioni a monopoly over the distribution of fuel and making the National Guard the exclusive arms trader" (Baev, 2003, p.133). Thus, by the mid-1990s the paramilitary leaders and their allies had become significant players in not only the economic but also political arenas.

4.4.2.4 External actors

There are some key external actors that can be considered as key agencies influencing security sector change. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the USA had had been a major strategic player in the Caucasus and Georgia. The Georgia-US relationship became even more crucial than before for the two countries since the 9.11 attacks in the USA in 2001. Following the event, Georgia became one of the strategic partners for the USA's 'War on Terror' policy, and US's military and economic assistance increased.

Russia began to add a political pressure on Georgia as it started regaining a certain degree of political stability following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For Russia, Georgia located in the strategic position by neighbouring with the North Caucasus and Chechnya heavily affected by the violent conflicts with Russia. Russia's strategic interest in involving in the bordering region between Georgia and North Caucasus, Russia deployed its troops to the Russia-led CIS peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in Abkhazia.

During the Shevardnadze period, the bilateral relationship saw both deteriorating and constructive developments. In 2002, Russian fighter jets bombed Georgian villages near the Pankisi Gorge, killing civilians. This made Georgia's external relation swing back to Russia. In 2003, waiting for the presidential election in

November, Georgia signed on a strategic relation with a Russian energy company, Gazprom, over an energy strategy in 2003, which was a major diplomatic concession for Georgia.

The EU began to appear as a key regional player for Georgia's external relationship. As the relation between Georgia and the Western allies became closer, various international actors, especially of the Western countries, started directly involving in Georgia. During the first half of the 1990, the USA and European countries provided assistance. The European Commission launched the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in 1991. Through TACIS, Europe had assisted institutional, legal and administrative reforms in Georgian.

Another regional actor, Turkey, began to develop a close relationship with Georgia since the early 1990s. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the strategic importance of Georgia increased significantly for Turkey and it became an immediate neighbouring country sharing a border with Georgia. In particular, developing a close tie with Tbilisi became indispensable for the actualisation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that would run between the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and avoid passing through Armenia. Unlike the other external actors, although it provided Georgia with military assistance, Turkey remained low-profile in the geopolitics in the region unlike other external actor such as the USA, EU and Russia. Lynch attributes Turley's interest in "supporting stability in Georgia – no matter the government in power" rather than playing a role in the overall geopolitics in the region to its interest in securing the BTC pipeline plan as energy supplies to Europe (Lynch, 2006, p. 56).

4.4.3 Dynamics

How did the structural factors and agencies interact in the course of security sector change under the Shevardnadze period? Which factors interact with the agenda-setting of security sector change and how? Between 1992 and 2003, the process of security sector change was dominantly shaped by the political dynamics and power struggle between Shevardnadze and other political figures.

It appears that political and economic interests among the key actors/agencies dominated the SSR priorities.

4.4.3.1 Professionalising the armed forces as part of power consolidation under Shevardnadze

Domestic politics had its own dynamics to influence the course of security sector change between 1992 and 2003. During the first half of the Shevardnadze time, security sector change, namely the disbandment of the quasi-state paramilitaries and the defence system development, happened in the context of power struggle between the paramilitary heads and Shevardnadze.

Having been appointed the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament in 1992 then elected the President in 1995, Shevardnadze gradually managed to reinstall himself as a dominant political figure in Georgian society. Simultaneously, the relation between him and the paramilitary leaders started to change around 1993 and became confrontational by the mid-1990s.

The decline of the paramilitary leaders could be attributed to two factors. The first factor is the decreased popular support among the general Georgian population for the paramilitary forces. The turning point was Georgia's defeat in the war with Abkhazia in 1993. In September 1993, the Georgian troops were defeated in Sukhumi by the Abkhaz forces and driven out of Abkhazia. The defeat affected Georgian psychology towards the paramilitary forces, too. Since the fighters could not win and get back Abkhazia, "these soldiers do not deserve respect in society."[49] The defeat in Sukhumi and the loss of Abkhazia led to the decline of people's support towards the paramilitaries.

The second factor is the increasing concentration of executive power under Shevardnadze. Since 1992, Georgia began its process of developing its own national security sector. In this process over the time period between 1993 and 1998, Shevardnadze gradually curtailed paramilitary forces' influence in society. It took the form of institutionalising security sector governance system and

[49] Personal communication in Tbilisi, 2000.

appointing professional security personnel to replace the paramilitary heads. The process began when Shevardnadze created the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) in 1993. The paramilitary leaders, Kitovani and Ioseliani, were appointed deputy chairs of the council. However, their position had no veto power. This indicated that it was actually a downgrading their position from the *de facto* decision makers to the ones subordinate to Shevardnadze. Furthermore, Shevardnadze established a Military Consultants' Group to supervise the ministries concerning military matters. The Military Consultants Group became directly reporting to the President, supervised military departments and implemented the NSDC decisions. Shevardnadze appointed professional military officers independent of their influence, to governmental positions. This way, Shevardnadze further cut down cliental networks of Kitovani and Ioseliani in security forces.[50]

Another purpose of Shevardnadze's reshuffling the personnel at the security ministries was to counter-balance the re-emerging nationalist movements by appointing pro-Moscow personnel at those "Power Ministries". After the defeat in Sukhumi in 1993, the Zviadists started to use the defeat to generate grievance against Tbilisi. Shevardnadze needed Russia's support to curtail the Zviadists, which had used the defeat in Sukhumi to re-gain support in western Georgia. Shevardnadze appointed Shota Kviraia as the new Minister of Internal Affairs, and Igor Giorgadze as the new Minister of State Security.[51] Both Kviraia and Giorgadze were former KGB agents. Heavily involved in the fight in Abkhazia, Kitovani was forced to resign in May 1993. A former Soviet military captain, Giorgi Kharkharashvili, replaced Kitovani. Shevardnadze ordered the complete re-establishment of the National Guard in October 1993.[52] By replacing the key ministers with these pro-Moscow, non-nationalist personnel, Shevardnadze consolidated his dominance over Kitovani, and his position to counter both the nationalist movement led by the supporters of the former president.

[50] Colonel Vladimir Cikovani, who was appointed as a military advisor to Shevardnadze, is one of such examples (Jones, 2015, p. 98).
[51] Giorgadze was later accused of masterminding and carrying out the 1995 assassination attempt against Shevardnadze and removed from the post.
[52] Karkarashvili resigned to protest against the remaining of the Russian military bases in Georgia in 1994.

The dismantlement of the Mhkedrioni became complete by the late 1990, after the two assassination attempts against Shevardnadze in 1995 and 1998. Back in 1994, the Mkhedrioni had declared a voluntary disarmament, but in reality the process was not clear and they allegedly restored armaments. After the 1998 assassination attempt, Ioseliani was accused of masterminding and carrying out the attempt. Subsequently, key members of the Mkhedrioni, including Ioseliani, were arrested. The government disbanded the Mkhedrioni.[53]

By the late 1990, Shevardnadze rooted out the political influence of the paramilitary leaders. Security sector change in Georgia in the first half of the Shevardnadze regime was more of a political process to dismantle the paramilitary leaders' influence in politics, rather than institution building of the security apparatus.

4.4.3.2 Maintaining the power base by keeping the "Power Ministries" free of reform

Unlike the MoD that had seen a process of modernisation, the other two security sector ministries, i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security had hardly undergone any organisational reform efforts during the Shevardnadze period. The absence of reform in the internal security organs could be attributed to the political leadership's need to secure its regime security.

The return of Shevardnadze as the president in 1992 reinstalled his old-style governance by utilizing the core Soviet apparatus, i.e. the MSS and the MIA, and keeping balance of power between them. Having ousted the paramilitary leaders, Shevardnadze needed a new power base. This time, Shevardnadze sought for support from the MIA which he used to head during the Soviet period. Despite pressure from Europe, Shevardnadze did not advance the process of reforming the police system to transform it from the Soviet to Western styles. All the Ministers of Internal Affairs appointed between 1992 and 2003 were Police Major

[53] Ioseliani was, however, later given amnesty and became a head of a political party. The political party was also named "the Mkhedrioni".

or Lieutenant General, as in the Soviet times. The power consolidation overrode the reform of the police as a priority.

Shevardnadze needed to provide the MSS with an incentive strong enough for them to stay under his control. For establishing such a condition to ensure his regime's stability, Shevardnadze provided the two 'power ministries' with economic incentives. The economic incentives were generated from the corruption and informal economy in which those state security actors were heavily involved.

Corruption among high ranking security sector officials was often reported by the media. For instance, a high ranking official in the MIA who owned a local football team received a grant from the state budget used to balance the books of his private company. The phrase "thieves in law" well describes the people's perception on the phenomena of the wide spread corruption at the security sector institutions, in particular, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. Given the wide-spread corruption within the 'power ministries', any substantial reform involving institutional downsizing and restructuring would jeopardize the corrupt system and the power base for Shevardnadze. According to one observer, "corruption was his rule of law".[54]

Shevardnadze took advantage of the situation for ensuring his stability in power. In order to tame the powerful ministries' and their elite officers, Shevardnadze bargained them by providing them with exemption to reform. Shevardnadze provided the internal security elites with immunity to their corruption in exchange with their support for his regime. As seen in the previous section, by the late 1990, corruption in the Georgian society had become rampant, especially through the patron-client network in the security sector ministries. Against the background, several state commissions concerning the security sector were established between 2000 and 2003. These commissions included a commission for drafting an Anti-Corruption Programme, a coordination council for Anti-Corruption Policy, a commission to study military legislation, and a commission to suggest reforms of security sector agencies. However, these commissions' work remained on

[54] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.

paper only, and their recommendations were hardly translated into practice. No actual efforts to curtail corruption took place in the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. The legislature at that time was still too weak to counter the disproportionally powerful executive, including the President.

Due to the economic benefits and political immunity to reform, Shevardnadze succeeded to restore a certain degree of support, or at least lack of strong dissidents against him, within the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. For the Shevardnadze regime, the political benefit to secure the regime security prevailed benefits of developing transparent and accountable the security sector. Likewise, serving officers at those ministries also found economic benefits of the absence of reform. State budgets were constantly tight and salaries for law enforcement personnel were not only low but also often delayed or underpaid. Therefore, the incentive for serving officers to back the reform of the current structure remained low. Moving towards transparency and accountability of the system was often perceived as a direct threat to those personnel who gained benefits from the existing corrupt network. The lack of substantial reform efforts at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Ministries was therefore a product of a mutually beneficial condition between the top leadership and the serving officers.

4.4.3.3 Shifted benefits from the absence of reform to the advancement of reform

The stagnated reform efforts in the ‘power ministries’ suddenly came to end in 2003. What drove the change was not SSR agenda, but the domestic political movement.

The lack of the reform efforts in the internal security institutions brought a significant political impact on the Georgian politics and led to the emergence of the anti-Shevardnadze block. The lack of the reform efforts in the “Power Ministries” and paramilitary forces had a political consequence which later directly affected the Shevardnadze government itself and jeopardized its regime. In October 2001, dozens of officers from the MSS went to Rustavi2, an independent

TV station and a vocal critique of the corruption and the Shevardnadze regime. The media reported this event as a raid by the security officers loyal to the regime, and the situation became tense. This event became a political watershed: students organised several rallies to protest against the security ministries. As a result, the Ministers of State Security and Internal Affairs, and the Persecutor General resigned. The anti-Shevardnadze block further gained popular support and eventually replaced the Shevardnadze regime, as discussed earlier in this chapter. It is an irony that the lack of reform and the overlooked corruption later became the very reason for the forthcoming anti-Shevardnadze movement led by Saakashvili in the mid-2000s.

In post-2003 Georgia, Georgia advanced its SSR efforts under the new administration led by one of the so-called ‘reformists’, Saakashvili. Chapter 6 details driving factor to make the shift from the absence or reform to the advancement of reform was the political motivation.

4.5 Conclusion

Between 1992 and 2003, Georgia achieved a lot in terms of state building. The first half of the Shevardnadze times saw various progresses such as the adaptation of the 1995 Constitution, the affiliation with international organisations and partnerships such as the UN as an independent state. Building its own state institutions also took place during this period. As for the territorial integrity, Georgia had a major setback: the defeat in Abkhazia meant a territorial loss to Georgia. By the mid-1990s, Georgia under the Shevardnadze regime become relatively stable compared to the Gamsakhurdia time. Since 1995, however, the Shevardnadze regime faced a number of political challenges such as the two assassination attempts against Shevardnadze and the growing anti-government movements, until it was replaced by the so-called ‘reformists’ in 2003.

Various changes in the security sector during the period between 1992 and 2003 took place in this context. The political economy analysis in this chapter demonstrated the interaction between political dynamics in the key political developments and the change of the security sector. One major change in the

security sector was the development of the modern defence and justice sectors. As Georgia established its presence in the international community, it began to receive external assistance in the security sector. The defence and justice sectors went through various reform efforts, mainly to transform them to align with the Euro-Atlantic standards. The defeat in Abkhazia resulted in the decline of the influence of and popular support for the quasi-state paramilitaries, which helped Shevardnadze to curtail the quasi-state paramilitary heads and paved the way for professionalising paramilitary forces.

On the other hand, some of the security apparatus, namely the MIA and the MSS, escaped significant reform efforts. Little effort had been made to develop the institutional capacity of these institutions. The analysis reveals the main reason for the absence of reform efforts in these security sector actors is the Shevardnadze regime's need for consolidating power. The analysis attributes the enabling factors for the power consolidation in the security sector actors, in particular, the two 'power ministries', to the 'power ministries' roles in the persisting corruption and to their power relations with Shevardnadze. This way, the analysis in this chapter shows that various political, social and economic factors influenced the course of the agenda-setting process, in which the unbalanced SSR progress took place.

Based on the analysis of security sector change under the Shevardnadze regime between 1992 and 2003, the chapter provides the following observations on the relationship between domestic factors and the process of agenda setting for security sector change.

First, the nature of the security sector process continued to be politically driven. The executive power concentrated at the President led to the selective reform efforts. On the contrary to the Gamsakhurdia period, the president's executive power was strong and dominant over other executive bodies. The agenda for security sector change was set (or not set) in accordance with the political purposes of the President as described above. The strong executive, i.e., the President under which the executive power was concentrated enabled to implement the SSR agenda accordingly. The SSR efforts were very much driven by the domestic political dynamics, especially at the top elite level.

Second, the politically-driven SSR efforts led to the lack of reform efforts in the internal security institutions and paramilitaries, with political and security consequences in the Georgian society. Compared with the lawless situation with the quasi-state paramilitaries in the early 1990s, the control of those armed forces was achieved to a certain degree. However, the persisting ambiguity and confusion over roles of the various armed forces under the rival security sector institutions still remained and the paramilitaries were left without thorough reform efforts. This was a result of a political compromise among the political elites, i.e., the President and the 'power ministries'. The compromise appears to have achieved a purpose of establishing and maintaining political stability in Georgia. However, at the same time, the compromise appears to have allowed the security sector actors remain an influential political actor in Georgian politics rather than a mere security apparatus.

It was in this context that external SSR assistance began to arrive in Georgia. How did external SSR assistance efforts were received, consumed and digested by the Georgian side which involved those varying factors, dynamics and political context? The next chapter explores this query.

Chapter 5 Dynamics in the provision and reception of the SSR assistance in Georgia between 1992 and 2003

5.1 Introduction

Since Shevardnadze came to power and Georgia gained the international recognition of Georgia as an independent state in 1992,[55] an increasing number of SSR assistance programmes and projects started to flow into Georgia. Some of the assistance efforts brought intended progress in SSR. However, other SSR assistance did not necessarily lead to outcomes intended by the SSR assistance providers. What was the interplay between external donors' SSR assistance and actual security sector change like? What were the local dynamics between the providing and receiving ends of SSR assistance in the interplay like?

The first part of this chapter examines the external assistance for SSR in Georgia between 1992 and 2003. It examines political contexts in which SSR assistance agendas were formulated in the assistance providing countries. The chapter then examines the SSR assistance at the technical level and to which extent the SSR assistance provider's objectives were met in the process of security sector change. In doing so, the section discusses how the Georgian counterparts responded to the SSR assistance. The last part of the chapter explores which security priorities were reflected in the course of security sector change between 1992 and 2003, and what security issues remained to be attended as a result.

5.2 External actors' SSR assistance in Georgia between 1992 and 2003

As chapter 2 discussed, the concept of SSR had emerged in the late 1990s within the policy development circle in the West, particularly among scholars and policy makers in the western European countries.[56] No comprehensive and concrete

[55] Georgia was recognized as an independent state by the UN and the EU in 1992.
[56] The early SSR literature include: Nicole Ball (1998): Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government (Ball, 1998), Herbert Wulf (ed.) (2000): Security Sector Reform, Brief 15 (Wulf, 2000b), Herbert Wulf (2000): Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An Analysis of the International Debate and Potentials for Implementing Reforms with Recommendations for Technical Cooperation (Wulf, 2000a), Michael Chalmers (1999): Security-sector reform in developing countries: an EU perspective (Chalmers, 2000), DAC/OECD (2000): Security-

country-specific SSR strategy was available during the Shevardnadze times yet. The SSR assistance in Georgia was not necessarily labelled as SSR explicitly during the Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze periods.[57] In the case of Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, where the international community provided a set of assistance under an SSR package either through multilateral or bilateral schemes, there was no comprehensive SSR assistance package existed Few materials on SSR activities in Georgia during this period are available. The scarcity of the SSR literature on Georgia reflects the underdeveloped SSR thinking on Georgia during this time. Nonetheless, a number of organisations and donor countries started providing assistance in various spheres in the security sector during the Shevardnadze times. The flow of assistance accelerated since 1999, after Georgia had established a certain level of stability and sovereignty as an independent state. The assistance were not labelled as SSR, yet the assistance providers, mostly the Euro-Atlantic allies, including NATO, the OSCE and the EU and their member states started offering assistance to Georgia's security sector institutions.

5.2.1 Objectives of the external SSR assistance

For the Western governments, in the power vacuum followed by the Soviet Union dissolution, the Southern Caucasus region became a major strategic interest for the Euro-Atlantic allies. MacFarlane clusters the objectives of the West in the former Soviet Caucasian countries including Georgia into two groups: norm-based objective and interest-based objectives. (MacFarlane, 1999)

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sector reform and development co-operation: a conceptual framework for enhancing policy coherence (OECD/DAC, 2000), DFID (1999), Poverty and the security sector (DFID, 2000b), DFID (2000a): Security-sector reform and the management of defence expenditure, a conceptual framework (DFID, 2000a), DFID (2000b): Security-sector reform: Review of the role of external actors (DFID, 2000c), Hendrickson (1999): Key issues in security-sector reform (D Hendrickson, 1999), NUPI Working Group on Security-Sector Reform (1999): Security-sector reform as a development issue (NUPI. Working Group on Security Sector Reform, 1999), DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, OECD, Paris, Clare Short (1999): Security-sector reform and military expenditure symposium (Short, 2000),World Bank (1999): Security, poverty reduction & sustainable development: challenges for the new millennium (World Bank, 1999).

[57] It was 2004 when USAID endorsed the OECD/Development Assistance Committee's publication, Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice on behalf of the US Department (OECD/DAC, 2005). US Agency for International Development, US Department of Defense and US Department of State (2009): Security Sector Reform, (USAID et al., 2009), p.2. The EU Concept for ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) Support to SSR was developed in 2005 (*Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: a concept for European Community support for security sector reform*, 2005).

The first group of objectives, an identify-driven, norm-based objective, aimed to transform the former Soviet countries in the region to become “more like us” (MacFarlane, 1999, pp. 9–10) based on liberal democratic norms such as “sovereignty, stability, democracy and liberalism”. (MacFarlane, 1999, p. 60) In SSR assistance to Georgia, the norm-based objective was most explicit in the defence and justice spheres. Since the end of the Cold War structure and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, establishing professional defence institutions with effective civilian control was of a primary interest for the Western countries. As described below, the West sent a group of senior military experts as early as in the mid-1990s to provide the Georgian government with overall policy advice to reform the Georgian security sector along with NATO standards.

NATO compatibilities also required the Georgian defence institutions to adopt democratic norms, such as democratic control of armed forces. Western notions of civil-military relation and ‘democratic oversight’ were a new concept for this former Soviet republic. The external assistance in the defence sphere during this period thus involved the development of scholarly and professional discussions on norms and principles such as democratic control of armed forces, civil-military relations and professionalism in the defence sector. The norm-based approach was well represented by the justice sector, too. The West, especially the EU and OSCE, set their assistance objectives in promoting the rule of law, human rights and democracy. Taking the norm-based approach was reasonable and needed in Georgia at that time. Georgia was in the process of shifting from the Soviet judiciary system whose independence was not ensured due to frequent interference by the Communist Party.

The second group of objectives, an interest-based objective, was driven by political and economic self-interests of the West (MacFarlane, 1999, p. 10) such as “containing radical Islam, containing Iran, reducing the influence of Russia, securing access to energy resources” (MacFarlane, 1999, p. 60). This approach was eminent in the defence sphere, in which SSR assistance was most concrete and made available fast and abundant in quantity. In particular, enhancing border control capacities was a primal priority for the West. The border control issue during the Shevardnadze period posed a practical challenge for both the West

and Georgia. For Georgia, the violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had been jeopardizing its territorial integrity. For the West, the unsettled violent conflicts were risk for destabilizing the South Caucasus region including Georgia. Inadequate and porous border control was considered to pose significant security threat for the West as they would raise the risk of trafficking of various items including small arms and light weapons as well as nuclear missile materials. Thus, the border control assistance had an interest-based objective, which was mutually met between Georgia and the West.

Similarly, building the Georgian military force was of an interest for the NATO allies. This became particularly the case after the 2011 9/11 attacks in the USA which shifted the USA and its allies' strategic efforts to counter-terrorism. Consequently, as described below, NATO needed to increase its combat manpower to engage in counter-terrorism operations in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan. Raising the combat capacities of Georgian troops to meet the NATO standards became a strategic interest for the USA and the other NATO members. SSR assistance of the Euro-Atlantic ally countries and partnership organisations were provided in this context.

5.2.2 Varying SSR strategies within external assistance providers

The evolution of the SSR assistance provided by the West can be grouped into three phases. The first phase runs between 1992 and 1996 in which two major frameworks for cooperation were developed. In the defence sphere, Georgia signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) with NATO in 1994, which provided a platform for having a political dialogue to discuss cooperation between Georgia and NATO. In 1995, the first NATO-Georgia Individual Partnership Program (IPP) containing activities in different areas of co-operation was developed. In 1996, the first Georgian Unit participated in the PfP Field Training and the EU and Georgia signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA, entered into force in 1999, covers an array of areas of cooperation aiming at the harmonisation of Georgian legislation with EU standards.

The second phase of the SSR assistance covers between 1997 and 2000. During this period, the SSR assistance contained more concrete activities. For instance, the ISAB, consisted of high-ranking experts[58] was established in 1998. The ISAB assessed the situation surrounding the Georgian security sector and provided the National Security Council with a comprehensive set of recommendations on SSR. The recommendations provided guidance on developing and reforming the Georgian security sector in line with the Western standards. The ISAB recommendations accompanied with an implementation plan which specified timeline and lead agencies for implementing recommended activities (The Centre for Peace and International Relations Studies, 2000, p. 104). In parallel, the USA started providing border control assistance. The USA provided technical assistance specifically targeted at enhancing border control capacities through the provision of financial assistance, equipment and training.

The beginning of the third phase coincides with the 2001 9/11 attacks in the USA followed by the 2002 Prague Summit. The Summit adopted measures aimed at strengthening the Alliance's capabilities for fighting terrorism (NATO, 2002). It was in this context that the USA started providing bilateral assistance titled the Georgian Train and Equipment Program (GTEP) (Global Security, n.d.). Subsequently, reform assistance in the Georgian defence sphere via NATO started to increase, with the objective to enhance its counter terrorism capabilities. In the new security environment, SSR assistance became centred on the defence sphere, especially in the area of direct provision of combat capacity training.

The main providers of the SSR-related efforts were those of the Euro-Atlantic ally countries, partnerships and frameworks including the EU, NATO and the OSCE. In the 1990 and early 2000s, SSR policies were yet to be developed. As seen above, SSR discourses had been increasingly developed among the Euro-Atlantic countries, especially within the European countries. On the other hand, the key assistance provider for Georgia, the USA during this period hardly used the term SSR, assistance for the security sector actors in Georgia was provided nonetheless, without being labels as SSR assistance, in both multilateral and bilateral frameworks.

[58] The advisory board consisted of general Sir Garry Johnson (Chairperson, UK), David Ochmanek (USA) and General Henning von Ondarza (Germany) (ISAB, 1999).

The external assistance providers' SSR approach to Georgia was sporadic and focusing on specific issues in an independent manner, rather than regarding the SSR issue as a whole. Their approaches towards the assistance varied: NATO and US assistance focused on the defence and security issues. The European countries under the OSCE framework were also heavily involved in the security issues faced by Georgia. But their attention was at that time more on the conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU provided assistance for Georgia to become part of the market economy. Their assistance had a strong focus on the economy aspect, in order to harmonise Georgia's regulations and institutions with the EU ones, along with other activities including democratisation assistance such as and civil society support and political reform processes

5.2.2.1 Defence- and security-oriented assistance: NATO and the USA

The collapse of the Cold War structure led to the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic partnership towards the east. A number of agreements and frameworks for cooperation between Georgia and NATO were signed since Shevardnadze came to power.

In 1992, Georgia joined the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council.[59] In 1994 Georgia joined the PfP, a programme aiming to increase security and defence cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries. Those milestones provided a framework for further partnership and assistance in the defence sphere, with a certain level of coherency.[60] The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) is a significant step development as it provided a concrete process for enhancing capacities for defence planning. In 1999, Georgia joined the PARP to help its forces develop the ability to work with NATO to improve defence planning.[61] The PARP was set up in order to help Georgia's troops

[59] The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997.
[60] In 1995, Georgia signed the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and its partner countries. SOFA addresses the status of foreign forces while present on the territory of another state in the context of cooperation and exercise under the PfP programme.
[61] PARP is a practical tool aimed at enhancing the interoperability of partner countries' military units and command structures with NATO forces (Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, n.d.).

develop the ability to work with NATO and provides planning targets that are key to SSR objectives by facilitating improved financial management in the MoD, assisting in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed forces and ensuring that a credible Strategic Defence Review was conducted.

For the NATO's engagement in the SSR in Georgia, the Prague Summit in 2002 was a prominent step. The Prague Summit adopted the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism which aimed at enhancing counter-terrorism capacities in NATO member countries. At the Prague Summit, Georgia officially declared its aspirations to NATO membership and its intention to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO to sharpen the focus of cooperation on reform efforts. Reflecting the NATO's strategic priority to enhance counter-terrorism capacities, their assistance was geared to enhance Georgia's capacities relevant to the counter-terrorism operations. However, the development of detailed for IPAP had to wait until 2004, after Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze.

Actually, cooperation in the field of combat capacities had already started since the late 1990. Having received voluminous assistance from the USA as the leading NATO member state, Georgia started contributing peacekeepers to the NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999. Consequently, Georgia hosted multinational PfP military training exercise in 2001 and 2002.[62] Georgia extended its contribution to the NATO troops by participating in the ISAF in Afghanistan in 2003 (NATO, 2015).

The USA was the most prominent donor providing defence- and security-oriented assistance. Two objectives were particularly important for the USA's strategic interest in preventing the region from being penetrated by terrorism. One was the USA's increasing engagement in counter-terrorism operations worldwide. The USA needed Georgia's troops to increase combat capacities to for their operations in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan. Since 9/11 attack in 2001, the USA enhanced its assistance either bilaterally and/or through NATO in the field of counter-terrorism. The second objective was to curtail the trafficking of

[62] In 2001, Georgia hosted a multinational PfP military training exercise "Cooperative Partner", and "Cooperative Best Effort" in 2002.

radioactive materials from the Northern Caucasus region to other regions via Georgia. Their assistance thus focused on the development of combat capacities and border control. Having focused on the bilateral partnership with Georgia rather than waiting for the NATO frameworks to be developed, the USA started providing direct assistance in a wide range of security sector spheres, namely the defence, police and border control.

5.2.2.2 Conflict prevention and resolution approach: OSCE

Since the end of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Cold War structure, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), formerly titled as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),[63] became engaged in a wide range of conflict prevention and resolution activities in the former socialist and communist counties, including Georgia. The OSCE involved in Georgia by placing the centrality of its involvement in conflict resolution over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Upon a request from Georgia, the OSCE Mission to Georgia was established in 1992. The Mission's objective was to support a peaceful and political settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, and later included support for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia (OSCE, n.d.). In 1994, the mission's mandate was expanded to include helping Georgia to establish a democratic state under the rule of law and promoting the observance of human rights (Stöber, 2010, pp. 203–220).

Although not being mandated to conduct SSR per se, in practice the OSCE Mission engaged in a variety of SSR-related activities,[64] especially in the field of policing and community security. Following the war in the North Caucasus republic of Chechnya in 1999, the OSCE Mission engaged in policing through a joint-initiative with the Georgian police, the South Ossetian militia and the JPKF (OSCE, 1997). Since 2000, the OSCE supported the JPKF programme on the voluntary handover of small arms and ammunition (OSCE, 2002). The OSCE

[63] The CSCE changed its name to the OSCE at the Budapest Summit in January 1995. The change of the names, according to the Budapest Summit document, "has no effect on the character of its commitments nor the status of the CSCE and its institutions" (OSCE, 1995).
[64] The OSCE engaged in promoting confidence-building measures among parties to the territorial conflicts at grass-roots level, supporting the return of IDPs, facilitating economic activities and reconstruction in conflict-affected areas (Sagramoso, 2003, p. 78).

assisted the Georgian government in ridding the environment of surplus weapons (OSCE, 2002).

5.2.2.3 Democratisation-focused approach: the EU

Cooperation between Georgia and the EU started after the EU recognised Georgia's independence in 1992. The European Commission launched the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in 1991. Through TACIS, European countries assisted institutional, legal and administrative reforms in Georgia, to support its transition to market-oriented economy.[65] Georgia under Shevardnadze expressed its interest in joining the EU. Following the policy orientation, the EU and Georgia agreed on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1996.[66] The EU approach to the SSR assistance in Georgia mainly took place in the legal framework. The aspiration for the EU membership required Georgia to harmoniseA its legislation with the EU law,[67] the EU's *acquis communautaire*, the set of rules and regulations for all member states.[68] The preparation process for the adaptation of the National Program of Harmonisation of Georgian Legislation with EU law started in 2001-2003. It was only after 2004 that concrete action plans were developed.

5.3 External SSR assistance programmes and projects between 1992 and 2003

SSR assistance between 1992 and 2003 began by adopting two major partnership agreements, PfP and PCA, with major SSR providers, NATO and the EU. These two partnership agreements laid out frameworks for further cooperation. Those frameworks, however, were not substantiated with detailed action plans that could provide clear milestones and feasible work plans during the Shevardnadze's period. The exception was the US assistance in the defence

[65] Since 2007, TACIS was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Policy.

[67] The EU membership requires prospect members to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, a set of basic principles including "stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" (European Union, 1993).

[68] Those rules and regulations include including in rules on public procurement, indirect taxation and nuclear regulations and transport (Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, n.d.).

sphere, in the areas of border control and combat capacities. Detailed action plans for the overall SSR did not become materialised during the Shevardnadze period. As the subsequent sections demonstrate, the lack of substantiated action plans other than border control and combat capacities development left most of SSR issues unattended during the Shevardnadze period. At the policy level, the SSR consisted of a set of various technical cooperation programmes and projects rather than a comprehensive strategic framework. When it comes to the actual implementation, the partnership objectives tended to be translated into sporadic and *ad hoc* projects.

On the receiving end, Georgia under Shevardnadze did not provide a leadership to consolidate the varying assistance efforts for establishing a security sector in accordance with the recommendations offered by external advisers. Furthermore, as the two previous chapters discussed, the security sector actors were heavily involved in the domestic power politics among a handful of political elites. Assisting the reform of the security sector meant to interact with the power politics, whether assistant providers had such an intention or not.

The following section focuses on some key SSR assistance initiatives in the defence, police, justice and border control spheres, and examines the converging and/or diverting incentives and interests between the providers and the receiver of the external SSR assistance.

Table 4 SSR assistance initiatives in Georgia during the Shevardnadze time: 1992 – 2003

Imitative	Objective, Content, Activity	Who	When
Defence			
NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP)	PfP is the main framework under which political dialogue is conducted and different programs and activities are developed. Under the PfP framework, Georgia has contributed peacekeeping contingent to a NATO-led military operation in Iraq.	NATO	1994 -
Georgia-Turkey bilateral military cooperation agreement	Under the military cooperation agreement, Turkey provided military equipment, training for officers and troops and support for the Georgian National Defence Academy reform, as well as the modernisation of an airbase.	Turkey	1997 -

International Security Advisory Board (ISAB)	A group of western senior experts providing recommendations on the overall SSR strategy.	UK, USA	1998 - 2006
NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP)	PARP has helped its forces develop the ability to work with NATO and provides planning targets that are key to security reform objectives by facilitating improved financial management in the MoD, assisting in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed forces and ensuring that a credible Strategic Defence Review was conducted.	NATO	1999 -
Foreign Military Financing Programme	The Foreign Military Financing Program provides the Georgian military with defense articles, services and training. FMF also promotes Georgian's participation in NATO's PfP.	USA	2001
International Military Education and Training Program	The International Military Education and Training program helps Georgian soldiers to develop the English-language and professional military skills necessary to augment Georgia's PfP participation and its interoperability with NATO and other international peacekeeping missions.	USA	2001
Georgian Train and Equipment Program (GTEP)	GTEP assisted Georgia in enhancing its counter-terrorism capacities. The 18-month programme started in 2002. US allocated USD 64 million to provide staff and tactical training to approximately 2,600 troops including a headquarter staff elements and five tactical units. A trained infantry battalion was deployed in Iraq in 2005. Georgian troops also supported operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo.	USA	2002 - 2004
NATO Integrated Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)	Georgia declared its intention to develop an IPAP at the 2002 Prague Summit and signed in 2004. IPAP is a partnership tool for NATO to provide focused country-specific advice on defence and security-related domestic reform and on larger policy and institutional reform. IPAP sets up strategy and operational action plans for defence institution building and armed forces development.	NATO	2002 -
CUBIC program	Assisting in the development of strategic documents, defence planning, professional military education, logistics and resource planning. Assisting the National Defence Academy in establishment of Command and Staff College.	USA	2003 -
Police			
Law Enforcement Program	Focusing on police reform and the improvement in law enforcement capabilities and supporting for strong money laundering and other anti-crime legislation. Supporting the development of modern forensics techniques and establishment of a modern forensics laboratory through the provision of training and equipment.	USA	Exact date not available
Justice			
Technical assistance projects in the judiciary	Assisting the reform effort and supporting the government and parliamentary efforts to combat corruption. Advising on criminal law reform. Assisting in drafting money-laundering legislation. Anti-trafficking programs, including assistance in prevention and prosecution, in order to help to raise the profile of this issue and reduce the occurrence of trafficking in persons.	USA	Exact date not available

Financial assistance in the justice sector	Providing credits to finance court infrastructure rehabilitation, improved court administration, training for judges and staff, and a public campaign to increase awareness of and trust in the legal system.	World Bank	1999 - 2002
Technical advice on human rights issues	Providing technical advice and disseminated human rights norms. Advising on law concerning the status of judges and the police, development of the penal system and the organization of ministries of justice, as well as training of lawyers, prosecutors, police and prison officials both on general issues.	Council of Europe	Exact date not available
Border control			
The Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLW) Assistance Program	The Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance Program assisted the Border Guards and the Custom Service. The GBSLW Assistance Program provided equipment, logistical and infrastructure support, and training to help Georgia's Border Guards maintain an active border presence, particularly along the Georgian-Russian border.	USA	1997 - 2005

5.3.1 Defence sphere: enhancing NATO compatibilities in counter-terrorism operations

Reform efforts in the defence sphere during the Shevardnadze aimed at the modernisation of the defence system and its institutions. The Western advisory group for SSR, The ISAB, recommended that Georgia "should undertake a comprehensive modernization and reform process in the security and defence areas" (ISAB, 2000). The ISAB recommendations in 2000 set out what needed to be done for SSR. Those recommendations were submitted to the National Security Council of Georgia in the same year. The two major recommendations were a) the demilitarisation of the security concept and b) the de-militarisation of the security sector governance (Johnson, 2005, pp. 8–9).

Technical assistance to the defence sphere began to arrive. They could be categorised into four main thematic areas: a) security concept and strategy development; b) overall defence institutions building; c) parliamentary oversight; and b) capacity development. Having ousted the paramilitary heads from the state security institutions, the Shevardnadze government stated an intention to formalise and professionalise the defence sphere. The both sides of the SSR assistance providers and receivers seemed to agree on the objectives. However, their understanding on what the word 'modernisation' suggests a divergence when reform efforts started to be implemented on the ground.

5.3.1.1 Security concept and strategy development

The SSR assistance providers and Georgia found the first and most significant chasm of interest and understanding in the issue of defining a national security concept and a strategy. For Shevardnadze's Georgia, explicitly defining a national security concept itself meant a strategic challenge.

For the Euro-Atlantic actors, defining a clear security strategy was regarded key prerequisite for SSR assistance. The Western assistance partners had pressed the Shevardnadze government to define its national security concept explicitly: the ISAB stressed the need to being the SSR process by defining "the basic security concept and strategy by which Georgia intends to secure and advance its national objectives in light of the international situation" in its report submitted to the Georgian government in 1999 (ISAB, 1999). The 1999 ISAB report recommended that such a security concept to be supported by an endorsement within Parliament and widely accepted by the general public (ISAB, 1999).

The development of an articulated security concept and a strategy was a dilemma for the Shevardnadze government. The reason is twofold. The first factor concerns external relations with Russia. In the late 1990s, Russia still had its military bases in the Georgian territory. The situation in the two disputed territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, remained volatile, with Russia-led peacekeepers deployed. Under the circumstances, Russia was an obvious security threat for security and stability in Georgia and the Southern Caucasia (Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).

The Shevardnadze government did not explicitly adopt a security concept that clearly indicated Georgia's orientation towards the West. Some critiques claim that this was because Shevardnadze was afraid of upsetting Russia.[69] One observer commented: "Shevardnadze knew Russia well and knew what it means to have an army against Russia."[70]

[69] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.
[70] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.

The fear of angering Russia directly impacted the development of a national security concept. A group of Georgian and international expert drafted *Georgia and the World: A Vision and Strategy for the Future* in 2001 (Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000)s The document, submitted to Shevardnadze, explicitly states an intention to integrate into Europe as foreign policy objective. The document, however, remained "under Shevardnadze" (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 18). Darchiashvili reports that the fear against Russia was "essentially believed to be the reason why a national security concept was never adopted under Shevardnadze" (Darchiashvili, 2008). The lack of firm commitment by the highest level of the Georgian authority was clearly noted by the ISAB. General Sir Garry Johnson, the ISAB chairperson recognises that "the proximity of Russia, the complexities of the region and the greater distance from the heart of Europe" made it difficult for Georgia to declare an explicit foreign policy orientation to become a member of NATO and the EU (Johnson, 2005, p. 51).

5.3.1.2 The separation of the law enforcement and defence forces

One of the pre-requisites for the SSR assistance providers was the separation between the law enforcement and defence forces. However, for Georgia, the blurred demarcation between the law enforcement and defence forces was rather a deliberate choice. In most of the SSR assistance providing countries, the MIA is usually a civil ministry. On the other hand, in Georgia with a Soviet legacy in its state apparatus, the MIA still possessed the largest armed forces, Internal Troops, in post-independence Georgia.[71] For the Western advisors, the main issue for building defence institutions was the blurred demarcation between military and law enforcement institutions in the security sector. In other words, establishing defence institutions in Georgia required demilitarisation of the non-military institutions. In the late 1990, Georgia had a few major state paramilitary forces under the Ministries of Defence (the National Guards), Internal Affairs (Internal Troops, State Department of Border Guards), State Security (Special State Guard Service and Presidential Guards). As chapter 4 discusses, some of those forces

[71] Internal Troops were reported to possess around 6,300 troops in 2002. (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, p. 73) Larsson suggests that an actual number of troops was much less and that the Internal Troops only fulfilled its manpower by 56% (Larsson, 2003, p. 15).

had unclarified roles and mandates, and some of which overlapped and/or duplicated. Recognising this issue, the 1999 ISAB Report pointed out the "possession of armed forces by a civil Ministry does not conform with normal practice in a modern democracy" (ISAB, 1999) and recommended to separate between armed forces with military and law enforcement functions. (ISAB, 1999) In the same report, the ISAB specifically recommended that:

> "all units with a military function (i.e. the Armed Forces, the National Guard, and the Independent Brigade[72]), be subordinated to the MoD, and reformed on NATO-compatible lines by 2004" (ISAB, 1999); and
>
> "all units with a police or civil function (i.e. Interior Troops, Border Guards, and Police Special Duties Unit), be subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and that these organisations be reformed on lines which are compatible with general practices and standards of member nations of the Council of Europe by 2004" (ISAB, 1999).

The 1999 ISAB report also recommended that "plans for those actions should be submitted to the National Security Council by spring 2004" (ISAB, 1999). Thus, the ISAB advisory members had explicitly recommended the separation of law enforcement security forces from the defence forces from an outset of the SSR assistance. Yet, the implementation of this recommendation did not take place throughout the Shevardnadze period. Rather, there was a strong resistance within the Shevardnadze regime to undertaking such a substantial institutional reform involving the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. The major reason for the lack of will for reform is the power dynamics among Shevardnadze and the two 'power ministries' as discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

Another reason was related to the security dilemma over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia, along with the majority of the international community, regarded those two regions as part of Georgia. For Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were of internal rather than external issues. In the meanwhile, the unsettled disputes over the two regions required Georgia to equip with armed forces

[72] At that time, the Independent Brigade was affiliated to the MIA.

capable of low-intensive combats. Thus, the Georgian internal affairs troops required to be militant. The security need and the territorial and security complexity concerning Georgia and its two separatist regions therefore prevented Georgia from advancing the West's recommendation to make a clear demarcation between the law enforcement and defence forces.

Despite the lack of willingness to advance the separation between the defence and law enforcement bodies, the West's assistance in the defence sphere started to flow into Georgia before the institutional demarcation between defence and law enforcement borides had been complete. The Euro-Atlantic allies started providing assistance, such as the USA's GTEP, to build the defence institutions. The primal example of the contradiction in the defence assistance can be found in the area of border control. The ISAB report itself gave a temporary waiver on the institutional restructuring for the border control actors, as securing national borders is the vital necessity so that "any change in the status of the Border Guards as an independent Department of State (rather than as their status as the State Department for Border Defence, added by the author) should wait until the border situation has been sufficiently stabilised" (ISAB, 1999). Having given the waiver, the Euro-Atlantic allies provided an intensive assistance for building border control institutions. Through the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLW) Assistance Program, the USA helped Georgia's Border Guards build its capacities by providing equipment, logistical and infrastructure support, as well as training the Border Guards troops. This way, the Western assistance in the defence sphere began without waiting for the institutional restructuring within the Georgian security sector.

5.3.1.3 Parliamentary oversight and democratic control

In the relation between Georgia and the international community, the issue of democratic control of armed forces and parliamentary oversight was recognised as crucial element in the reform of the security sector institutions since 1994. At the Budapest Summit of the OSCE,[73] the Code of Conduct on Political-Military

[73] At the Budapesht Summit, CSCE was renamed OSCE.

Aspects of Security was adopted.[74] The Code highlighted the centrality of the democratic control of not only military but also, paramilitary, internal security forces, intelligence services and the police as an indispensable element of stability and security ("Budapest summit declaration," 1994). The Code provided the CSCE participating states with a political roadmap for international cooperation in enhancing democratic control of armed forces. Similarly, the 1999 ISAB Report stressed the importance of democratic control of armed forces and the central role of Parliament in democratic control of the military (ISAB, 1999).

Despite Georgia joining the early political statement on the need for democratic control by the international community, no significant progress to establish parliamentary oversight and democratic control was made in Georgia during this period.

Without explicitly pointing at the budgetary mismanagement and high level of corruption within the Shevardnadze government, the ISAB Report highlighted the need for Parliament to ensure financial accountability by not only to approving but also reviewing an overall expenditure budget (ISAB, 1999). The Report recommended the Georgian government and Parliament to continue to seek for advice on the establishment of effective budgetary management systems.

The Georgian side showed signs of improving the budgetary management. An Administrative Code was adopted to establish democratic accountability and principles in the overall public sector. For the defence sphere, the Georgian government did pass a set of legislations related to the budgetary management. Those legislations included The Law on Budgetary System and Responsibilities and The Law on Security Services were adopted. The 'Group of Trust' was established at Parliament for the oversight of some special and classified military and security programmes (Darchiashvili, 2004, pp. 90–91).

However, the level of the implementation of those legislations remained quite low during the Shevardnadze times. As discussed in the previous chapter, the corrupt network within the security sector was a platform to generate power for the

[74] CSCE adopted the Code on the 3rd of December, 1994.

Shevardnadze regime. A parliamentarian reported a massive scale of corruption and misuse of the state budget within the MoD.[75] For Shevardnadze's government, establishing effective budgetary management systems meant a means to erode the power generating mechanism. A substantial reform progress thus had to wait until Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze and his government in 2003.

5.3.1.4 Development of combat capacities and human resources

External assistance included various institutional capacity development and combat capacity development. For instance, the neighbouring country, Turkey, signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement as early as in 1997 and provided a number of supports to modernise the Georgian military. Their assistance included the provision of military equipment, training for officers and troops, support for the reform of the National Defence Academy and upgrading the Vaziani airbase to NATO standards (Lynch, 2006, p. 56).

The major assistance provider was the USA, whose strategic interest in stabilising the Caucasus region had significantly increased since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Through the Georgian Train and Equipment Program (GTEP), the USA assisted Georgia in enhancing its counter-terrorism capacities and developed its operational capacities in multi-national environment. The GTEP was one of the few SSR assistance with concrete and substantial activities involved during the Shevardnadze times. Since April 2002, the USA provided an 18-month long bilateral defence assistance and allocated USD 64 million to provide staff and tactical training, as well as military equipment including uniform items, small arms and ammunition, communications and training gears and construction materials. Between 2002 and 2004, the GTEP trained approximately 2,600 soldiers, including a headquarters staff element and five tactical units. (Global Security, n.d.) The defence assistance provided through the GTEP remained at the operational and technical level and did not involve normative and substantial reform assistance. Nonetheless, the USA benefitted from the GTEP by receiving

[75] Authors interviews, March 2005, Tbilisi

troops contribution from Georgia for military operations led by the USA in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.

From Georgia's perspectives, however, the GTEP left mixed results. Initially, Shevardnadze requested the USA to provide a firm political backing on the issue of the Pankisi Gorge in Abkhazia, where Georgia claimed that Al Qaida elements were operating (Civil Georgia, 2002). The USA, on the other hand, responded with the provision of the GTEP rather than bringing up the Abkhazia issue as a political agenda between Russia and the USA.

The fact that the USA's engagement limited to the provision of training and equipment, however, contributed to creating deterrence between Georgia and Russia over the bordering territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, at least for the time being. By keeping the reform effort at a somewhat superficial level, the Shevardnadze government avoided having Russia regard the assistance as an immediate and direct threat to the Georgian territory. This way, Shevardnadze achieved to maintain Georgia's statehood, although the success was made in exchange for the *status quo* over the territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

5.3.2 Police sphere: immunity to police reform as a means of regime stabilisation

The police sphere hardly saw any substantial reform initiatives under the Shevardnadze government, due to socioeconomic and political dynamics among the domestic actors in Georgia as discussed in chapter 4. The absence of any reform plan developed by the Shevardnadze government provided no systemic assessment of the law enforcement institutions. This left external assistance providers with no choice but providing specific technical assistance in certain areas rather than offering support in a holistic manner.

In Georgia, a former Soviet republic country, a handful of institutions, namely the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security, covered the police sphere. Those institutions inherited the structure and human resources from the Soviet system.

Those institutions, including their paramilitaries, remained immune to any substantial reform efforts during the Shevardnadze period. The external assistance in the police sphere was limited at this time, with some exceptions of some *ad hoc* technical and human rights related assistance,[76] as well as providing policing service in the conflict-affected regions bordering with Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia (Kakachia, 2005). The OSCE had its focus on the policing issues from the early stage of their involvement in Georgia. The OSCE expanded its assistance to train the Georgian police, but this had to be waited until 2004, after Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze as the president.

The US assistance programmes for law enforcement bodies, for instance, focused on building capacities of money-laundering and anti-crime legislation. The USA also provided training and equipment to build forensic examination capacities.[77]

Both the SSR assistance providers of the West and the Shevardnadze government were cautious in the interests of the stability of the Shevardnadze regime. For the Shevardnadze government, the absence of reform in the police structure contributed to consolidating and maintaining his political platform in the MIA. The lack of reform efforts in the police sphere thus contributed to Shevardnadze's remaining in power.

Either norm-based or interest-based, external assistance to the reform of defence and justice spheres were provided. When it comes to the police sphere, however, no substantial reform efforts took place during the Shevardnadze period. Both the West and Georgia found a common interest in resisting to reform in the police. As discussed in the previous chapter, the police were Shevardnadze's power platform. Reforming the police may have risked jeopardising the power platform, and potentially destabilize the Shevardnadze regime. This was not the interest of the West or of the Shevardnadze government. The police sphere thus escaped from any substantial, normative reform efforts, as long as the Shevardnadze's regime managed to restore a certain level of political stability.

[76] OSCE, for instance, provided police officers with training on combating domestic violence (OSCE, 2003).
[77] The US provided a significant amount of assistance for the border control institutions. See Sub-section 5.6 Border Control in this chapter for further discussion on the US assistance on border control.

5.3.3 Justice sphere: compromised reform impacts

Prospects for the justice sphere reform initially seemed high when the Shevardnadze government executed the lay-off of a large number of judges and replaced them with newly appointed ones in 1998. The reform efforts were carried out by the Georgian authorities, conducted under Saakashvili, then Parliament's Legal Committee and subsequently the Minister of Justice, who had been regarded as an emerging political leader with strong orientation towards western values. Subsequently, an expectation for progressive reform efforts in the justice sphere became high among the general public as well as the international community, followed by the arrival of external assistance in the justice sphere.

The international assistance placed its focus in the transformation of the Georgian judiciary from the Soviet style system to a modern, western-style system that is independent of the executive power. What entailed in the external assistance for the justice sphere ranged from direct assistance on infrastructure and human resources such as rehabilitation of court infrastructure and development of human resources including judges and court staff, to the provision of legal advice to develop a range of codes and legislations concerning the justice sphere. Between 1999 and 2002, the World Bank financed the rehabilitation of courts infrastructure and the training of judges. The assistance's objective was to modernise the judiciary, and enhance its level of the independence and efficiency (World Bank, 2009, p. 25). Following an initial assessment in 1998, the World Bank financed a variety of judicial reform activities including "court infrastructure rehabilitation, improved court administration, training for judges and staff, and a public campaign to increase awareness of and trust in the legal system" (World Bank, 2009, p. 25). The Council of Europe vigorously pursued "its central functions in the area of dissemination of human rights norms." The reform concept of the Georgian prosecuting agency was drafted by EU experts (Darchiashvili, 2003b, p. 125). The Council of Europe provided "advice on law concerning the status pf judges and the police, development of the penal system and the organization of ministries of justice" (Darchiashvili, 2003b, p. 125). The Council of Europe also provided human resources capacity development through

“the training of layers, prosecutors, police and prison officials both on general issues and on such special topics as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities” (Darchiashvili, 2003b, p. 125).

Despite the initial reform efforts by the Shevardnadze government and external assistance, the justice sphere did not see much improvement in public perception on the judiciary. The World Bank itself considered outcomes of their assistance moderately unsatisfactory, noting that those assistance efforts did not lead to improved public trust in the judiciary and judicial independence (World Bank, 2009). Like in the other security sector spheres, corruption was endemic in the justice system and general public had very low confidence in judges and the overall court system (Human Rights Watch, 2000). As the previous chapter discussed, corruption had become so imbedded in the security sector even to the extent that corruption became a means of livelihoods. In the environment, Georgia lacked a strong enough incentive to reform the judicial system, while the external assistance in the justice sphere largely focused on developing judicial infrastructure and human resources.

5.3.4 Border control: large scale technical assistance with limited impacts on border control effectiveness

During the Soviet times, Georgia shared a national border only with Turkey. As the Soviet Union was disappearing along with its borders, the CIS Summit meeting reached Agreement on Armed Forces and Border Troops which confirms “member-states legitimate right to set up their own armed forces” in December 1991 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 246). As Georgia became an independent state, it came to share the new national borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the border with Russia became contentious as the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia demanded for independence from Georgia. The border control between Georgia and its neighbouring countries was quite porous, due to weak institutional capacities and corruption among border guards and custom officials. During the Shevardnadze period, building functional border control between Georgian and

its neighbouring countries became an acute issue for Georgia and the international community.

External assistance in the border control area began as early as in the late 1990. During Shevardnadze's time, the Border Guards was regarded as military institutions. As part of the overall SSR advisory, the ISAB recommended transferring the Border Guards to be removed from the State Department for Border Defence and to be subordinated under the MIA in its 1999 report (ISAB, 1999). At the same time, the same ISAB report gave a *de facto* waiver for the affiliation issue, and specifically mentioned the Border Guards by stating that:

> "ISAB understands that special priority must be given to the vital necessity of securing national borders and, there, that any change in the status of the Border Guards as an independent Department of State should wait until the border situation has been sufficiently stabilised" (ISAB, 1999).

The main assistance providers for the border control issues were the USA and OSCE. The USA provided technical assistance to the border control institutions since 1998 through the Georgian Border Security and Related Law Enforcement (GBSLE) programme (Welt, 2005). Since 1999 the OSCE Mission in Georgia provided the border monitoring function along the border between Georgia and Russia (OSCE, n.d.).

The early and direct commitment of the West in the border control issues were driven by two urgent security concerns for the West. The first is the unsettled territorial conflicts on the border between Georgia and Russia, over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Following the war in Chechnya, since 1999 the OSCE's mandate was expanded to provide border patrol along with the areas bordering first with Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia (Kakachia, 2005). The other security concern for the West was the weak border control risking the trafficking of radioactive materials from Russia. According to a report by a non-proliferation specialist, Cory Welt, Georgian officials have apprehended traffickers in radioactive materials at least seven times between 1999 and 2005. In addition, three earlier cases of trafficking of radioactive materials in 1993, 1996 and 1997 were reported. Those cases allegedly involved Georgian citizens in trafficking

radioactive materials from Georgia (Welt, 2005, p. 528). For the USA, Georgia's border control capacity development was their strategic interest to prevent those materials from proliferating in the region and beyond.

In this context, the USA launched the GBSLE program. The GBSLE program targeted a varying border control actors, both of defence and law enforcement spheres including the "Border Guard, Customs, Ministry of Defense, and other border security and law enforcement agencies" and provided assistance ranging from the provision of communications equipment, vehicles and helicopters with spares/repair parts for transport and patrol, surveillance and detection equipment, computers for automation of applications, licensing and regulatory systems, and forensics laboratory assistance" (Global Security, n.d.). Through the GBSLE program, between 1998 and 2005 the USA allocated approximately 135 million USD to Georgia in border security assistance.

From the viewpoint of the Shevardnadze government, the external assistance in the border control sphere benefitted Georgia by building a modern border control apparatus. During the Shevardnadze period, the border control capacities were close to nil. The border control along with the borders with its southern neighbours, i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, for instance, was largely porous at that time. The border guards had neither enough uniforms nor food and lacked proper facilities such as radio equipment to monitor the borders.[78] During the Shevardnadze period effectiveness of the Georgian border control was questionable.

The provision of the US assistance in the area of border control capacity development was welcomed in the void of financial and material resources. In 2005, the GBSLE program stood 15 million USD, more than the annual budget of the Georgian border protection department. The GBSLE program helped Georgia to create the Coast Guard, and provided training, supplies, equipment, uniforms, infrastructure, helicopters, ships, aircraft and vehicles to the border protection department, and trained and supplied the customs department and other relevant agencies, as well as provided forensic laboratory assistance (Welt,

[78] Author's interview, March 2005, Marneuli.

2005). The US Department of Homeland Security also focused on the radioactive material issues and provided technical assistance, training and equipment to enhance Georgia's capability to deter, detect, interdict, and prevent the spread of dual-use equipment and technology, such as radioactive materials.

In sum, the border control assistance significantly advanced the modernisation of the border control institutions in terms of the equipment and training. On the other hand, as in the case of the defence sphere, the capacity development of the border control stopped at the technical level without involving substantial reform efforts in a normative sense (Welt, 2005). The Shevardnadze government did accept the technical capacity building of the border control institutions but did not proceed with an institutional reform substantial enough to eradicate corruption within the institutions.

5.4 Security consequences of the SSR efforts between 1992 and 2003

The external SSR assistance efforts during the Shevardnadze period lacked a comprehensive approach. External SSR assistance providers such as NATO, the OSCE, the EU and bilateral donors signed a number of partnership agreements. However, most of the partnerships remained at a policy discourse and did not translate into actual action points and activity plans.

As chapter 4 and the previous sections in this chapter discuss, in the absence of a comprehensive SSR assistance strategy, external assistance activities were provided in limited fields, namely, the provision of training and equipment for enhancing counter-terrorism combat and border control abilities. Georgia’s SSR efforts during the Shevardnadze period remained technical and sporadic, and did not bring substantial SSR that would have required substantial political commitment to the Georgian security sector actors. The disproportional assistance in the security sector resulted had Georgia face multifaceted security consequences. The following part of the chapter analyses those consequences to regime security, state security and human security. At the same time, the section examines what security issues remained unattended in the SSR process,

in spite of and/or because of the way the SSR assistance was provided in Georgia between 1992 and 2003.

5.4.1 Regime security: frustration over corruption leading to the end of the Shevardnadze regime

As discussed in chapter 4, the lack of reform efforts in the 'power ministries' contributed for Shevardnadze's regime to restoring its power base. External assistance in the security sector did not change the dynamics which restored Shevardnadze's regime security. Incentives for restoring the regime security needs appeared to be more powerful than establishing a functional security sector apparatus.

An illustrative example of the western SSR assistance did not surpass the domestic political dynamics can be found in the field of border control. One of the most significant external SSR assistance activities, the border control institutions development mentioned above, contributed to building and developing the Georgian border guards' capacities. Despite the large amount of the assistance from the USA, the effectiveness of border control remained low. Smuggling remained rampant over the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Marneuli, a town close to the two southern neighbouring countries, a local resident described the extent of smuggling and lack of effective border control by saying: "A real frontier we have is only with Turkey".[79] In Zugdidi, a town close to Abkhazia, people also pointed out weak capacities of the border guards. One local interviewee told:

> "Nobody is satisfied with the frontier military work. Kidnapping of neighbours in the bordering area by Abkhazia criminals is very common. The neighbours are constantly under fear. People are unprotected because the frontier military works badly."[80]

[79] Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.
[80] Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.

In the bordering regions, people were particularly discontent with the government's official's involvement in smuggling. One source told that the local authorities in the border regions were involved in illicit trading of commercial goods and weapons.[81] According to the source, Shevardnadze promised unofficially to the local authorities that Tbilisi would not prosecute for trafficking in exchange for their being allowed to remain in the Georgian territory.[82] The level of corruption among border control officials remained high throughout the Shevardnadze period and even after Saakashvili came to power in 2003. Local residents in Marneuli reported that the cost of bribery increased from approximately 30GEL to 100GEL between 2004 and 2005.

Rampant corruption and the frustration over the Shevardnadze government's lack of efforts for curtailing corruption eventually led to mass demonstrations against his government. During the demonstrations in November 2003, the security ministries including the MIA, who had been Shevardnadze's power platform, did not stand on the Shevardnadze side. An official from the MIA explained the reason that rank-and-file officers at his Ministry and the MSS did not benefit from corruption as "most of the money went to people at the very top level (in the ministries)".[83] This way, the lack of the reform in the police and law enforcement failed to garner enough institutional support from the security ministries, and failed regime security for Shevardnadze.

5.4.2 State security: maintaining the territorial *status quo* over Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The biggest threat to state security during the Shevardnadze period was posed by the unsolved conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Without having received full-fledged assistance to upgrade its defence system and articulating its strategic direction, the Shevardnadze government maintained moderate relations with Russia, and restored the *status quo* situation over the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a way, the lack of a comprehensive

[81] Author's interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.

SSR strategy, especially in the defence sphere, contributed to ensuring a certain level of state security for Georgia.

The Georgian perspective needs to be understood in the political context surrounding Georgia during this period. In the political context in which the SSR assistance was provided, Georgia was at the edge of a collapsed state when Shevardnadze arrived in Georgia. The first few years under his administration focused on restoring a certain level of order, gaining international recognition of Georgia as an independent state and developing basic state institutions. Its relation with Russia was not always a smooth one and it soured under the Shevardnadze government. Georgia did not join the CIS upon its foundation, but later chose to join it in 1993, hoping its CIS membership may lead to resolving the conflicts over Abkhazia.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Georgia under the Shevardnadze government was yet to firmly decide Russia as an existential threat, unlike the Saakashvili government. During the Shevardnadze period, Georgia was still very much under strong and direct influence of Russia. This was largely due to the unsettled violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the presence of the Russia-led peacekeeping forces in those territories. Russia still kept its military bases in proper Georgia. The two assassination attempts against Shevardnadze in 1995 and 1998 were suspected to be masterminded by Russia. Under the circumstances, SSR from the Euro-Atlantic countries was regarded as antidote against Russia's influence and political and social elites with strong ties with Russia. In this context, a full-fledged, substantial SSR implementation had a risk to invite a coercive reaction from Russia. In the political environment, Shevardnadze placed a priority on maintaining a relation with Russia than developing an explicit security concept enlisting Russia as a threat.

5.4.3 Human security: relying on private networks

The absence of reform efforts in the police spheres not only fostered the culture of corruption in the police and other security sector institutions. It also left a

number of human security challenges at community level little attended and left non-state actors remained as a major security provider on the ground.

Although some external SSR assistance providers attempted to attend human security needs on the ground. For instance, as chapter 3 discussed, the proliferation of small arms in society had been an issue since the Gamsakhurdia period. One report estimates that approximately 40,000 weapons were in the possession of armed groups during the period. (Demetriou, 2002, p. 20) Under the Shevardnadze regime, small arms still remained circulating in society. While the capacity of the Georgian government was yet to be established, the international community provided assistance in order to control the irregular proliferation of small arms. In South Ossetia, for instance, the OSCE Mission to Georgia provided weapons collection assistance (OECD, 2002). Nonetheless, human security needs at community level were far from being met by the external assistance.

People had little trust in the capacity of the state security institutions in the Georgian society. Field studies conducted in 2005 shows that people shared testimonials on the state security apparatus on its weak capabilities and lack of willingness to attend people's needs (Koyama, 2005). Moreover, people felt that the institutional capacities of state security apparatus declined since the Soviet time. The lack of confidence in state security institutions drove them to rely on their own private networks for protection Georgia was known for its unofficial networks since the Soviet time as economic corruption and political nepotism flourished through such private webs (Koyama, 2005). In Georgia during the Shevardnadze period, the private networks took over the state security sector's role to provide security to people in communities. Human security needs were attended by non-state, alternative actors such as community members themselves who were often armed with small arms, traditional and ethnic community networkers, family and relatives and even criminal groups.

Having very low confidence in the state security institutions, local community members chose to rely on their own network for protection. One such network found typically in the ethnic Azeris communities, was the traditional community network called *brethren*, and community elders called *akhsakhals* to resolve

conflicts. Even during the Soviet time, they tended to seek for their traditional chiefs' ruling. In the lacuna of law and order, the roles of the *brethren* and *akhsakhals* as the justice provider became more critical. Azeri participants explained a type of community-based conflict resolution:

> "When there is a conflict between people, the parties start getting to know the other side: what kind of family they are, who their friends are and to which *brethren* they belong. Then, they will find a person among this circle of people with whom they could negotiate. This is a way of conflict settlement. It is a better way than to appeal to the government structure." [84]

In Marneuli, the Georgian communities went to *akhsakhals* rather than to the police in case of disputes with Azeri neighbours. From the Georgian side, another ethnic group, the Svans, were often selected as a negotiator as they were regarded neutral.

People sometimes tried to work out issues without the police and state security agencies particularly on issues related to domestic violence and abduction of women and girls for marriage. Cases involving sexual issues were particularly under-reported.[85] People tended to receive punishment by themselves. The Armenian female group reported two examples of murders. One participant said:

> "In my district, a father found his daughter in incest with her brother. He killed both of them. Now the father is in a psychiatric hospital."[86]

Another ethnic Armenian participant reported a case of summary execution of a suspect by community people. According to her:

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[84] Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.

[85] In most cases of domestic violence, victims, who were mostly women, were persuaded to "endure" violence at home by family members. If the victims decided to resolve these issues at all, they preferred to resolve it within their circle of friends or relatives. Women believed it was rather pointless to bring a case to court since they did not have enough money to bribe judges, unlike her male family members. Thus, women tended to rely on her family network to settle disputes. In case in which families of kidnapped women and girls were against the marriage, they did not report the incident to the police but organised their own 'rescue' teams. Through networks of family, relatives and friends, they collected information, identify the abductor, and negotiate the release of the kidnapped.

[86] Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe.

> "Six or seven years ago, a young man raped a little girl. The people in the village caught the man and burned him."[87]

Another such private networks include criminal groups. Since the breakdown of the Soviet system, criminal groups had engaged in extortion. During the civil war, these groups set up their own rules, which locals had to obey and largely rely on these criminal groups for their protection. In some cases, community members also relied on the criminal networks to resolve crimes. They preferred to go to criminal groups than to the police, because "the police take years to investigate a case if they do it at all, while the criminal groups would settle the problem within a matter of hours."[88] Another interviewee told:

> "The criminal groups are still the major source of security and protection. You pay one criminal group, and they would protect you from other criminal gangs."[89]

Needless to say, the private networks were unable and incapable of responding to all the security needs of the people.[90] At the same time, people acknowledge that money was often a key in mobilizing the police, the courts, and the criminal groups. This implies that the rich, legally or illegally, had better access to the security and justice systems, at the expense of the poor who could not afford access. In other words, access to security and justice for people had become disproportionate between the rich and the poor.

5.5 Conclusion

Having gained independence in 1991, Georgia in the 1990s was still on its early stage of state-building. Security sector change took place in the state-building context, in which security sector institutions and the sector's governance mechanism were to be transformed from Soviet- to Western- style apparatus. In

[87] Ibid.
[88] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Such shortfalls were especially prominent in cases of gendered violence.

this context, a number of major strategic partnerships such as NATO's PfP and EU's Partnership for Cooperation Agreement were signed between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic block. Following the adaptation of the key partnership frameworks, external assistance for the security sector started to arrive since the late 1990.

The ample externa assistance in the security sector sphere did not lead to a normatively informed reform. Neither the external assistance providers nor Georgia developed a comprehensive policy or action plan for the overall SSR, although the need for clarifying the political and security framework within which SSR was to take place at the onset was pointed out.[91] In Georgia, external assistance in the security sector arrived in the absence of an overall SSR policy framework.

The provision of SSR assistance between 1992 and 2003 appears to be driven by strategic interests and political incentives among the external assistance providers and the Georgian counterpart for reforming and not reforming the security sector. For instance, in the early 1990, the Western assistance providers had an interest in the stability in the Southern Caucasian region and in Georgia. The West also had an aspiration for the eastward expansion of democracy based on liberal democratic norms. Regime stability was the priority for their counterpart, the Shevardnadze government, too. The absence of substantial reforms in the police sphere was an illustrative example of the outcome of the mutually met political incentive between Georgian and its SSR assistance providers. For the domestic stability in Georgia, the Shevardnadze regime at that time appeared to be a condition for stabilising Georgia. No reform efforts which may jeopardize the regime's power such as the MIA took place. The external assistance providers' incentives for the reform in the police sphere did not surpass the strategic interest in establishing a stable regime in Georgia. This way, the aim to expand democracy based on liberal democratic norms was significantly compromised.

The external assistance providers and Georgia did not always share the common goal in the implementation of SSR, however. The case of the defence sphere is

[91] Johnson, 2005, p.55

a suggestive example. The dissolution of the Soviet Union created a strategic space for the Western allies for the eastward enlargement of their influence towards the region to promote and embed the post-Cold War political transitions and also to replace Russia as a major geopolitical power. Georgia's SSR efforts took place in the strategic context. The Euro-Atlantic allies, especially the USA, provided a significant amount of SSR assistance to help Georgia's defence system, especially, to build capacities of the combat battalions under the MoD and border controls. The Georgian counterpart expressed their intention to modernise their security sector. But the intention was largely driven by a political motivation: modernising the country and its security sector institutions as an antidote against Russia. However, even this political agenda had to be compromised in order to prevent the relations with Russia from being deteriorated. An absence of a national security concept despite of the explicit recommendation by the Western advisers illustrates the specific security and political challenges that Shevardnadze's Georgia faced at that time.

These observations on the SSR assistance and how they were treated by the Georgian counterparts provide the following conclusions on the interplay between the SSR assistance and the actual changes in the security sector.

First, the SSR assistance aimed at attending strategic concerns for the SSR assistance providers, and not necessarily Georgia's security concerns. The SSR assistance initiatives provided by the Euro-Atlantic allies during the Shevardnadze period mainly focused on the development of border control and combat capacities. The main objective was to enhance Georgia's capacities to counter terrorism as part of the USA and its allies' efforts against terrorism. The SSR assistance thus concentrated on those issues which aimed for ensuring security outside, not inside Georgia.

Second, in the interest-driven SSR agenda-setting process, state and regime security concerns appeared to be a dominant factor determining the course and extent of SSR. Consequently, despite the increased external assistance in SSR, Georgia remained affected by a number of security concerns. The lack of substantial reform in the police and law enforcement spheres, combined with the external security oriented SSR efforts on counter-terrorism, left a wide range of

other security issues within Georgia little attended. The issue of human security at community level in the chapter provided an illuminating example of the consequence of the compromised SSR implementation.

Third, little efforts in security sector governance issues contributed to sustain the regime security, but eventually led to jeopardise the regime security. The SSR assistance during the Shevardnadze time remained at a technical level, and did not involve substantive, normative reform in the field of security sector governance, including budgetary management and parliamentary oversight. The lack of the governance reform helped the security sector institutions restore its corrupt system at first. However, the ousting of the Shevardnadze regime by popular demonstrations against corruption suggests that the lack of substantial reform in the power base of the Shevardnadze regime turned out to be a trigger for destabilising the regime security.

The SSR assistance efforts between 1992 and 2003 left a number of challenges, both in terms of the security sector development and security concerns in Georgia. The external assistance remained only supplementary without leading to normative reform. What took place in the security sector between 1992 and 2003 could be better described as security sector change rather than SSR, given the lack of substantial normative reform.

The next chapter discusses a drastic change in the course of Georgian politics and external relations under a new government led by Saakashvili that replaced the Shevardnadze government, and analyses the interaction between these political chances and security sector change between 2004 and 2008.

Chapter 6 Security sector change under the Saakashvili regime between 2004 and 2008

6.1 Introduction

A number of changes in the security sector in Georgia between 2004 and 2008 took place in a politically eventful period, both domestically and internationally. The Rose Revolution in 2004 began this next period, from 2004 to 2008. The new Saakashvili government during this time enhanced the democratization process further, while removing his political rivals consisting of the former Soviet nomenklatura and Shevardnadze appointees. At the same time, the Saakashvili government explicitly expressed the ambition to join NATO and the EU, which intensified tensions in the relation with Russia. The Georgia-Russian relation increasingly deteriorated, and ultimately resulted in a war over the South Ossetia territory in summer 2008.

This chapter seeks to understand how the political developments affected the course of security sector change processes, including SSR in the transitional context in which the centre of power shifted from pro-Russia to pro-West elites. By examining how the security sector evolves and changes in detail, this chapter analyses what socio-political factors influence the course of security sector change and how. The example of Georgia during this period illustrates that the political dynamics continued to play a major role in determining the course of security sector change, even though the country had an advantage of receiving international expertise on SSR, the provision of equipment and training, as well as financial support.

The analysis of security sector change under the Saakashvili government is organised in three components. The first part of this chapter provides a brief analysis on the major political developments the period between 2004 and 2008 in which Georgia experienced a revolution domestically and a war internationally. The chapter then proceeds with a detailed examination on security sector change that took place in the transitional context. As in chapters 3 and 4, the third component comprises a political economy analysis of security sector change and

of the set of factors that influenced the course of the security sector change process and vice versa.

6.2 The examination of political developments between 2004 and 2008

This chapter covers the period between 2004 and 2008. During this period, Georgia experienced major political and social developments, both domestically and internationally. The Rose Revolution introduced a new political leader, Saakashvili and his allies, replacing Shevardnadze and his supporters. The new administration took an expansive approach towards the contested territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which led to a deteriorated relation with Russia. The relation with Russia became further intensified and finally resulted in a war in the summer of 2008. (Gahrton, 2010; Jones, 2015) This section provides a detailed discussion of those key social and political developments that influenced the course and agenda-setting process of security sector change under the Saakashvili government between 2004 and 2008.

6.2.1 Domestic political developments: power struggles under the Saakashvili government

The so-called Rose Revolution ushered in Saakashvili and a few other young and liberal political elites into power. Following the Rose Revolution, the Saakashvili won the presidential election with an overwhelming majority with 96 per cent of the vote in January 2004 (OSCE/ODIHR, 2004). Saakashvili formed the government consisting of young, pro-reform politicians and civil society leaders.[92] This made a sharp contrast with his predecessor's government which was dominated by the former Soviet nomenklatura.

Saakashvili and his administration put their priority in reforming and modernising the state administration to remove corruption from the state institutions. To initiate

[92] Upon elected the president, Saakashvili appointed another reformist leader, Zhvania, the Prime Minister. Zhvania's time as the Prime Minister, however, ended with his sudden death in February 2005. Zhvania's death left Saakashvili to become the most prominent leader in the reformist block. Saakashvili's political dominance lasted until other political leaders, namely Irakri Okruashvili, the Minister of Internal Affairs and then the Minister of Defence, emerged as a prominent figure in late 2005.

the reform, Saakashvili established a Civil Service Council and an office of the State Minister for Reform Coordination in 2004 (Jones, 2015, p. 166). A large number of civil servants were accused of corruption and removed from their positions. The MIA, once the power base of Shevardnadze and notorious for its corruption, was particularly affected: the MIA investigators and 211 policemen were charged of corruption (Jones, 2015, p. 166).

There were only two years that Georgia enjoyed political stability during this period. In 2006, Georgia experienced had another political crisis and mass demonstrations. The Saakashvili government implemented an anti-corruption campaign, including the massive lay-off of allegedly corrupt officials, especially of the Traffic Police, and the abolishment of the MSS, that were the stronghold of the former Soviet nomenklatura and notorious for corruption. Popular support for the Saakashvili government started to wane, as the general public, which held a high if not unrealistic expectation had become increasingly frustrated by the pace of the reform efforts. Their resentment against the Saakashvili government escalated further when Irakli Okruashvili, the former Ministers of Internal Affairs and Defence and Saakashvili's close ally, was arrested after he openly criticised Saakashvili by accusing him and his government of corruption.[93]

The anti-Saakashvili movement started to accumulate a momentum and eventual grew to become a political crisis. Large-scale anti-Saakashvili demonstrations started to take place on 1 November 2006. A large number of demonstrators, estimated between 50,000 and 70,000, gathered in central Tbilisi (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 3). After having failed to reach an agreement with the opposition, the Saakashvili government had the police disperse the protestors on 7 November. Later the day, Riot police were deployed, followed by a military unit, to disperse the crowd. Through the operation, the number of violent acts by the police and other law enforcement bodies were witnessed and reported (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 4). In that evening, the government declared the state of emergency and the public broadcasts were suspended. Saakashvili called for a presidential election in January 2008, which Saakashvili

[93] Okruashvili had resigned from the Saakashvili government in late 2006. Having parted from Saakashvili, Okruashvili had become a popular political leader rivaling Saakashvili. Okruashvili also claimed that Saakashvili ordered an assassination of a prominent business figure, Badri Patakatsishvili (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 2).

won. Saakashvili was re-elected the president on 5 January 2008 (International Crisis Group, 2007a, pp. 7–8).

6.2.2 Deteriorating relations with Russia

Since Saakashvili became the president for the first time in 2004, the bilateral relationship between Georgia and Russia became intense. Although the relations between the two countries had never been an amicable one since Georgia's independence, the bilateral relations sharply deteriorated since the arrival of Saakashvili as the president. In May 2004, Georgia launched an anti-smuggling operation in the conflict-affected South Ossetia. It was believed that Okruashvili, the then Minister of Internal Affairs led the campaign. In addition, Saakashvili and his allies also employed antagonistic discourses against Russia, which was believed to damage the relations with Vladimir Putin even at a personal level beyond repair (International Crisis Group, 2007a, pp. 7–8).

Throughout 2006 and 2007, Georgia and Russia had a series of offensive retaliations. Since the end of 2005, Russia had put pressure on Georgia economically. In late 2005, Russia's state owned gas company, Gazprom, raised the gas price from $62.5 to $110 per 1,000 cubic meters (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 8). In January 2006, two gas pipelines were destroyed by explosion in Russia's North Ossetian Republic, which resulted in a suspension of gas supply to Georgia (Civil Georgia, 2006a). Around the same time, Russia prohibited the import of wine, brandy and mineral water, all of which are important export products for Georgia.[94] Furthermore, Russia closed the only transportation channel in July 2006. Following the 'economic embargo' (Civil Georgia, 2006b), Georgia arrested four Russian officers for a spy charge and expelled them from Georgia in September 2006. In return, Russia recalled its ambassador and more than 2,300 Georgians were expelled from Russia (Human Rights Watch, 2007b).[95] Russia blocked the only transportation channel between Georgia and Russia on October 2006.

[94] Prior to the bans, Russia banned agricultural imports from Georgia in December 2005.
[95] In Russia, ethnic Georgians and Georgian nationals were harassed. Russia stopped issuing visas to Georgians, too.

In 2007, the confrontation between the country countries transformed to more direct and violent, especially over the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In summer 2008, a war finally broke out between Georgian and Russia over South Ossetia.

6.2.3 Disputes over territories: Adjara, Abkhazia and South Ossetia

For the Saakashvili government, the restoration of territorial integrity of the Georgian state was his first priority (German, 2006, p. 8). This aspiration was met with a mixed result, i.e., a success in Adjara and *de facto* loss of territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In the Autonomous Region of Adjara, Abashidze had had immunity under the Shevardnadze government and controlled in both political and economic senses. When Shevardnadze was ousted by the Rose Revolution, Abashidze refused to recognise the new authority of Tbilisi and Saakashvili as the President of Georgia. Declaring a state of emergency, Abashidze and his forces[96] took a defiant stance and burned down bridges between Adjara and the rest of Georgia, to which Tbilisi reacted firmly.[97] Having met large scale demonstrations calling for the resignation of Abashidze in Batumi, the capital of Adjara, Abashidze finally resigned in May 2004 and fled to Russia. His post was abolished by Saakashvili. Having ousted Abashidze, a new legislation that have the President of Georgia appoint the head of the Adjaran government was passed. Subsequently, a Saakashvili ally, Levan Varshalomidze, was appointed chairperson of the regional council of ministers. Adjara had become under the control of Tbilisi within the first year of the Saakashvili regime.[98]

The success of Adjara was not replicated in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Following the successful integration of Adjara, the Saakashvili government offered autonomy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In South Ossetia, the offer was

[96] Georgia's 25th Moto-Rifle Brigade based in Batumi mutinied and pledged support to Abashidze. In addition, Abashidze had Adjara's internal minister's battalion (356 men) and a special force, well trained by a retired Russian general, directly under his control (International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 7).
[97] Saakashivili ordered Abashidze to disarm his forces or face removal (BBC, n.d.).
[98] Abashidze was later sentenced to prison for a charge of misuse of office and embezzlement of GEL 98.2 million state funds (Civil Georgia, 2007).

met with a rejection by a referendum in 2006. Since then, the relation between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali further deteriorated. In parallel, the situation in Abkhazia intensified. In March 2007, the Upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, the only territory under the control of Georgia, was shelled. In July, Georgia launched an operation in the Kodori Gorge to arrest an Abkhazian militia leader Emzar Kvitsiani (International Crisis Group, 2007b). In August, a military aircraft launched a missile onto Georgian territory near South Ossetia(International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 9). Georgia claimed Russia's involvement in the incident, which Russia dismissed (RFE/RL, 2007a). The tension between Georgia and Russia further amounted, when a Georgian drone was shot down over the Abkhazia territory in April 2008. Following the incident, Georgia sent its troops to Abkhazia.

The tension between Georgia and Russia over the two separatist regions reached its peak in August 2008. In early summer in 2008, sporadic violent clashes had taken a place between the Georgian and South Ossetian armed groups. After a series of violent clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces, Georgia launched a bombardment and ground attack on 7 August 2008. Russia countered the attack by sending thousands of troops into South Ossetia.[99] The five-day Russo-Georgian War left a few hundred deaths on both the sides. (International Crisis Group, 2008a, p. 3) According to a report, 30,000 ethnic Ossetians fled from South to North Ossetia.[100] 85,000 ethnic Georgians were displaced: 15,000 from South Ossetia and 30,000 from Abkhazia (International Crisis Group, 2008a, p. 3). During the war in South Ossetia, Russian armed forces moved through the Abkhazian territory.[101] The Abkhazian armed forces took a control of the Kodori Gorge that had been under the control of Georgia. After the war ended, Russia formally recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. After the Russo-Georgian War, the two separatist territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, became under the *de facto* control of Russia, and deepened their dependence on Russia, militarily, politically and economically.

[99] More than 20,000 troops were reportedly crossed the border from Russia into South Ossetia, as well as to Abkhazia (International Crisis Group, 2008a, p. 3).
[100] The displaced figures were provided by a UNHCR official to International Crisis Group (International Crisis Group, 2008a, p. 3).
[101] Moscow moved its troops, amounted up to 400, into Abkhazia. The justification was to rehabilitate between Sukhumi and Ochamchira (International Crisis Group, 2008b, p. 3).

As this section illustrates, post Rose Revolution Georgia did not enjoy political stability for too long. Domestically, the young, ambitious liberal democrat politicians were met with a large scale of demonstrations, which required the president declare a state of emergency. The bilateral relation with Russia became damaged through a number of antagonistic incidents involving both *de facto* economic sanction and violent clashes, and finally the 2008 War. The reform of the security sector institutions took place in this volatile political environment. The next section examines in detail on the developments in the security sector change during this period.

6.3 Security sector change in Georgia between 2004 and 2008

Georgia under Saakashvili saw a significant progress in the development and reform of its security sector actors. The result of the SSR between 2003 and 2008 is a mixed one. The Saakashvili government implemented various SSR efforts. The main approach to the reform efforts can be characterised as 'Europeanisation' of its security sector apparatus, by bringing their compatibilities with NATO and the EU. Through the reform efforts, the so-called 'power ministries', i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security underwent drastic changes. This led to the eradication of the post-Soviet nomenklatura in those ministries, which was one of the political agendas of the new government under Saakashvili. On the other hand, they were occasionally mobilised to supress some political movements whilst the security sector actors were "democratised" and fully "modernised". The degree of civilian control remained questionable, as some civilian state figures overran it and participated in a violent confrontation with South Ossetian forces. This section provides a detailed analysis on the SSR efforts that took place under the Saakashvili government in each of the following security sector spheres: defence, internal affairs and justice. In particular, the section examines the process of the re-shuffling of paramilitary forces among defence and law enforcement institutions. The section then scrutinises the degree and nature of civil control of those armed forces under the Saakashvili government.

6.3.1 Defence reform: aligning with NATO standards

Georgia saw a significant progress in the defence reform under the Saakashvili government. His predecessor, the president Shevardnadze declared the intention to join NATO in 2002. Efforts to upgrade the defence sphere in terms of defence institutions, equipment and capacities accelerated under the Saakashvili government and more detailed, concrete action plans were lied out. This includes the agreement of an IPAP between Georgia and NATO in 2004.[102] Subsequently, defence reform activities were carried out in accordance with the strategy and operational action plan set up by the IPAP.

As the previous chapter discuss, the process of professionalising the defence institutions had already begun during the Shevardnadze period, and Georgia had received external advice from a group of experts from NATO ally countries. Under the Saakashvili government, the progress was further made in professionalising and modernising the defence institutions, both at conceptual and operational levels. These efforts were implemented in accordance with NATO standards.

The concept of security and defence was re-examined and revised under the Saakashvili government by consulting a wide circle of experts, academia and civil society actors. A new National Security Concept was developed and adopted in 2005. The National Security Concept specifies its national strategic interests such as restoration of territorial integrity (Darchiashvili, 2008). The content reflected recommendations provided by the international experts such as the ISAB since the late 1990. Additionally, the process of the document development involved a consultation with civil society representatives and academia to incorporate their perspectives. The National Security Concept employed a wider and inclusive security concept which includes non-direct security threats such as organised crimes and corruption. Given a consideration to the multi-ethnic nature of the society, the document adopted the word ‘people of Georgia’ instead of ‘Georgian people’. The Saakashvili government thus clarified security concept and strategic priorities in both domestic and foreign policies.

[102] Georgia signed the IPAP on 29 October 2004. Georgia is the first country that signed the IPAP (NATO, n.d.).

The people-centred security concept was, however, slightly shifted as the territorial tensions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased. In 2006, the National Security Concept was amended in 2006. The amended National Security Concept placed an emphasis on the need for preparing for unconditional and total defence. The amendment tasked the National Guard with training reservists to become able to engage in defence operations (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 27). The amendment of the National Security Concept departed from its initial, inclusive scope and narrowed its focus on traditional, defence-centred security approach.

The civilian control mechanism for armed forces in Georgia saw a certain degree of advancement under the Saakashvili government, making the civilian control system more aligned with the US counterpart. Yet, the degree of the actual implementation of the civilian control was questionable. The main issue is the provision of more power to the President in terms of the approval for deploying armed forces. The 2004 Constitutional amendment made it possible for the President to dispatch armed forces without seeking for a parliamentary approval prior to dispatching armed forces. Instead, the 2004 amendment allowed the President to obtain an approval from the Parliament within 48 hours *ex post*, instead of prior to the dispatch.[103] The question over the actual civilian control could be found at the operational level, too. The weak control of oversight over the paramilitary forces was particularly pressing when Okruashvili was the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence. Okruashvili, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, led an aggressive police operation in South Ossetia in 2004.[104] In the following year, Okruashvili who by then had become the head of the defence ministry entered into conflict-affected areas in Abkhazia. Okruashvili, the then MoD, made a public statement that he went to Abkhazia with several soldiers.[105] Those two incidents illustrate that the principle of civilian control was violated by a civilian head of the security sector ministries himself. The fact that Okruashvili

[103] The 2004 Constitutional amendment contradicts with the Law on Defence, which still requires a parliamentary approval prior to the dispatch of armed forces.
[104] In summer 2004, Okruashvili led an aggressive police operation against South Ossetia (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 2).
[105] The website of the Ministry of Defence confirmed his statement, and added that the Minister was accompanied only by his security guard (Anjaparidze, 2005).

remained in the defence minister's office[106] suggests that the Saakashvili government did not take the violation of the civilian control principle as too serious an issue. Furthermore, the oversight of reservists was even more ambiguous, as there is no written specification as to whether the parliament should be informed of their deployment during a state of emergency (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 61).

Georgia under Saakashvili continued to receive large scale foreign aid, particularly from NATO ally countries, for its defence system. Along with the NATO-aligned action plans, a number of efforts upgrading the defence system were implemented in the areas of organisational management including human resources[107] and budget, along with the provision of training and equipment. Following the adaptation of the IPAP in 2004, Georgia received a range of assistance in defence sector management from the NATO ally countries. The Netherlands, for instance, supported Georgia in the defence-related planning and management through the "Planning, Programming and Budgeting System/Financial Management System (PPBS/FMS)" (Transparency International Georgia, 2007, p. 3). The USA continued providing defence management training to the MoD personnel (Transparency International Georgia, 2007, p. 3).

The adaptation of the IPAP included an obligation to earmark no less than two percent of a national GDP (Transparency International Georgia, 2007, p. 1). As a result, the defence budget drastically increased. Between 2004 and 2005, Georgia's defence budget increased by more than three times (Transparency International Georgia, 2007, p. 1). In 2007, allocating 3.2 percent of the total GDP, the defence budget amounted about 1.5 billion GEL (about 640 billion USD), whilst the 2006 defence budget was 6.5 billion GEL (about 2.8 million USD).

One account states that the national defence spending rose from a few dozen million GEL in 2003 to over a billion laris in 2007. The large margin of the increase is partly due to the insignificant budget allocation to the defence sector during the Shevardnadze period. Nonetheless, the sharp increase in the defence budget in

[106] Okruashvili remained as the defence minister until November 2006, when he became the Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development.
[107] The 2007 Law on Military Duty and Military Service refers to the Ministry of Defence forces of 32,000 servicemen (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 30).

the short-period of time was quite a noticeable indication of the Saakashvili government's commitment to the integration with NATO.

NATO member countries, namely US, provided combat training for Georgian troops along with the defence management training. In 2005, training was conducted through the 18-month long Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP) of 60.5 million USD.[108] GSSOP's objective was to train and equip more than 1,200 soldiers for the USA's war on terror in Iraq through their Operation Iraqi Freedom stability missions. ("Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP)," n.d.) GSSOP was designed to consolidate the progress made at its preceding programme, the Georgina Train and Equip Program (GTEP) of 2002-2004. Building on the GTEP, the 2005-2006 GSSOP involved training and equipping the 11th Brigade, equipping two other infantry battalions, two logistics battalions and training some other separate companies of the 11th Brigade ("Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP)," n.d.).

Thus, the Georgia's defence system had received foreign assistance in modernising its management system, building the defence management and combat capacity training under the Saakashvili government. Along with the government's strategy to integrate into NATO, those assistance was provided to raise the NATO compatibility of the Georgian defence system. On the other hand, the Georgian troops were challenged to defend their own country. When the Russo-Georgia broke out in summer 2008, for instance, around 2,000 Georgian troops including the GSSOP trained personnel had been deployed in Iraq as part of the USA-led operation in Iraq (France24, 2008), leaving the home country less prepared for Russia's attack.

6.3.2 Reforming the MIA and abolishing the MSS

The Saakashvili government set up the reform of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security as the major political agenda under the campaign: "War

[108] GSSOP was a two-phased programme: GSSOP-I took place between 2005 and 2006, followed by GSSOP-II carried out between 2006 and 2007.

against Corruption". Under the strong political direction, the Georgian law enforcement organs underwent massive structural and organisational changes for the first time since the independence. As a result, the MIA was hugely downsized and the MSS was abolished in 2004, leaving some departments integrated into the MIA and the Presidential unit. The Justice Ministry was separated from the MIA, making the justice became independent of the executive power.

Reform initiatives began as soon as Saakashvili held the power in the office. In January 2004, the Saakashvili government outlined goals for the reform of the MIA. Those goals were:

- reorganisation of the Ministry into the body responsible for the internal policy of the country, with duties including the execution and coordination of police activities;
- professionalisation of the police force to make it completely non-political, including the bolstering of public confidence in the police by increasing its effectiveness in fighting crime, ensuring civilian security, and combating the system's existing corruption;
- creation of appropriate work conditions, suitable remuneration, and job stability for the employees of the Ministry system and protection against the hiring of unqualified persons; and
- gradual execution of the reform process, ensuring that the necessary material, technical, and human resources are determined and their sources defined before components of the reform are implemented (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2004).

These goals clearly indicated the new government's intention to remove the Soviet legacy in the security sector and to eliminate the political influence of the two ministries.

Subsequently, in the relatively short period of time between January and December 2004, the ministries underwent an organisational change. One of the major efforts was made in downsizing the size of the MIA. In July 2004, several departments such as the Transport Police Department, the Main Administrative

Board of Traffic Police, the Main Administrative Board of Protection of Public Order, and the Main Administrative Board of Ecology Police were abolished.[109] Some organs were transferred to other ministries.[110] For instance, the Internal Troops were transferred to the MoD, and the National Bureau of Passport-Visa and Citizens Registration was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Consequently, the number of the employees of the Ministry was reduced from 53,691 to 22,229.[111] Before the restructuring of the MIA, there was one police officer per 89 citizens. In 2005, the ratio became one police officer per 214 citizens. The large scale lay-off contributed to the increase of the average wage for the MIA personnel raised from 80-90 GEL (around 45-51 USD) to 350-500 GEL (around 200-286 USD). (Krunic and Siradze, 2005, p. 55) The salary increase was expected to curtail corruption with the MIA as it may motivate the police officers that were notorious for bribe-taking largely because of the low salaries during the Shevardnadze period.

The second effort was to replace the Traffic Police, most notorious and unpopular among the general public for their corruption, with a new Patrol Police. The laying-off of the police officers, in particular of traffic police officers and the establishment of the new Patrol Police were regarded as the best policies carried out by the new Government. (International Herald Tribune, 2004) The Main Administrative Board of the Highway Patrol Police was established in August 2004 to replace the Traffic Police. Since October 2004, a new Police 022 telephone central dispatch system (24/7) were installed in Tbilisi. A media campaign was conducted in order to raise the positive image of the police. For instance, a TV programme broadcasted their activities on a daily basis, campaigning to eradicate the negative image of the old traffic police and the police in general.

The most significant reform in the law and enforcement sphere during this period is the abolishment of the MSS, the most influential 'power ministries' during the Soviet period. In December 2004, the Minister of State Security, the former

[109] These organs include: the Transport Police Department; the Main Administrative Board of Traffic Police; the Main Administrative Board of Protection of Public Order; and the Main Administrative Board of Ecology Police.
[110] In November, the Internal Troops were transferred to the Ministry of Defence. The National Bureau of Passport-Visa and Citizens Registration was transferred to the Ministry of Justice.
[111] There are approximately 12,000 Protection Police employees. But they are not covered by the State budget (Krunic and Siradze, 2005, p. 55).

Georgian KGB, was integrated into the MIA. Many of the functions of the MSS, including Security Service, were abolished and the border guards department became integrated into the MIA. The Department of Intelligence in charge of foreign intelligence gathering came directly under the control of the President. The biggest stronghold of the legacy of the Soviet nomenklatura was thus washed out the slate by the Saakashvili government, at least in terms of a state institution.

6.3.3 Reforming the justice sector

Saakashvili had been an active driver of the judicial reform since he was the Minister for Justice under the Shevardnadze administration. In 2000, the Ministry of Justice became independent of the MIA. The reform efforts in the justice sphere continued after Saakashvili became the President. Salaries for court officials were raised and detainees' rights were strengthened (Jones, 2015, p. 170).

The justice reform received support from the EU. In 2004, the EU set out a strategy for the criminal justice legislation. The EU Rule of Law mission, so-called EUJUST THEMIS, operative between 2004 and 2005, assisted Georgia in developing a strategy for criminal legislation reform in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (European Union, 2005). A high-level working group was set up and developed a strategy for reforming Georgian criminal legislation and submitted to the Government of Georgia in 2005. As an outcome, the National Strategy for Criminal Justice Reform was drafted after a consultation with various stakeholders. In 2005, the President Saakashvili adopted the National Strategy by decree and noted that the National Strategy would be part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan and that the implementation of it would be his government's top priorities.

The actual commitment from the Georgian during the drafting process side was rather bleak, however. A high-level working group was established and headed by the Minister of Justice: its members included a number of respective actors such as the Secretary of National Security Council, the Secretary of the High Council of Justice, the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Supreme Court, the General Prosecutor, the Public Defender and a representative of the Liberty

Institute, an influential civil society organisation close to Saakashvili himself (European Union, 2005). The working group failed to meet frequent enough and provide inputs to finalise the draft strategy. At the end, EUJUST THEMIS drafted the strategy then incorporated a contribution from the Georgian side (Kurowska, 2009, p. 206).

Besides the lack of actual commitment from the Georgian counterpart, EUJUST THEMIS had hurdles for implementation at strategic and operational levels. Some critiques note such as ambitious strategic goals, inter-personal conflicts among high-level EU officials and complex bureaucratic administrative procedures which led to the delay in disbursement of financial resources. (Helly, 2009; Kurowska, 2009) One report refers to financial and procurement delays resulted in a lack of basic equipment such as computers for the first three months (Kurowska, 2009, p. 205).

Another reason that can be attributed to the poorly managed implementation process is its pilot nature. In the early 2000‘s, the EU was yet to develop a assistance approach to the issue of rule of law. In the context, the EU regarded the EUJUST THEMIS as “an opportunity to test civilian crisis management capabilities in the field of rule of law, in a relatively stable area with a small-scale mission” (Helly, 2009, p. 91). The EUJUST THEMIS was “a first ever ESDP operation in the Former Soviet Union, therefore, “it was also a test for EU relations with Russia” (Helly, 2009, p. 91). In other words, Georgia’s judicial system received external assistance that was more of an experiment.

6.3.4 Reforming paramilitaries: from defence to law enforcement, and back

A major achievement of the Saakashvili government in the field of paramilitary reform is the abolishment of the defiant, quasi-state paramilitary forces under a local tycoon in Adjara, Abashidze. The rest of the paramilitaries were targeted for the restructuring along with the ISAB recommendations. Paramilitary reform during the Saakashvili period thus saw a significant progress in a sense that they became a reform target unlike during the Shevardnadze period. On the other

hand, the issue of their affiliation, unclear demarcation of roles remained unsolved.

During the Shevardnadze period, most of the paramilitary forces except a few in the separatist regions came under state subordination (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004). According to Military Balance 2004/2005, there were overall 11,700 paramilitaries, out of which 6,300 paramilitaries were the Interior Troops, 5,400 were border guards (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004). The Saakashvili government abolished quasi-state paramilitary forces in Adjara. In May 2004, Tbilisi sent special troops to Adjara, a Turkish dominant territory under the long-term control of Abashidze, to bring the *de facto* semi-autonomous region under Tbilisi's control. During the event, the Adjara's paramilitary forces became dissolved and disarmed.

One of the recommendations that the Western security and defence experts such as the ISAB had insisted since the late 1990 was the separation of the defence forces from other security forces. Following the recommendation, some of the MIA' troops including Internal Troops and all their heavy weaponry were transferred to the MoD since Saakashvili came to power in 2004.

Despite the major transfer of the Internal Troops from the MIA to the MoD, a number of other paramilitary forces remained under the MIA and other non-defence ministries and state agencies. For instance, the Law on Weapons lists state agencies with units carrying military weapons. According to the Law, those agencies include the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and Justice; the Foreign Intelligence Service; the Ministry of Finance's social sub-agencies and the Special Service of State Guard (SSSG) (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 36).

The departure of the Internal Troops to the MoD still left the MIA with several paramilitary units. Two paramilitary units affiliated to the MSS were transferred to the MIA when the MSS was abolished in 2004. Those paramilitary units were the special purpose unit named after General G. Gulua and the State Department of the State Border Defence (SDBD).[112] The special purpose unit was directly

[112] The MIA also had a contingent to protect its building, and the contingent consisted of conscripts.

subordinated under the MIA. The Unit was responsible for anti-terrorist operations and arresting dangerous criminals and had 155 troops. The Unit had four combat groups: Alfa, Bravo, Charlie, and Omega. Delta group was a supporting unit with sharp-shooters, communications and medical unit. There was also a new unit called Legion which was under creation. The new unit was reported to be a gendarmerie unit.[113] The SBPD came under the control of the MIA in February 2004, in order to harmonise with EU standards.[114] The SDBD consisted of 6,700 personnel, 40% of which was conscripts and 3% contractors, mostly from the Rapid Reaction Unit.[115] In 2006, the SDBD was reorganised from a paramilitary unit into a law-enforcement body: the Border Police. (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2014) In 2006, amendments to The Law On Defence gave a mandate to function as a military force to the Border Police, which was initially established as a law enforcement body. The demarcation of law enforcement and defence forces became therefore even more blurred.

The most controversial and less transparent state paramilitary force was the one under the MSS. When its predecessor, the National Security Ministry was reorganised into the MSS and the State Intelligence Department, the armed units of the MSS was planned to transfer to the MIA. Later on, President Saakashvili abolished the MSS.

The Saakashvili government thus paid efforts to cluster its paramilitary forces along with the Western standards. The paramilitary reform process, however, was a controversial issue: the lack of clear demarcation between paramilitaries belongs to the defence and law enforcement bodies. As further elaborated in chapter 8, the issue of the blurred demarcation among different state paramilitaries had persisted since the Shevardnadze period, and remained unsolved.

[113] The Unit underwent the anti-terrorist training by US between March and June in 2002.
[114] Under the Shevardnadze government, the SBDP had been an independent agency for eight years. The SDBD was combined law enforcement and military service, and obliged to obey different military acts, during the Shevardnadze period, however, they had not been dispatched to armed conflicts. Instead, they were in charge of protecting the state border through patrolling and border-control.
[115] Since 1998, various technical assistances had been provided to the SDBD by Germany, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and the US.

Table 5 Major security agencies during the Saakashvili period, 2004 – 2008

Non-state	Quasi-state	State
(Mostly disbanded/dissolved)	• Ajara paramilitary forces (abolished in 2004)	• Border Police (transferred from MSS to MIA in 2004) • Internal Troops (transferred from MIA to MoD in 2004) • Ministry of Defence • Ministry of Internal Affairs • Ministry of State Security (abolished in 2004) • National Guards (renamed the 4th Infantry Brigade, MoD, in 2004) • National Security Council • Special Service of State Protection

Figure 2 State paramilitaries and their affiliation under the Saakashvili period, 2004 - 2008



* The State Department of Border Defence was created in 1994 by being separated from the Ministry of Defence. Under the state department, the Boast Guard Service was created in 1998, followed by the creation of the Border Aviation Service in 1999. The state department was absorbed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2004 and became the Border Police in 2006.

6.4 Examining driving factors for security sector change between 2004 and 2008

As examined in the previous section, the security sector institutions and governance system experienced substantial changes between 2003 and 2008. The Saakashvili government implemented a number of reform efforts in the defence and law enforcement spheres, with an explicit intention to transform the defence and law enforcement institutions NATO- and/or the EU-compatible. On the other hand, despite the recommendations by external experts such as the ISAB members, a lack of clarity in the demarcation among defence and law enforcement paramilitaries remained. Furthermore, the actual civilian control over armed forces seemed to have become obscure. This section applies the same analytical framework applied in chapters 3 and 4 and provides a detailed analysis on what factors drove security sector change this way.

6.4.1 Structural diagnosis

6.4.1.1 Political dimension

Since Saakashvili took power, Georgia's pro-liberal, pro-democratic and pro-reform political orientation became very much explicit, both in domestic politics and external relations.

Prior to the so-called 'Rose Revolution', Saakashvili and his political allies had garnered popular support through their anti-corruption stance and discourses. Their stance towards corruption and allegedly corruption officials became even more aggressive when Saakashvili was elected the President. The issue of corruption was a political issue, rather than a mere issue of transparency and accountability of state institutions, as it implied the purge of officials associated with corruption who were mostly pro-Russia, former Soviet nomenklaturas. The Saakashvili government pledged a number of reforms to eradicate corruption.

The reform efforts in the law enforcement institutions such as the abolishment of the Traffic Police and the MSS, took place in this context.[116]

External relations under the Saakashvili period, Georgia's orientation towards its foreign policy also made a sharp contrast with the Shevardnadze government. Saakashvili's predecessor, Shevardnadze, had declared Georgia's intention to join the Euro-Atlantic partnership, however, his government maintained a balanced diplomacy between Russia and the Western allies. When Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze, the Georgian government expressed its intention to join NATO and the EU more explicitly, adopted a pro-US foreign policy orientation. Consequently, the relations with Russia had become sore, and finally reached to the point of engaging in a war, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

On the other hand, the relations with the USA became much closer than in the Shevardnadze period. Since the independence of Georgia, the USA had provided Georgia with large-scale assistance in the areas of defence, economy, humanitarian and governance. Since the 9.11 attacks on the USA in 2001, the strategic importance of Georgia for the USA increased further. The USA demonstrated it through the visit of the President George W. Bush in May 2005, which was received vehemently by Georgian crowds (RFL/RL, 2005). This was the first visit by the US President to Georgia, which Saakashvili referred to as a "great political victory" (EurasiaNet, 2005). The close Georgia-US relations were reflected in the increase of the defence assistance provided by the USA through GTEP and GSSOP, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

6.4.1.2 Socio-economic dimension

Organised crimes and corruption

A sharp contrast can be found between the political stances towards corruption and organised crimes between Saakashvili and his predecessor, Shevardnadze. The state's dependency on prominent thieves-in-law such as Tariel Oniani

[116] Yet, the slow pace in the implementation gradually accumulated popular frustration. The Saakashvili's reformist government itself became criticized by his former political ally and now rival, Irakri Okruashvili, for corruption.

peaked in around 2003. By the end of the Shevardnadze regime, “professional criminality had matured as an alternative power centre and represented a substantial challenge to the political elites” (Kupatadze, p.127). While Shevardnadze generated his political influence by overlooking corruption in the state system and mutual beneficiary relations with thieves-in-law, Saakashvili regarded the eradication of corruption and organised crimes as a major goal under his administration. The issue of corruption and organised crimes thus significantly influenced the Georgian politics and the agenda-setting of the reform of security sector institutions, particularly the police and the MSS. From the onset of his presidency, Saakashvili expressed his government’s commitment to an anti-corruption and anti-mafia campaign. At his inauguration speech, Saakashvili stated: “We have to eradicate corruption. At the current stage each corrupted official is a traitor to state interests in my opinion. We will root out the corruption and change the system that gave birth to the malignant circle of corruption” (Civil Georgia, 2004a).

The Saakashvili administration introduced an anti-mafia legislation and curtailed the influence of thieves-in-law and organised crimes in Georgia significantly. A new legislation adopted in 2005 made “being a thieves-in-law a criminal act” (Kupatadze, pp.126-127). During the year 2015 alone, the police in Tbilisi detained nine thieves-in-law and 37 criminal authorities (ibid., p.127).

The informal economic activities and corruption remained a major part of Georgia’s actual economy, despite the Saakashvili government’s political statement to eradicate corruption. In the regions bordering with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey, illegal economic activities such as smuggling were highly noticeable, so were the involvement of some local authorities and security sector actors. As illustrated in one report, smuggling was rampant over the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan (Koyama, 2005, p. 23). At a focus group interview meeting, a local community member in Marneuli in Kvemo Kartli, expresses the actual scale of smuggling across the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan by saying: “Frankly speaking, the real frontier we have is only with Turkey.”[117] Other local participants in Marneuli pointed to an increase in the price

[117] Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.

of the bribes which need to be paid by smugglers. According to a female Azeri participant, the bribe increased approximately from 30 GEL to 100 GEL between 2004 and 2005.

Corruption and organised crimes were not only of an economic but also a political issue. The Saakashvili government used the issue of corruption as the main justification for the drastic reform of the police and the MSS. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the MIA was significantly downsized after the dismissal of so-called corrupt officials. The aim of the reform was the eradication of corruption, but more importantly the removal of the former Soviet nomenklaruta and so-called 'thieves-in-law' and their political influence from the security sector institutions.

The issue of corruption became further politicised, as the rivalry among political elites including Saakashvili and Okruashvili became intensified. By 2007, some of the alleged corruption cases involved cabinet members, [118] including Saakashvili and Okruashvili. Okruashvili, for instance, accused the President of "liquidation" of certain individuals, without providing any details. As discussed in this chapter earlier, the accusation led to a series of mass demonstrations against Saakashvili, then the declaration of a state of emergency later the year.

Georgian-centric nationalism

Georgian-centric policy discourses and implementation were observed under the Saakashvili government, unlike during the times under Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze's government introduced a number of policies embracing the multi-ethnic nature of Georgia. For instance, the law on citizenship had no requirements such as a citizen's ethnicity and the knowledge of the Georgian language (Jones, 2015, p. 224).

On the other hand, Saakashvili reintroduced an ethnic Georgian centric stance in his political speeches and claimed for a need for "taking Georgian back" (Jones, 2015, p. 225). As discussed earlier, the new National Security Concept adopted

[118] One report mentioned that "the winner in every public procurement tender exceeding USD 50,000 is pre-determined from above (Kupatadze, 2010, p. 108). The report mentions a person receiving a call from a close relative of President Saakashvili recommending a certain company to win a public tender, too (Kupatadze, 2010, p. 108).

the word ‘people of Georgia’ instead of ‘Georgian people’, to place an emphasis on the multi-ethnic composition of the country. In parallel, however, the Saakashvili government adopted a policy allowing only Georgian to be an official state and working language in 2004.[119]

This introduction of the official language policy brought negative consequences to non-Georgian ethnic minorities and their relationship with the state security institutions. According to one report (Koyama, 2005, p. 19), male ethnic-Azeri community members in Marneuli claimed that the Georgian language requirement for the state officials had reduced the number of Azeri police officers. According to them, although there was no official regulation to discharge non-Georgian speaking personnel, Azeri officers felt pressure to leave their office if they did not have enough competencies in the Georgian language. Consequently, they felt the police reform had led to an under-representation of non-Georgians in the police force (Koyama, 2005, p. 27). The decreased number of ethnic Azeri in the state structure widened the distance between the Azeri community and the police. The increasing mistrust of the police drove ethnic Azeris to call for their own community network to settle conflicts and resolve problems, rather than reporting to the police. One ethnic-Azeri community member said: “A person who does not speak Georgian is actually unprotected” (Koyama, 2005, p. 20).

The state language policy was not accompanied with the government’s support for non-Georgian speaking ethnic minorities to obtain the Georgian language skills. In Marneuli, an area dominantly inhabited by ethnic Azeris, schools were not equipped with Georgian speaking teachers and manuals in Georgian.[120]

Public perception on the security sector actors

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Saakashvili government had an urgent need to reform the security sector, especially the police. Their notorious

[119] The 1995 Constitution defined Georgian as the state language. The Chapter of Regional Language had not been adopted as of May 2005.

[120] One middle-aged Azeri man put his frustration against Tbilisi bitterly: “Azeris living in Kakheti, Tbilisi and Kapsi speak Georgian perfectly. The government must elaborate a special programme for us. Not that one for show, but a real one, which will give us an opportunity to learn the language. They say they will many times, but so far we see no results. All these seem like an empty promise. I think the government does not want us to speak Georgian.” Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.

reputation for corruption, within the Traffic Police, had become a symbol figure of the Shevardnadze government, representing the image of corrupt Soviet legacy. For instance, people in Zugdidi regarded the police rather as a threat to their security. One male community member said: “People have to defend themselves against the police.”[121] Reporting to the police was often regarded pointless, because the police are prone to corruption.[122] The reform of the police could make an illustrative example demonstrating the Saakashvili government’s liberal political orientation and the departure from the existing Soviet style political culture, represented by the previous regime.

However, despite the massive campaign to improve the image of the police by the Saakashvili Government, confidence in security sector institutions remained low, especially in regions far from Tbilisi where no apparent police reform activities could be seen. People did not believe that the police were able to investigate a case professionally.[123] It also appears that the change in the state language policy mentioned above left a negative impact on the perception on the state agencies among the non-Georgian citizens. Both the minority groups in Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli expressed that the state agencies were for the benefits of ethnic Georgians and not for their own ethnic groups.[124]

6.4.1.3 Institutional dimension

The legislature was dominated by the ruling party, the United National Movement-Democrats party led by Saakashvili. Furthermore, by the constitutional changes in February 2004, parliament lost the right to dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote (Civil Georgia, 2004b). According to one report, the degree of the independence of the legislature was quite weak (International Crisis Group,

[121] Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.
[122] A local resident in Zugdidi told: “I was robbed in a café the other day. The shopkeeper saw everything. I asked him to help me to report to the police. But he said no. I asked him why not. He said, “Because it’s nonsense – the robber will pay the police and will be released anyway. As a result, you will just get an enemy.” Ibid.
[123] A middle-aged Georgian woman in Akhaltsikhe told: “Recently, there was a robbery. The police arrived late and the criminals had run away already. The police then suddenly arrested an innocent boy of 18 years old, claiming that he was guilty. The whole community told them that he was not guilty and asked the police to discharge him. Even the victims of the robbery asked the police to release the boy, because they knew he was innocent. But the police ignored these claims and they still detained the boy.” Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe.
[124] Focus group interviews, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli.

2007a, p. 18). An independent parliamentarian reportedly said that the parliament acts primarily as Saakashvili's "notary public" (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 18). The report also refers to a diplomat who pointed out that "the parliamentarians do not seem to feel mandated with a free voice, rather they act as civil servants of the ruling party" (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 18). Key parliament committees, including those relevant to the SSR, were dominated by the ruling party members. The defence committee, for instance, had both its chair and deputy from the United National Movement-Democrats.[125]

As for the executive, with the overwhelming popular support, Saakashvili managed to consolidate and centralise power under the President, which his predecessor Shevardnadze did not achieve. Constitutional changes in February 2004 gave the President power to dissolve parliament and call a new election (Civil Georgia, 2004b). With the legislature that was weak and under the strong influence of the President, the executive bodies had much more powerful positions in Georgia during the Saakashvili period. For instance, in 2004, a Prime Minister became the Head of the Government as well as the Cabinet of Ministers. Out of 14 ministries, the three "Power Ministries", i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs, State Security and Defense became under primary supervision, whiles the other ministries were supervised by the Prime Minister. The National Security Council was largely inactive in an official sphere during the Shevardnadze period. However, since the death of Nugzar Sajaia in February 2002, the National Security Council had shifted to an institution with a stronger US tie. The transformation was well reflected in the appointment of Tedo Jafaridze, the former Ambassador to the USA, as the Secretary of the NSC.[126] Concurrently, the USA offered assistance to the NSC to become "a more viable institution prior to the presidential election in 2005" (Chiaberashvili and Tevradze, 2005, p. 200). Since Saakashvili took power in 2003, the heads of the NSC have been pro-US figures (National Security Council of Georgia, n.d.).

The justice reform during the Shevardnadze period brought a certain degree of independence of the justice system by separating it from the executive power.

[125] Givi Targamadze as the chair, and Nika Rurua was the deputy (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 19).
[126] Prior to the appointment, Jafaridze had been "closely involved in the discussions and planning of US military assistance to Georgia for counter-terrorism training" (EurasiaNet, 2002).

Saakashvili and his government were determined to remove corrupt judges. In 2004, the president was given temporary constitutional power to dismiss and appoint judges (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 22).[127] The president's prerogative was removed when the government introduced another justice reform through constitutional amendments in 2007. By the 2007 reform, judges were no longer appointed or dismissed by the President (Simons, 2012, p. 279) (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 22). The constitutional amendment made the justice system to be more independent of the President. The reason for the provision of the prerogative to the president between 2004 and 2007 was rather political. Despite the reform efforts, the degree of people's confidence in the justice system remained low. One report points out that the prerogative made it "easy for the government to intimidate judges" (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 22). Similar to the parliament obedient to the President and his ruling party, the judiciary's *de facto* independence of the executive was questionable.

The security forces under the Saakashvili government, the security forces were seen politically royal to the government and/or its high ranking officials at some key political events. An illustrating example is the security forces' violent reaction towards anti-Saakashvili demonstrators and the defence and internal forces accompanied Okruashvili in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The first example took place in 2007. On 7 November, the government violently supressed protestors and closed down a TV station, Imedi Television, in Tbilisi.[128] According to governmental officials, the security forces mobilised to disperse the demonstrators were said to be riot police and patrol police (Human Rights Watch, 2007a, pp. 60–61). However, other informants stated the involvement of paramilitary forces, such as the Ministry of Justice's special forces. (Human Rights Watch, 2007a, p. 61) The second example illustrates the personal royalty of some Georgian security forces to an individual politician rather than the principles of civilian control of the chain of command. In 2004, the then interior minister Okruashvili led an aggressive police operation against South Ossetia by himself (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 2). Okurashvili later became the

[127] The government pressure against judges was profound. Out of the total 37 Supreme Court judges, 21 designed (Human Rights Watch, 2007c).
[128] For detailed account of the police's violent dispersal, see Human Rights watch (2007): *Crossing the Line: Georgia's Violent Dispersal of Protesters and Raid on Imedi Television*, 19 December 2007 (Human Rights Watch, 2007a).

head of the defence ministry, and repeated a similar action by being accompanied by elite troops and entering into a territory under the control of the separatist region of Abkhazia in 2006 (Anjaparidze, 2005; Kommersant, 2005; The Associate Press, 2006).[129] These two examples suggest the questionable degree of transparency and accountability in the chain of command and civilian control of the security forces under the Saakashvili government.

6.4.2 Agency diagnosis

6.4.2.1 Mikheil Saakashvili: The President

Saakashvili appealed to anti-Soviet, pro-US and ethnic Georgian centric discourses, often by using fervent and militaristic expressions. Saakashvili used militant and chauvinistic discourse. Levan Lamishvili, the chairperson of the Liberty Institute who is close to Saakashvili's circle explained his militaristic rhetoric. The militaristic discourses were used instead of extreme nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Lamishvili explained the reason for Saakashvili and his political allies using the militant discourse was that they were "criticised for their being extreme liberal, western-educated and not rooted in the Georgian tradition".[130]

Another reason why Saakashvili and his political allies needed the radical and nationalistic discourses was precisely because he lacked a strong political platform based on the traditional system such as the Soviet bureaucratic structure. Saakashvili needed to establish a strong political platform to rival Shevardnadze and his supporters. Unlike Shevardnadze, Saakashvili lacked strong institutional support system like Shevardnadze had from the former Soviet institutions and nomenklatura. As for Shevardnadze, his political leverage mainly stemmed from his background as a former Georgian Communist Party leader and a veteran Soviet nomenklatura. In particular, his close tie with the MIA served well in order to build and maintain the political economy structure based on client-patron relations with the power ministry officials, as described in chapter 4. On the other

[129] The helicopter was the possession of the MIA (The Associate Press, 2006).
[130] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.

hand, Saakashvili, who was 22 years old when the Soviet Union collapsed, had little tie with the former Soviet bureaucratic system. Rather, his educational and professional experience in Europe and the USA made him very much inclined to the western, liberal-democratic political stance. Saakashvili did not inherit Shevardnadze's political power base, although initially he was regarded as Shevardnadze's protégé.

As for external relations, Saakashvili's explicit pro-western diplomatic stance made a sharp contrast with his predecessor, too. Shevardnadze was moderate in his foreign affairs stance, especially with Russia. Saakashvili tried to forge a close strategic tie with the USA, especially in the defence sphere. For instance, in 2005, the then US president Georgie W. Bush paid the first visit as the USA president to Tbilisi. Georgia became one of the largest troop contributing countries for the USA-led NATO operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo during the Saakashvili times. For the Saakashvili government, it was crucial to implement the SSR, especially of the defence forces, so that it can demonstrate that Georgia had political backing from the USA and NATO allies.

6.4.2.2 Irakli Okruashvili: The Ministers of Internal Affairs (2004) and Defence (2004 - 2006)

Okruashvili is one of the most prominent political figures in the Saakashvili government. He held the top positions of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence. But the scope of his influence was not on the SSR process itself, but the Abkhazia and South Ossetia relations, as well as domestic politics, especially in relation with Saakashvili.

Okruashvili, born in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, became a close ally of Saakashvili.[131] Under the Saakashvili government, Okruashvili held the top positions of the key security sector institutions: he was appointed the Minister of Internal Affairs in June 2004 then the Minister of Defence in December 2004. Okruashvili was a controversial political figure with a radical stance towards his

[131] Okruashvili served the deputy Minister of Justice under the then justice minister, Saakashvili. When Saakashvili founded the United National Movement, Okruashvili joined the party.

opponents. When he was the Minister of Defence, Okruashvili introduced a large-scale personnel change. He dismissed the Ministry's most of all department heads and many General Staff officers those trained in the USA and Germany (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 54).[132] While the large-scale staff reshuffling took place, there were no clear criteria for dismissing and placing defence personnel. One critique claims that Okruashvili appointed his friends and acquaintances in the defence ministry "as new cadres" (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 54).

Okruashvili had a fervent stance towards the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and often appealed to provocative, militaristic actions. For instance, in September 2005, Okruashvili attended a forum attended by young Georgian "Young Patriots" and mentioned that he went to the contested territory of Abkhazia with several dozens of Georgian elite soldiers and spent several days in Galsky region of Abkhazia which was under the control of Abkhazian militia and Russian peacekeeping forces (Anjaparidze, 2005; Kommersant, 2005). Another example took place in September 2006, when he was the Minister of Defence. Okruashvili entered the airspace over the separatist region of South Ossetia in a helicopter (The Associate Press, 2006). The helicopter was shot by South Ossetian forces although Okruashvili and his co-passengers including the chief of staff of Georgia's armed forces were safe.[133]

Those patriotic political gesture gained popular support. By 2006, Okruashvili became a political rival of Saakashvili. In 2006, Saakashvili dismissed Okruashvili in 2006. Okruashvili criticised Saakashvili and his government for corruption and accused Saakashvili of ordering murders and establishing an authoritarian rule. By 2007, Okruashvili had become a leading opposition politician. In September, he established a new political party, the Movement for United Georgia, then within a week, he was detained for charges of extortion, money laundering, and abuse of office during the time at the defence ministry (RFE/RL, 2007b). Having been released, he later fled to France to take an exile.[134]

[132] Okruashvili also disbanded a battalion, the Monadire (Hunter) Battalion.
[133] As mentioned earlier, while he was the head of the interior ministry, Okruashvili also led an aggressive police operation against South Ossetia in summer 2004.
[134] Okruashvili returned to Georgia and apologized Saakashvili for his act, after the 2008 war with Russia.

6.4.2.3 The ‘power ministries’: the MIA and the MSS

The two ministries became a primal target for the Saakashvili’s reform efforts. This is a sharp contrast with the Shevardnadze times. Their influence was severely curtailed as the reform of eradication corruption started to take place. The MIA underwent a significant staff reduce by half: over 16,000 police officers were laid off (Jones, 2015, p. 166). In 2005, the MSS was abolished (Krunic and Siradze, 2005). Saakashvili appointed his close political allies to these ministries. For instance, as seen above, Okruiashvili was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs in 2004. According to one observer, Saakashvili regarded the MSS as a Soviet system and trustable. Subsequently, the same observer says, Saakashvili appointed people younger than 35 years as he believed that they would not be influenced by the Soviet legacy.[135]

6.4.2.4 Civil society

Georgia’s civil society organisations were involved in monitoring and assessing the SSR efforts and the security sector institutions’ governance since the times of Shevardnadze. However, they were rather independent and critical of the government, and were not so much involved in the government’s policy making process during the Shevardnadze times. Since Saakashvili took power in the government, the relation between the civil society organisations and the government changed drastically (Hiscock, 2005).

When he formed his own government after the Rose Revolution, members of some of NGOs joined the Saakashvili’s government and took the ministerial positions by replacing the former Soviet nomenklaturas.[136] After the so-called ‘Rose Revolution’, Georgia’s civil society separated into two factions. One consisted of the affiliates and/or former members of the Liberty Institute or other NGOs with a close relation to it. Many of them joined the Saakashvili government

[135] Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.
[136] The most notable examples of a former civil society person turning to a politician is Giga Bokeria. Bokeria had been a close ally to Saakashvili. Even prior to the Rose Revolution, in autumn 2000, Bokeria was seemingly confident that Saakashvili would become the next president. Author’s communication, October 2000, Tbilisi.

and provided policy advice directly to the President. The MIA organised a 'reform group' consisting of NGO members, academics and lawyers. (Hiscock, 2005, p. 181) The group discussed and recommended the way that the ministry need to take in the course of reform. Civil society was involved in carrying out reform efforts. For instance, the Liberty Institute provided assistance to the Saakashvili government to strengthen the Ombudsman for the police, by following the example of the police in Northern Ireland.[137] They mostly belong to the young generation of under the age of 35 and relatively fluent in English. Another group of civil society members was those who remained out of power. Most of them were of a much older generation and more fluent in Russian than in English. The two groups became distant from one another: the civil society close to Saakashvili was criticised for being "elite-centric" and "making decisions without consulting widely".[138] On the other hand, those close to the administration claims that "there is no use to consult old Soviet professors."[139] The emergence of the anti-Shevardnadze movements brought an ironic side-effect to civil society, i.e., divided civil society.

6.4.2.5 External actors

Georgia's strategic importance for the USA increased drastically since the early 2000's, especially after the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the USA. Responding to the attacks, the USA and its NATO allies adopted the Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism" at the 2002 Prague Summit, aiming at enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities in NATO member countries. The modernisation and strengthening of Georgia's defence forces were addressed in this wider context of the USA's global campaign against terrorism. The visit of the then US President, Georgia W. Bush, for the first time in Georgia in 2005, illuminated the strategic partnership between Georgia and the USA.

Russia's geopolitical interest in Georgia had been always present throughout the Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze periods. Since the arrival of pro-West Saakashvili, Moscow had become more explicit and direct in expressing its

[137] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.
[138] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.
[139] Ibid.

intention to regain control over Georgia. In addition to the election of Saakashvili as the president, the opening of the BTC pipeline was another significant incident that increased Russia's frustration with Georgia. The oil pipeline, opened in May 2005, runs between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, bypassing Armenia that is close to Russia and Russia itself. This decreased the geopolitical leverage of Russia in the context of energy politics. Consequently, between 2004 and 2008, Russia expressed the intention through various economic and political actions including sanctions of Georgian import items, destruction of gas pipelines between and a total war over South Ossetia in summer 2008. The intention was grounded on Moscow's political attitude towards the former Soviet Union republics. Moscow regarded that Georgia, among other former Soviet Union republics, was Russia's 'near abroad' (*ближнее зарубежье*).[140] As the connotations of the Russian phrase suggests, Moscow had had difficulty in recognising that the newly independent former Soviet republic countries such as Georgia and Ukraine as sovereign states (German, 2006, p. 10). Russia viewed that Georgia, one of the "near abroad" states, belongs to their backyard, and intended to reinstall their influence in Georgia.

The EU had shown its political orientation towards the eastward expansion since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and provided assistance in promoting market economy and democracy. Georgia, along with the five other former Soviet countries, i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, was a target country of the fifth wave of the European expansion towards the east. In 2007, TACIS was replaced with the ENP. The ENP provided a framework for further technical cooperation programmes in a wider range of issues, including energy and transportation (Gogolashvili, 2017, p. 8). Although the assistance was not part of the official preparatory procedure for the reintegration into the EU, the assistance was recognised as useful to prevent "general tendencies in the EU's neighbourhood from hindering the process of each country's functional EU integration" (Gogolashvili, 2017, p. 10).

[140] Russians under Brezhnev used to use the phrase in ironic or wistful tone to suggest that "the Russian people had to sacrifice a higher standard of living to support their 'socialist comrades' elsewhere" (Safire, 1994).

6.4.3 Dynamics

Between 2004 and 2008, Georgia's security sector institutions underwent a number of reform efforts and received external assistance, by aiming at enhancing NATO and the EU compatibilities. During the first half of this period, the reform efforts bared tangible outputs: the notoriously corrupt Traffic Police was replaced with the Patrol Police and the USA-trained Georgian troops were deployed for NATO operations overseas. The second half of the Saakashvili times witnessed the security sector actors involved in suppressing anti-Saakashvili demonstrators. How the structural factors and agencies interacted in the course of the security sector change process under the Saakashvili regime? Which factors affected the agenda-setting of security sector change?

6.4.3.1 Power struggle between pro-West reformist leadership and former Soviet nomenklatura in the police sphere

With a strong popular support, Saakashvili enabled to introduce a number of SSR efforts in the early period of his regime. Reform of internal affairs organs had been dictated by the power struggle between the two political groups, i.e., the young, pro-West 'reformists' and the older, former Soviet nomenklatura faction. The reform in the law enforcement sphere, i.e., the police, the judiciary and the MIA, along with the abolishment of the Ministry of State Ministry can be regarded as a means for establishing political dominance of Saakashvili and his reformist block over the Soviet nomenklatura faction.

The Saakashvili government introduced a number of reform efforts in the security sector institutions, namely the Patrol Police, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. A number of departments and units were downsized: the State Security ministry was abolished and the Traffic Police were replaced by the Patrol Police. As a result, as seen above, a large number of personnel was purged. Some criticised Saakashvili's appointing particular personnel due to their royalty to the President himself. In addition, the Ministerial positions of the key security sector institutions such as the Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs were

frequently changed.[141] The frequent ministerial shuffles hampered a structural reform in the security sector. Through the large-scale dismissals of security sector personnel, Saakashvili purged those suspected to be pro-KGB by accusing them of being corrupt or defiant against the state.

The staff dismissal and the abolishment of the MSS appear to be motivated by Saakashvili's political interest. Saakashvili was said to distrust the MSS and regarded it as an inheritance of the Soviet system.[142]

Some 'reformists' politicians recognised the police reform as the central to "the modernisation process".[143] The "modernisation" by the reformist political elites meant the reform of the Soviet governance, which Shelley described that "[T]he centralized, hierarchical structure of the (Communist) Party shaped the organization of law enforcement in the USSR and left no room for decentralized policing or local autonomy" (Shelley, 1994, p. 60). According to Levan Ramishvili, the chairman of the Liberty Institute, the police reform consisted of an important part for this decentralisation reform, not only as the mere reform of law enforcement bodies. According to Ramishvili, an important aim of this reform was to reduce the central control over the police and local authority, which was the remnant of the Soviet governance style.[144]

Another reason why the Saakashvili government focused on the reform in the internal affairs sphere was to sustain support from the general public. Having been brought to power by a revolution backed by mass demonstrations, Saakashvili and his government needed to show tangible outcomes of the 'Rose Revolution' in order to sustain the general public support. However, discussed in the earlier section, the public perception on the security sector actors remained low even after the regime change. Hence, the Saakashvili administration needed to demonstrate tangible results. The government's primal target for reform became the Traffic Police, as the frustration against them among the general public had been quite strong.

[141] Since the inauguration of the Saakashvili government, there have been two cabinet shuffles by May 2005.
[142] Author's interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.

Furthermore, Saakashvili relied on a small circle of young, pro-western and liberal political elites many of whom joined the administration from civil society organisations. His government was often criticised for its elite-centric decision-making style, without consulting a wide range of political blocks, in particular, the older generation and of the Soviet administrative background. Having been asked for the reason, one of the Saakashvili government's key members replied: "I have the full respect to the old people. But there is no use to consult old Soviet professors for Soviet knowledge."[145] Saakashvili seemed to share a similar attitude towards the older generation that were trained under the Soviet system. According to one source, it was Saakashvili' deliberate decision to appoint personnel younger than 35 years in the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security.[146] The generation gap between the young politicians represented by Saakashvili and their older counterparts corresponded with the political division.

The reform of the police and the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security, thus aimed to serve the Saakashvili government three political objectives: eradicating corruption, purging anti-reformist and Soviet nomenkratula faction and garnering popular support.

6.4.3.2 Impacts of the relations with the USA and Russia on the reform in the defence sphere

The external actors and their relations with Georgia led by Saakashvili also played an influential role in the SSR process. In particular, the relations with Russia and the USA had significant impacts on Georgia's reform agenda-setting, especially in the defence sphere.

Since the beginning, the Saakashvili government expressed explicitly the intention to become a NATO member. Following the 9.11 attacks in the USA and the opening of the BTC pipelines, the geopolitical importance of Georgia for the USA changed significantly in the early 2000's. Georgia's pro-NATO aspiration

[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.

matched the USA's war on terrorism, for which the USA needed more ally countries to provide troops to engage in combats in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reform of the Georgian defence system, or, more precisely, the development of combat capabilities of Georgian troops, served the USA's strategic interest.

The defence reform during the Saakashvili period, however, did not witness a significant progress in the civilian oversight of the armed forces. On the centrally, the degree of the democratic control of armed forces decreased under the Saakashvili government. The reason for the lower degree of civilian oversight of the armed forces could be attributed the deteriorated diplomatic relation with Russia. There are two illustrative examples of the decreased civilian oversight.

The first example lies with the concentration of power under the president. Combined with the massive popular support, the strong backing of the USA provided Saakashvili with a solid position in Georgian politics. Furthermore, the United National Movement-Democrat, a reformist party led by Saakashvili, had an overwhelming majority at the parliament,[147] resulting in weakening the legislature's ability to check and balance the executive. Under those circumstances, Saakashvili changed the Constitution and enabled the President to deploy armed forces without seeking for a parliamentary approval in advance. This was a response to Russia's increasing pressure in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Since the Saakashvili administration adopted its explicitly pro-Western strategic stance and employed antagonistic discourses against Russia, the latter increased its pressure over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Under the deteriorated diplomatic relation with Russia, the Saakashvili administration was required to change the Constitution to enable a rapid deployment of the armed forces. However, this decision was a set-back from the armed forces' civilian control perspective.

The second example concerns with the actual implementation of civilian oversight within the security sector. The actual implementation of civilian oversight was sometimes hampered. As discussed in the earlier section, the defence troops and internal affairs ministry's helicopter were utilized by a civilian minister, Irakri

[147] The United National Movement occupied 135 out of 150 parliamentary seats in 2004.

Okruashvili, when he entered the contested territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in order to boost his popular support by demonstrating his patriotic and militant actions. Those incidents illuminate that civilian control principles could be overridden by a civilian minister due to his political motifs.

6.4.3.3 Paramilitary reform interrupted by the re-escalating Abkhazia and South Ossetia issues

The paramilitary reform still had a persisting challenge: the demarcation of paramilitary forces in the defence and law enforcement spheres, inherited from his predecessor's regime that implemented no significant paramilitary reform. As discussed in chapter 4, the paramilitary forces under the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence had overlapping mandates. The Saakashvili government addressed the issue by transferring the Internal Troops from the MIA to the MoD. Saakashvili also managed to disband the paramilitaries in Adjara. With the disbandment of the paramilitaries in Adjara, the Saakashvili government succeeded to complete the lengthy process of integrating paramilitary forces into a single state structure.

The unsettled violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not allow the paramilitary reform to advance further. During the second half of the Saakashvili times, the tension over Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased. As the relations with Russia over those territories raised, the security situation in areas bordering with Abkhazia and South Ossetia escalated. The deteriorating situation in those two territories required the Saakashvili administration paramilitary units with military combat capacities. In 2006, the MIA obtained a new paramilitary body, the Border Police, whose mandate included a military function. The Border Police, therefore, was given a military function, despite their affiliation with the MIA. The demarcation between the Georgian paramilitary forces' mandates thus remained blurred between the defence and law enforcement spheres. This change reversed the process of separating the defence forces from law enforcement forces.

6.5 Conclusion

The so-called 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ brought the pro-West, reform-minded leadership headed by Saakashvili. Georgia under the Saakashvili period saw a number of reform efforts in the security sector. Having developed a close relation with the USA, the Saakashvili government heavily invested into the upgrading of the military to align the NATO standards. The reform efforts in the justice sector continued since the time that Saakashvili was the justice minister under the Shevardnadze period. A contrasting difference with the Shevardnadze period can be found in the police sphere. Having centred its political agenda on the reform of the old regime under Shevardnadze and its power base, the ‘power ministries’, the new administration initiated a number of SSR initiatives. The SSR efforts led to the removal of anti-Saakashvili components within the ‘power ministries’: Saakashvili targeted the ‘power ministries’ in its campaign against corruption, abolished the MSS, and downsized the MIA.

It is noteworthy that those reform efforts were implemented in the local context in which the administration centred the overall ‘reform’ as the main agenda. Based on the analysis, the chapter provides the following observations that explore the understanding of the relationship between socio-political factors and the agenda-setting process for security sector change.

First, as in the cases of the Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze times, the nature of the security sector change process in Georgia appeared to remain politically driven. The Saakashvili government targeted the security sector institutions in order to curtail its opposition. For instance, the reform of the Police, Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security mainly targeted the dismissal of anti-Saakashvili block from the former ‘power ministries’. The Saakashvili government achieved its political objective to curtail the socio-political influence of the former Soviet nomenklatura. The introduction of the Patrol Police brought a positive public perception in Tbilisi. However, outside Tbilisi, the impact was limited, and people’s perception on the police and other security sector institutions remained low, especially among non-Georgian community members.

Second, the SSR agenda-setting process continued to be dominated by inter-personal power struggles among the elite political figures including the President and relevant line ministries in the security sector. The analysis in this chapter attributes the reason to the concentration of executive power at the President, combined with the weak legislation, led to regressed democratic practice by the security sector institutions. Once elected with an overwhelming majority, Saakashvili and his ruling party had become coercive against the population. The accumulated power of the President and the legislation disproportionally dominated by the ruling party jeopardized the civilian control of armed forces, as well as an exceeding use of violence by law enforcement forces deployed at the anti-Saakashvili demonstrations in 2007.

Third, the demarcation between the defence and law enforcement paramilitaries remained even under the reform-oriented Saakashvili administration. The paramilitary reform under the Saakashvili initially aimed at introducing the Western standard to separate the defence and law enforcement forces. However, the specific political and security challenges surrounding Georgia and the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not allow drawing a clear demarcation between the two forces. As a result, Georgia remained with the paramilitaries affiliated with a number of security sector institutions, namely the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence, with overlapping mandates and unclarified functions.

Thus, the analysis illustrates the interplay between the dynamics between political, socio-economic and institutional factors and the agenda-setting process for the SSR. Driven by these factors, the change in the security sector remained the mere change, rather than SSR informed of norms. The next chapter examines how the external SSR assistance interacted with those dynamics in the Georgian security sector change process between 2004 and 2008.

Chapter 7 Dynamics in the provision and reception of the SSR assistance in Georgia between 2004 and 2008

7.1 Introduction

The so-called ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003 brought a government headed by Saakashvili. Under the reform-oriented administration, a number of SSR initiatives took place. Externally, the Saakashvili government reiterated the strategic partnership with the Western allies. The relation with NATO and the EU grew into something more concrete and operational compared with the Shevardnadze period. In this environment, the security sector during the Saakashvili period between 2003 and 2008 increasingly received external assistance for SSR related activities. How did the external SSR assistance interplay with the actual security sector change in Georgia? What were the dynamics between the SSR assistance providers and the domestic actors receiving such assistance?

This chapter examines how the international SSR assistance was received and perceived on the ground, by analysing the interplay between the domestic dynamics in security sector change and international SSR assistance efforts in key areas. The second part of this chapter examines the SSR assistance at the technical level and examines to which extent the SSR assistance provider’s objectives were met in the process of security sector change. The section also discusses how the Georgian counterparts responded to the SSR assistance. The last part of the chapter examines which security priorities were reflected in the course of security sector change during the period between 2004 and 2008. It then discusses what security issues remained to be attended consequently.

7.2 External actors’ SSR assistance in Georgia between 2004 and 2008

The norm- and interest-based assistance for the SSR approaches discussed in chapter 5 continued under the Saakashvili government. The major difference from the Shevardnadze period is, however, that the western assistance became more concrete, and the degree of their assistance became deeper in terms of

implementation. This was because of the political will on Georgia's side: Saakashvili took a more explicit diplomatic orientation towards the Western allies which deepened the degree of SSR cooperation. The eastern expansion of the Western partnerships also provided SSR assistance platform for cooperation at operational level.

Another factor is the further development of the SSR assistance framework on the side of the assistance providers. Following the endorsement of the OECD/Development Assistance Committee's guidelines on "Security System Reform and Governance" in 2004 (OECD/DAC, 2005), the EU developed an EU concept on SSR by reflecting principles addressed in the OECD/DAC's SSR guidelines. In 2005, the EU developed "EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)" (Council of the European Union, 2005). This Concept aimed at providing a concept for the ESDP support to SSR in a partner state, such as Georgia. The document provides a standard definition of the security sector, an overview of the breadth and cope of ESDP support to SSR, a proposal for integration of civilian and military SSR activities within ESDP and modalities on how to plan and conduct SSR activities within ESDP (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 7).

The other major SSR donor, the USA, on the other hand, was yet to develop a comprehensive SSR approach. It was only 2009, following the frustrated experience in Iraq and Afghanistan where its counterinsurgency met with community-level resistance that the USA came to recognise an integrated approach to SSR. In 2009, the US Department of State, Department of Defence, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a comprehensive approach to SSR and guidelines for SSR programmes. (USAID et al., 2009) During the Saakashvili period, the USA' assistance for SSR continued being provided in specific issues such as the development of counterinsurgency capacities of Georgian troops and the justice sector reform.

7.2.1 Objectives of the external SSR assistance

The new president Saakashvili clearly indicated that Georgia's inclination towards Europe. His statement, "Georgians are Europeans",[148] makes a sharp contrast with the foreign policy inclination of his predecessor, Shevardnadze, who had avoided an explicit statement regarding Georgia's stance in the relation with Europe.

During the Saakashvili time, the West's engagement in the Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus seemed more certain than during the Shevardnadze period. Both the EU and NATO expanded its membership eastward in 2004. Seven former Eastern Bloc countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, formally joined NATO in March 2004. Shortly after, the EU pushed its eastern border with the participation of seven countries from the former Eastern Bloc and three former Soviet countries in May 2004.[149] The main SSR assistance provider, the USA, also had a closer relation with Georgia. The George W. Bush administration demonstrated its eagerness to support the Saakashvili government. President Bush visited Tbilisi in May 2005, and this was the first visit by the US president.

As in the Shevardnadze period, the Western allies provided SSR-related assistance based on liberal democratic norms. This "norm-based" approach (MacFarlane, 1999, pp. 9–10) can be found in the EU approached to SSR. "EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)" states that EU support to SSR is based on the following four principles:

- "democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, and the rule of law, and where applicable international humanitarian law;
- respect for local ownership; and
- coherence with other areas of EU external action" (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 4).

[148] For instance, in his address at Parliamentary Assembly session: 26 – 30 January 2004, the President Saakashvili, stated that "Georgians are Europeans – with a fundamental set of values, culture, behavior and system of governance that place them firmly within the European family" (Saakashvili, 2004).
[149] The countries which became the new EU member states in May 2004 are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Similarly, the EU/Georgia Action Plan was designed along with liberal democratic principles, with targeted actions including reform of the judicial system; civil service reform; and strengthening democratic institutions (European Union, 2006).

On the other side, the USA, another prominent SSR-related assistance provider, took an approach based on strategic interests. Following the 2001 9/11 attacks in the USA, the interest-based approach gained its weight as international strategic situations developed. The most prominent development was the 'War on Terror' by the USA and NATO. Given Georgia's geopolitical location bordering on Chechnya, enhancing the border control capacities of Georgia continued to be a strategic priority for the West, in particular the USA.

As NATO became engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, need for the NATO allies to provide troops with counter-insurgency capacities for its operations further increased. Raising the combat capacities of Georgian troops to meet the NATO standards thus continued to be a strategic interest for the USA and the other NATO members. Based on this strategic interest, foreign assistance was provided in the defence sphere, largely for enhancing combat capacities.

7.2.2 Varying SSR strategies within the external assistance providers

The Euro-Atlantic ally countries continued to be the main SSR assistance providers under the Saakashvili times. The term SSR was employed more often by the donors. For example, the USA and its departments and agency relevant to SSR, i.e., the Departments of Defence, States and USAID started using the term SSR since the middle 2000s, in an effort to provide assistance for security sector institutions in a coherent manner (USAID et al., 2009).

Despite the term SSR having become a more familiar concept among the donors, when it comes to the actual division of labour of the SSR assistance, the external assistance providers remained to take a siloed approach. The major SSR assistance providers had their own focused areas: the NATO members and the

USA focusing on the defence sphere; the OSCE on the police sphere and policing issues; and the EU on the democratisation of security sector institutions, with an emphasis on the justice sphere. This demarcation of labour remained more or less the same as in the Shevardnadze times. The difference lay with the OSCE which shifted its focus from conflict prevention and resolution to the police reform for a variety of reasons discussed later.

7.2.2.1 Defence-forces development

The relations between NATO and Georgia had become closer during Shevardnadze's time. The participation of the Georgian troops in the ISAF's election security force in Afghanistan in 2003 is a concrete example of the partnership. NATO-Georgia relations became even closer under the Saakashvili government whose foreign policy took a clear Euro-Atlantic approach. Echoing Georgia's inclination to the Euro-Atlantic alliance, NATO decided to place a special representative and a liaison officer in the region at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. In the same year, Georgia became the first country that agreed to an IPAP[150] with NATO,[151] and Georgia and NATO agreed to Intensified Dialogue in 2007. It was in this context that various platforms and partnership frameworks for assistance in the SSR context were developed. Concrete and more action-oriented initiatives started to take place. The Action Plan was approved by NATO member states and endorsed by members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in June 2005. (Pataraia, 2008, p. 50)

The difference between the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments is the degree of the commitment to the NATO partnership. The Saakashvili government became committed to more concrete partnership activities aiming at the NATO membership at operational level. In 2005, NATO and Georgia sign a transit agreement allowing the Alliance and other ISAF troop-contributing nations to send supplies for their forces in Afghanistan through Georgia. Following the

[150] IPAPs, launched in the Prague Summit in 2002, are designed to provide focused country-specific advice on defence- and security-related reform and larger policy and institutional reform. IPAPs also set up action plans at strategic and operational level for defence institution building and armed forces development (NATO, n.d.).
[151] Georgia declared its intention to develop an IPAP at the 2002 Prague Summit and signed at the Istanbul Summit in 2004.

agreement, NATO offered an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia on its aspirations to join the Alliance in the following year. In addition to the contribution of its troops to NATO's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2007 Georgia hosted a NATO PfP air exercise, "Cooperative Archer 2007". Having had the array of partnership activities, at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 NATO members agreed that Georgia would become a member of NATO ("Budapest summit declaration," 1994).

The USA continued providing assistance through its GSSOP. GSSOP followed its preceding assistance programme, GTEP, and continued providing Georgian troops with training and equipment to enhance their interoperability with US and NATO forces.

In addition to the USA and the other NATO member states, new members of NATO from Eastern Europe began to provide SSR assistance. The wide range of NATO-related policy frameworks provided platforms for Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states to take an advisory role. Their advantage was their recent experience of transforming their own security sector institutions. Under the Saakashvili government, those countries had increasingly become prominent actors in the provision of support for reforming the defence institutions, especially at the operational level. The increased presence of the Baltic countries in an advisory position was also prominent in the composition of the ISAB board members. Upon the conception, the ISAB consisted of three senior advisers from the UK, USA and Germany. By 2005, advisers from the three Baltic countries joined the ISAB team (International Security Advisory Board, 2005, pp. 27–28). Those countries also provided police training and defence planning. After the extension of the OSCE's Border Monitoring Operation was blocked by Russia in 2004, experts from those countries provided support to the reform of the border control as well (Lynch, 2005, p. 55).

7.2.2.2 Assistance for community policing

OSCE was the main provider of foreign assistance in the police sphere. Compared with their involvement in the conflict resolution efforts during the

Shevardnadze period, OSCE shifted their engagement in assisting the police and played a vital role in community policing and community security.

However, the deteriorated relations between Europe and Russia affected the OSCE assistance, especially on the border control on the Chechen border. The relation between the West and Russia became tense, especially after the eastern expansion of the EU and NATO in 2004 and Russia's recognition of Kosovo as an independent state in 2005. The international political climate affected the western assistance to Georgia. One concrete example is that Russia vetoed the extension of the mandate of the Border Control and the OSCE mission's border monitoring operation in the Chechen border in 2004. Russia vetoed an extension of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation in 2004. Since then, the OECD Mission conducted training programme for Georgian border troops and border police (Stöber, 2010).

7.2.2.3 Justice reform assistance

The EU engaged in various SSR-related assistance activities. The justice reform was one of the areas where their assistance was most prominent. The relations between Georgia and the EU entered a new phase after the enlargement of the EU towards the east in 2004. Prior to 2004, Georgia had always expressed its intention to form a close tie with Europe since the Shevardnadze time. Having clearly expressed its intention to join the EU, the Saakashvili government took a further and more concrete step to be closer to Europe. Since 2004, the relation between Georgia and the EU grew closer. Saakashvili appointed Salome Zourabishvili, a French diplomat who had served for the French Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Minister. This sent a clear message that Georgia intends to have a close tie with Europe.

Prior to the "Rose Revolution", for instance, the ENP, adopted in March 2003, recognised Georgia among other countries neighbouring with the EU countries as close partners (The European Commission, 2003). The EU Council designated an EU Special Representative (EUSR) to Georgia. In 2006, the

mandate of the EUSR was renewed. The five year Action laying out strategic objectives was adopted within the ENP context (European Union, 2006).

Reflecting the previous engagement, the Action Plan placed an emphasis of their assistance on the areas of the justice reform, border management, conflict settlement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (European Union, 2006). The Action Plan laid out an array of actions that are to complete those specific priorities. [152] Those actions include reform of the judicial system; civil service reform; and strengthening democratic institutions, which include the strengthening of the Georgian parliament especially in its oversight role in the security and defence sector. The 2006 EU/Georgia Action Plan thus provided a sense of prioritisation and a more coherent framework for actions for EU assistance in SSR.

7.3 External SSR assistance programmes and projects between 2004 and 2008

Reflecting the emerging threats of terrorism and the escalating tension with Russia, the Western allies' strategic interests heavily influenced the direction and focus of foreign assistance for SSR efforts during the Saakashvili period. Their assistance efforts concentrated on developing Georgian troops' counter-terrorism capacities, building their NATO compatibilities and border control capacities. Assistance in the rule of law was also provided to support the Saakashvili government's efforts in reforming the police and judiciary.

Unlike in Shevardnadze's time, foreign assistance largely remained at technical level. This makes a contrast with the role and activities of the ISAB that provided an overarching assessment of the Georgia's armed forces and civilian institutions concerning their oversight, along with an initial roadmap for reforming those armed forces and institutions since the middle 1990s. With the last report

[152] Those priorities are:
- "Strengthening rule of law especially through reform of the judicial system, including the penitentiary system, and through rebuilding state institutions. Strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with international commitments of Georgia (PCA, Council of Europe, OSCE, UN)" (priority area 1);
- "Enhance cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security, including in the field of border management" (priority area 4);
- "Promote peaceful resolution of internal conflicts" (priority 6); and
- "Cooperation on foreign and security policy" (priority 7).

published in 2006, The ISAB's advisory role in Georgia came to an end. The end of the ISAB's advisory role coincided with the process in which the external assistance became more specific and operational.

Table 6 SSR assistance initiatives in Georgia during the Saakashvili time: 2004 - 2008

Initiative	Objective, Content, Activity	Who	When
Defence			
NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)	An action plan aimed for Georgia's integration to NATO, associated with yearly implementation assessment.	NATO	2004
Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP)	60.5 million USD. Objectives: to train and equip more than 1,200 troops for US's war on terror in Iraq. Designed to consolidate GTEP. Trained and equipped the 11th Brigade. In March 2005, Signed with US an agreement for SSOP. Allowing Georgia to continue supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. In FY 2005, US allocated USD60.5 million for SSOP.	USA	2005 - 2006
NATO Planning Programming Budgeting System/Financial Management System (PPBS/FMS)	Increasing the efficiency and transparency of its defence planning and budgeting procedures. PPBS/FMS is a fundamental organizational concept that will guide Georgia's defence-related planning in the mid- and long-term future.	NATO, Netherlands	2006-
NATO Intensified Dialogue on Membership Issues	Through Intensified Dialogue, consultations between Georgia and the North Atlantic Council at a wide range of levels such as staff and high level takes place to discuss the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership.	NATO	2006 -
NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)	Assisting institution-building and armed forces development for the NATO integration	NATO	2008
Police			
Short Term Assistance Programme (STAP)	Supervised by the OSCE Mission to Georgia, the five-month STAP provided basic police training and strengthening the personnel management system, as well as in equipping the Police Academy's new library. The STAP included the following activities: Institution and capacity building for community policing (workshops, study visit, provision of equipment and training) Aimed for improvements to the human resources management system of the Georgian police (The provision of workshops, materials and equipment and study trips), improvement of the training process at the	OSCE, funded by Belgium and Norway	2005 – 2006

	Police Academy and police-related assistance in the Georgian-South Ossetian zone of conflict		
OSCE Police Assistance Programme (PAP): "Basic Improvements to the human resources management system of the Georgian police	Supporting Georgian Police in the transformation of its structure, professional culture and method towards a de-militarised, de-politicised and public service - oriented agency. The project focused on improving human resources management process in the aim of achieving the following objectives: · introduce modern tools and effective procedures for entry-level recruitment and create sustainable capacity for their use; and · initiate transition to computerized administration of personnel records.	OSCE	2007
OSCE Police Assistance Programme (PAP): "Institution- and Capacity Building of Community Policing in Georgia"	Supporting of institution building in the field of community policing, supporting of community policing related capacity building of police officers, starting with pilot implementation of community policing in selected area, and strengthening police-public partnership. Activities included public event and training.	OSCE	2007
Justice			
EUJUST THEMIS 'rule of law' mission	Assisting in developing a strategy for criminal legislation reform through the following activities: · assisting the development of a horizontal governmental strategy guiding the reform process for all relevant stakeholders within the criminal justice sector in full coordination with, and in complementarity to, EU programmes, as well as other donors' programmes; · providing guidance for the new criminal justice reform strategy and support the planning for new legislation; and · helping develop an overall policy and improve top-level planning and performance capabilities in the areas identified as requiring assistance.	EU	2004 - 2005
Border Control			
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program	For developing export control regimes to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile material, support the Georgian State Department of the State Border Guards	USA	Exact date not availabl e
Other			
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Action Plan for Georgia (ENP/AP)	The action plan obliges Georgia to take measures to promote dialogue on regional and international issues, including implementation of European security strategy, in the framework of the CoE, the OSCE and the UN; to cooperate in developing effective systems of national export control, and controlling exports and transits of WMD-related materials; to cooperate in implementing the provisions of the OSCE document on arms control issues, to bring national legislation in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.	EU	2006

7.3.1 Defence sphere: enhancing NATO compatibilities in counter-terrorism operations and NATO integration

The Georgia-NATO cooperation began as early as in 1992 when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Since Saakashvili took power, Georgia accelerated its effort to become a NATO member. In 2004, under the IPAP, Georgia began to receive a number of implementation assessments such as the assessment on maritime capacities and the assessment of the Georgian Navy Report (both conducted in 2004) and the US European Command Defence Assessment of Georgia (conducted in 2005). The defence reform efforts took place under the overall framework of the NATO-Georgia partnership. A wider range of assistance activities were provided through bilateral arrangements by the USA, the major assistance provider, as well as other NATO member states including those recently joined NATO. The main focus of the defence reform during the Saakashvili was two-pronged enhancing counter-terrorism operational capacities and NATO compatibility.

Both of them aimed at the integration into NATO. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, NATO agreed that Georgia would become a NATO member and laid out that the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as the next step for Georgia on their “direct way to membership” (NATO, 2008). Foreign assistance therefore continuously dominated in the area of combat capacity development, to enhance NATO interoperability of the Georgian defence forces. In comparison with the Shevardnadze times, external assistance in the defence sphere had more concrete and practical components not only in the field of combat training but also administrative management. For instance, in 2006, Romania provided expert advice on budgeting system and cosy analyses and the Netherlands carried out training on budgeting and cost analysis, while Germany trained Georgian battalions to prepare them for the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. In addition, personnel management training was provided by Germany, Turkey and the UK.

The most significant foreign assistance in this area is the Georgian Sustainment and Stability Operations (GSSOP) provided by the USA. Launched in January 2005, the GSSOP succeeded the GTEP of 2002 – 2004 and continued assisting the Georgian defence forces in enhancing their combat capacities. The first

phase of the GSSOP (GSSOP-I) ran for 18 months, with the budget of approximately $60 million. It was succeeded by the second phase component, GSSOP-II, which ended in June 2007. GSSOP-I provided training to three light infantry battalions, a maintenance battalion of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, a reconnaissance company of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and an independence company of military police. GSSOP-II trained two light infantry battalions, a maintenance battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, its reconnaissance and engineering companies, a communications company and an engineer company and a communications company of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

Another significant assistance package arrived from Turkey. Since the sign-off of the bilateral agreement on military cooperation on 1997, Turkey had provided Georgia with military equipment and training for officers and troops along with support for the reform of the National Defence Academy and the upgrading of an airbase. Between 1998 and 2005, Turkey had provided the total amount of 37 million USD in the support of the modernisation of Georgia's military (Lynch, 2006, p. 56).

The area of the parliamentary oversight and democratic control of defence forces had also been on agenda among the international donors since the Shevardnadze period, without seeing much substantial progress. The tendency remained the same under the new government led by Saakashvili. It was only after the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia that a bilateral assistance was launched in this area.[153]

7.3.2 Police sphere: advanced yet challenged assistance efforts

The international community's engagement in the police sphere during the Saakashvili period is twofold: assistance for the domestic police reform and support for policing issues in the conflict-affected regions bordering Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

[153] Between December 2008 and November 2011, the Netherlands financed a series of workshops which targeted Georgian parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, civil servants, NGO staff and journalists, and provided training on budgetary oversight, defence policy formation and planning (Centre for European Security Studies, n.d.).

Unlike during the Shevardnadze times, concrete assistance programmes and activities related to the institutional restriction of the MIA. The assistance to the reform of the police and the Ministry took was more practical and concrete, unlike the Shevardnadze period. Their assistance, however, were the provision of financial and technical support, and did not yield normative reform efforts. In comparison with the defence sphere, the police reform did not entail much concrete operational implications such as NATO compatibilities. The police reform was regarded as "'a marker of Georgia's commitment to move beyond the past' that has given Western governments confidence in pursuing closer relations with Georgia since 2003" (Light, 2014, p. 331).

The foreign assistance to the police reform was provided through the provision of short-term projects which lasted for one year. The time frame was unrealistic for delivering normative changes the police sphere although those assistance activities did send a signal that the west supports the police reform. The OSCE was the major actor in policing-related matters initially. However, their involvement decreased and finally ceased in 2005 to exist as the relation with Russia deteriorated.

7.3.2.1 Supporting domestic police reform

Saakashvili government's top priority was the reform of the police. Echoing to the political will of the Georgian government to change the police, assistance was provided to support the police reform by the Western countries through bilateral and multilateral aid (Boda and Kakachia, 2005). The major assistance providers in the police sphere were the OSCE,[154] the USA[155] and the EU.[156]

The Georgian government under Saakashvili brought a drastic change to the police by abolishing the Traffic Police, one of the most notoriously corrupt state institutions, and establishing the Patrol Police. While the Georgian government

[154] The OSCE Police Assistance Programme for the Georgian Police
[155] ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program)
[156] The Council of Europe assisted the police reform efforts through the Police and Human Rights Programme of the Council of Europe, while the EU deployed the THEMIS Rule of Law mission in Tbilisi.

invested in bringing a normative change to the police, foreign assistance activities were mostly centred on the area of training of police personnel, training of staff and improving the curriculum of the Police Academy.

Through the OSCE Police Assistance Programme for the Georgian Police, the OSCE assistance programme planned to "implement parts of the OSCE Kosovo Police Training School curriculum", (Boda and Kakachia, 2005) as well as provide opportunities for Georgian officers to participate in relevant courses abroad (Boda and Kakachia, 2005). The Police Assistance Programme in Georgia was launched in 2007, with a focus on institution and capacity building for community policing, improving the human resource management system of the Georgian police and improving the training of the Policy Academy (OSCE, n.d.). The programme carried out a few workshops and seminars on the theme of community policing.

The impact of the assistance programme seems quite limited and remained at the level of organising *ad hoc* workshops and seminars, without leaving concrete, substantial results in the police structure. The Final Report of "Institution and Capacity Building of Community Policing in Georgia" reports, for instance, that a "Community Policing Development Unit" in the MIA was not established, contrary to what the final project report of the programme had stated (OSCE, 2007a, p. 3). The Final Report points out that "respective training was held, but had no impact on any implementation of community policing in Georgia" (OSCE, 2007a, p. 3).

The other OSCE project under the Policy Assistance Programme, "Basic Improvements to Human Resources Management System of Georgian Police", similarly met with a frustrated result. The project aimed at assisting the Georgian police in developing introducing "modern tools and effective procedures for entry-level recruitment and create sustainable capacity for their use" (OSCE, 2007b, p. 3) and "initiate transition to computerized administration of personnel records" (OSCE, 2007b, p. 3). Institution and capacity development for community policing was carried out in 2008 for three months.[157]

[157] *Final project narrative report: enhanced capacity-building of the Georgian police through training on community policing and elaboration of an advanced training curriculum* (OSCE, n.d).

The USA also provided assistance in the police sphere through its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).[158] ICITAP is the USA's assistance scheme supporting the reform and capacity development of law enforcement bodies in countries all over the world since the late 1980s. ICITAP provides support for foreign law enforcement bodies in order to ensure the US national security police.[159] In 1997 ICITAP began providing assistance to several former Soviet Union countries,[160] but not Georgia. Following the regime change in Georgia in 2003, ICITAP assistance in Georgia began and provided support for the Police Academy, such as "management training, the development of standard operating procedures and curriculum, and the donation of equipment and uniforms" (US Department of Justice, 2016).

The Council of Europe was another foreign assistance provider for the police reform efforts. As part of the "Police and Human Rights" Programme, Council of Europe experts also provided assistance with the reform of the police in Georgia, particularly regarding the inclusion of human rights components in police curricula.

7.3.2.2 Policing in the conflict-affected regions

Under the Saakashvili government, the UN's UNOMIG continued playing a crucial role in providing policing function in the conflict-affected regions. UNOMIG's initial mandates were to monitor compliance with the ceasefire between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz authorities. Those mandates were revised and included evaluation of the local police forces in the regions bordering Abkhazia. The UNOMIG police forces developed training and reform projects in the areas of personnel and of police equipment (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

[158] ICITAP is administrated by the US Department of Justice. ICITAP was established in 1986. Its first set of activities was building criminal investigative capacities of police forces in Latin America in the late 1980s. Its assistance activities have reflected the US foreign policy priorities (US Department of Justice, 2016).
[159] ICITAP supports to "develop effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement capacity that protects human rights, combats corruption, and reduces the threat of transnational crime and terrorism, in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives." (US Department of Justice, n.d.)
[160] ICITAP provided assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 1997, and to Moldova and Ukraine in 1998 (US Department of Justice, 2016).

The OSCE mission also supported law enforcement and police-related activities in the conflict-affected Georgian-South Ossetian communities, through facilitating information exchange, regular meetings and a communication centre in the conflict-affected area.

The support for policing in the conflict-affected regions by both the UN and OSCE were heavily influenced by the political tension between Georgia and Russia, as well as between the western allies and Russia. After the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, UNOMIG's presence came to an end in June 2009 when the UN Security Council did not extend the mandate.[161] OSCE's mission was also affected negatively, as Russia blocked the extension of the Border Monitor in 2005.

7.3.3 Justice sphere: ambitious goals and unmatched implementation arrangement

Along with the reform of the police, the justice reform as Saakashvili's political agenda, even when he was the Minister of Justice. Assistance for justice reform efforts were provided by the Western actors, namely the EU and the USA, which were the two major assistance providers in the justice sphere.

For the EU, Georgia was an experimental case of its assistance provided in the regional defence and security cooperation. Since 2003, the EU increased its efforts to establish its political presence in the South Caucasus region and expressed its will to appointment of the EU Special Representative (EUSG) to the South Caucasus (European Union, 2003). It was in this context that EU THEMIS was provided. EUJUST THEMIS was the first rule-of-law mission under the ESDP set up in June 2004 (European Union, 2004) and implemented between July 2004 and July 2005. EUJUST THEMIS had ambitious objectives to achieve within the provided timeframe of one year. Those objectives were to "Provide urgent guidance for the new criminal justice reform strategy", "Support the overall coordinating role of the relevant Georgian authorities in the field of judicial reform and anti-corruption", "Support the planning for new legislation as necessary, e.g.

[161] Russia vetoed the extension of the mission at the Security Council on 15 June 2009 (Lynch, 2009).

Criminal Procedure Code" and "Support the development of international as well as regional cooperation in the area of criminal justice" (European Union, 2004).

THEMIS was an ESDP operation which aimed to have a quick impact and to demonstrate apolitical profile (Kurowska, 2009, p. 204). EU THEMIS was experimental in terms of implementing actors. It was not the oldest members of the EU but Lithuania and Estonia which joined the USA in 2004 that introduced and supported EU THEMIS in Georgia (Kurowska, 2009, p. 203). It was an emerging trend of the new EU member countries to provide assistance to a country that aspires to become an EU member. This cooperation had technical advantage due to similar socio-political background shared between the former Soviet Union countries. According to Kurowska, "Lithuania promoted a reform strategy for George that was inspired by its own experience of the mid-1990s when Vilinus designed and successfully implemented a comprehensive reform of the justice sector" (Kurowska, 2009, p. 203).

EU THEMIS met with a few challenges upon the implementation. The first challenge lies with the level of actual engagement of the Georgian side. The Georgian side did not manage to indicate a consensus in the direction of the judicial reform strategy. After having issued a presidential decree on the judicial reform, the President Saakashvili and his administration did not show strong commitment to developing a justice reform strategy. Kurowska points out the weak recognition that EU THEMIS received from the Georgian authority, partly due to the lower profile of the mission than initially expected.[162] During the course of the project was supposed to have a high-level working group draft a judicial reform strategy. The working group hardly met, and the Georgian authority did not contribute to finalising a judicial reform strategy (Kurowska, 2009, p. 206). EU THEMIS also struggled with a delay with logistic issues. This was due to complex financial and procurement procedures within the European Community (Kurowska, 2009, p. 205). The coordination between the THEMIS and Community was further hampered by "inter-institutional and individual tensions between THEMIS's Head of Mission and the Commission's delegation" (Helly, 2009, p. 94).

[162] According to Kurowska, the Georgian authorities were disappointed by the low political profile of EU THEMIS as a rule-of-law project. (Kurowska, 2009, p. 205)

Referring to the reform status in 2005, Helly points out remaining misunderstandings over crucial issues between Georgians and Europeans about the rationale of the reform (Helly, 2009, p. 97). For instance, the misunderstanding over what constitutes an independent judiciary surfaced when the executive power dismissed all the judges and put one third of them on a reverse list no independent Georgian organization existed to protect the judges (Helly, 2009, p. 97).

The absence of the political commitment and absence of consensus in the direction of the justice reform created a space for divergent approaches to the justice reform between European and American donors. EU THEMIS experts objected to proposals such as plea bargaining, jury trials and the creation of an ombudsman with prosecutor-like-prerogatives as they regarded them as "reflecting the position of the American Bar Association in Georgia and some local NGOs" (Kurowska, 2009, p. 206) and thought that those proposals were to advocate the American model. The divergence between the European and American legal philosophies were reflected in the competition between two groups of Georgian NGOs. The Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), a leading NGO in the field of legal and human rights issues, were more inclined to the European law, while the Liberty Institute, an NGO which played a crucial role in the anti-Shevardnadze movements and closely associated with Saakashvili and other influential politicians such as Giga Bokeria, was influenced by Anglo-American law (Helly, 2009, p. 96).

EU THEMIS exposed the challenges in the logistics and political recognition, as well as the internal rivalries both in the Georgian and Commission sides. The example of EU THEMIS illustrated the ambitious objectives of EU THEMIS to be achieved within the one-year project duration and that the implementation arrangement did not match to meet the ambitious objectives.

7.3.4 Border control: expanded assistance and limited impacts

As discussed in chapter 5, the USA had provided Georgia with training on the border management since the Shevardnadze period. Besides Georgia's border control activities being supported by the US assistance, the border control activities in the Georgian-Chechen border were conducted by the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation. The border control assistance had a major shift in 2005 when the relations between Europe and Russia deteriorated over the status of Kosovo and resulted in the suspension of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation on the Georgian-Chechen border. Following the suspension of the OSCE operation, Georgia requested the EU to play a larger role in the border control issues (Helly, 2009, p. 95).

Responding to the request from Georgia, the EU Member States increased its engagement in the border control on the Georgian-Chechen border by expanding the EUSR support team with the presence of border security experts.[163] The EUSR's mandate was amended in July 2005. According to the amended mandate, the EUSR's mandate included:

- providing "the European Union with reporting and a continued assessment of the border situation and facilitating confidence-building between Georgia and the Russian Federation, thereby ensuring efficient cooperation and liaison with all relevant actors;"
- "assisting "the Georgian Border Guard and other relevant government institutions in Tbilisi in preparing a comprehensive reform strategy;" and
- "working "with the Georgian authorities to increase communication between Tbilisi and the border, including mentoring. This will be done by working closely with Regional Border Guard Centres between Tbilisi and the border (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia)" (European Union, 2005).

The amendment also had a EUSR support team to "oversee the implementation of the strategy for the reform of the criminal justice system by the Georgian authorities and other actors, in particular through providing support to the Steering Group set up by the Georgian government" (European Union, 2005).

[163] The Commission had an advisory project in the MIA, including a Border Guards component (Helly, 2009, p. 95).

The foreign assistance and the government's efforts in improving capacities of the customs and border control were yet to be seen, as revealed by field research conducted in 2005 (Koyama, 2005). Despite the reform efforts, capacity of the customs officials declined according to local respondents. Smuggling was still rampant over the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the Soviet Union dissolved, the actual border seems the same as the Soviet era. An old Georgian male participant in Marneuli expresses that the actual scale of smuggling across the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan by saying: "Frankly speaking, the real frontier we have is only with Turkey."[164] In Marneuli, people noticed the slight decrease of smuggling since the middle 1990. They believed that improving the economic situation was the only effective way to reduce incidence of smuggling rather than increased capacities of custom offices. Similarly, in Zugdidi, people reported weak capacities of the border guards. One interviewee told:

> "Nobody is satisfied with the frontier military work. Kidnapping of neighbours in the bordering area by Abkhaz criminals is very common. The neighbours are constantly under fear. People are unprotected because the frontier military works badly."[165]

The improved regulations over custom officials and border guards remained largely unappreciated to the people. People cited the increasing price of bribe. According to a female Azeri participant, the cost of bribery increased approximately from 30 GEL to 100 GEL between 2004 and 2005. People in Zugdidi also pointed out the illegal trade as being problematic.

7.4 Security consequences in the SSR efforts between 2004 and 2008

Saakashvili's political stance was very much inclined to liberal democratic values, such as the respect for human rights. As the previous chapter discusses, the reform efforts led to a number of changes in the Georgian security sector. The

[164] Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.
[165] Author's interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.

modernisation of the military, the separation of the justice from the executive, the abolishment of the MSS and the replacement of the Traffic Police with the Patrol Police were among security sector change that the Saakashvili government realised. External assistance from the Western allies was provided in supporting his reform efforts as well as the Saakashvili government's aspiration for the reintegration into the EU and NATO.

The actual implementation of the SSR and its assistance efforts appears to have mixed results. As chapter 5 discusses, the Georgian side showed a lack of the genuine commitment to establishing liberal democratic principles such as the parliamentary oversight of the security sector. As for the external assistance providers, it turned out that in some areas their assistance was limited in terms of the depth of normative changes and implemented in an *ad hoc* manner within a short period of time.

The following part of this chapter analyses security consequences from state security, regime security and human security perspectives. The section examines what security issues remained unattended in the SSR process during the period.

7.4.1 Regime security: reinforced by liberal democratic reform efforts

The violent suppression of anti-government demonstration was carried out by the Saakashvili government that claimed to be liberal democrat, and not by the Shevardnadze government.

As in the Shevardnadze period, SSR efforts in the police sphere were particularly driven by Georgian domestic political dynamics. Under the Saakashvili government, the power dynamics were played out between the young, liberal democratic political elites led by Saakashvili and the former Soviet nomenklatura represented by the power ministries, especially the MIA. The police sphere saw the most illustrative example of how the political dynamics influenced the direction of reform efforts. The reform efforts including the abolishment of the MSS, the replacement of the Traffic Police with the Patrol Police and the large scale lay-off and staff reshuffle in the security sector institutions contributed to concentrating

power on Saakashvili. The reform efforts also helped the Shevardnadze build dominant political influence, to an extent that oppositions and some international critiques expressed concerns that his government had become an authoritarian regime.[166]

When the anti-Saakashvili demonstrations peaked in November 2007, the authoritarian feature of the government became highlighted by its usage of the police. As mentioned in the previous chapter, police dispersed the demonstrations in a harsh manner. The government's reaction to the demonstrations and the use of the police tarnished the liberal democratic reputation of the Saakashvili regime. The November 2007 event had the president declare a 10-day long state of emergency and prompted strong criticism by the international community (Human Rights Watch, 2007d, 2007a).

7.4.2 State security: defeated in the 2008 Georgia-Russia War

As in the Shevardnadze time, the issue of the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained the biggest threat to state security of Georgia under Saakashvili. The difference between the two governments lay in their diplomatic stance to relations with Russia. The Saakashvili government's militant approach invited a direct armed confrontation with Russia over South Ossetia in August 2008. Since April 2008, Georgian troops entered into the South Ossetian territory repeatedly. The August War began by illegal attacks by the Georgian troops (European Union, 2009). Within five days, the fighting ended, with Russia's *de facto* victory. Consequently, Georgia lost the two separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia which declared the recognition of the independence of the two territories (Levy, 2008).

The 2008 War shows a negative consequence of Georgia's engagement with NATO in terms of state security. During the Saakashvili period, Georgia strengthened the relations with NATO through the compact capacity training and Georgia's participation in ISAF operations in Iraq since 2003 and Afghanistan since 2004. In April 2008, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed that

[166] Author's interviews, March 2005, Tbilisi.

Georgia will become a member of NATO ("Budapest summit declaration," 1994). The acceptance to NATO did not guarantee Georgia its state security automatically. The combat capacity training paid off for NATO. As a result of the long-term training of its troops in counter-insurgency, Georgia became the biggest troop contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The capacity development efforts in the defence sphere in Georgia contributed hugely by increasing the NATO troops engaged in counter-terrorism campaigns, and to the strategic interest of the NATO allies, especially the USA. The military assistance and cooperation in the field of counter-insurgency thus brought Georgia a remarkable progress in forging close strategic relations with NATO.

From the perspective of Georgian state security, on the other hand, the outcome of the partnership with NATO does not appear to be a positive one. The 2008 War with Russia revealed a number of shortcomings in the Georgian army. When the war broke out in August 2008, 2,000 Georgian troops trained under the GSSOP were in not Georgia but in Iraq.[167] Even those troops that received the USA-sponsored programme were not equipped prepared for the warfare with Russia, according to some observers. For instance, Cheterian, citing a retired US Army General who was in charge of the Georgia Defence Reform Programme, points out that Georgia did not have a cohesive combat force necessary for the type of operation launched in August 2008 (Cheterian, 2009, p. 163). In spite of the heavy investment in the Georgian troops through the GSSOP and its predecessor, GTEP, according to the US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Eric S. Edelman, "the Georgian armed forces were never trained or equipped by the U.S. to fight the Russians" (*Georgia-Russia crisis, implications and US response, testimony of Eric S. Edelman*, 2008). A classified assessment by the US defence department reports that the Georgian armed forces were "prone to impulsive rather than deliberate decision making, undermined by unclear lines of command and led by senior officials who were selected for personal relationships rather than professional qualifications" (Chivers and Shanker, 2008).

Both the Saakashvili government and its Western allies had an ambitious goal of integrating Georgia into NATO as a full member, and a heavy investment followed

[167] The Georgian government recalled the 2,000 troops from Iraq to engage with the fights with Russia (Civil Georgia, 2008).

in order to achieve the goal. The result of the 2008 war with Russia and how the Georgian army fought in the war showed that the goal remained afar despite the efforts.

7.4.3 Human security: persistent security challenges at community level

As the previous section discusses, OSCE provided its assistance with a focus on security in communities. However, their intervention was limited in terms of the thematic scope, financial availability and project period. Within the circumstances, the external assistance could leave few tangible impacts on human security. In post-2003 Georgia, there were still a number of human security issues insufficiently addressed.

7.4.3.1 Persistent mistrust in the police

The Human Rights Report by Human Rights Watch published in April 2005 reports that the Saakashvili government took steps to address abusive practices by the police, but these efforts have been inadequate to eradicate them (Human Rights Watch, 2005a, p. 2). The youth population, young men particularly, were targeted by the police's coercive behaviour. The abusive behaviour of the police generated further distrust, as experienced by a young Georgian man in Zugdidi:

> "One day I was taken up by the police. They told me I had served in the army, although I haven't. They brought me to the police station and began checking me up. How can I trust the police that lie?"[168]

The Saakashvili government encouraged active media campaign to increase popular support for the newly created Patrol Police. A new TV programme called Patrol Police was aired to demonstrate good performances and portray a positive image of the police. The Patrol Police was appreciated in Tbilisi and other urban settings where they were most active, respondents in Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and Zugdidi noted that the police in general had few positive impacts on their daily

[168] Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.

lives. They also reported misconduct by the police including torture; not coming when called or come only when bribed; bribes for creating documentation, especially driving licenses; theft, including stealing from confiscated materials and during crime investigations; false arrest, accusation, and imprisonment; harassing youth; and arms and drugs trafficking.[169]

7.4.3.2 Marginalised ethnic minorities

The police reform by the Saakashvili government focused on the public safety in larger cities such as Tbilisi, where various ethnic groups co-existed with little friction. Compared with the Gamsakhurdia period, Georgia had a lesser degree of violence related to ethnicities. Yet, according to the field study conducted in post-2003 Georgia, few participants believed that grievance between different ethnic groups disappeared (Koyama, 2005). In the study, Georgian participants in Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli conveyed their feeling that their Armenian and Azeri neighbours keep their resentment against Georgians. One female participant from Akhaltsikhe told, for example, that she felt awkward to introduce herself as a head of the 'national' theatre to her Armenian audience.[170] In Marneuli, male Georgian participants recalled a recent dispute between Georgian and Azeri communities. According to them, one day during a ritual at a Georgian Church, some Azeris had come to hang a dead dog from the entrance of the church upon an order by an *akhsakhkal*.[171] In post-2003 Georgia, there were far fewer armed disputes between ethnic groups than in the 1990. Yet, underpinning mistrust between them seemed unsolved.

Ethnic minorities pointed out that the Georgian language was a key for their social and economic security. Rather, ethnicity had become a contested issue among the residents mainly because of the pro-Georgian language policy recently adopted by the Saakashvili government. The constitution of Georgia defines Georgian as the state language in 1995. The new Saakashvili government

[169] Focus group interviews, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and Zugdidi.
[170] Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe.
[171] Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.

adopted a policy allowing only Georgian to be an official state and working language in 2004.[172]

Whilst promoting the Georgian nationalist and the Georgian language in society, the government did not provide adequate support for then population of ethnic minorities. In areas where the majority of its inhabitants were ethnic minorities, schools were not equipped with capable Georgian teachers and manuals, either. They felt the government did not support them at all. One middle age Azeri man in Marneuli put his frustration against Tbilisi bitterly:

> "Azeris living in Kakheti, Tbilisi and Kapsi speak Georgian perfectly. The government must elaborate a special programme for us. Not that one for show, but a real one, which will give us an opportunity to learn the language. They say they will many times, but so far we see no results. All these seem like an empty promise. I think the government does not want us to speak Georgian" (Koyama, 2005).

Saakashvili appealed to ethnic minorities through political gestures by addressing in minority languages and announcing a programme to train young representatives from minority groups in Georgian university for future government positions (Nodia, 2005).

In the SSR efforts, either by the domestic and foreign assistance efforts, there were no particular effort paid to curtail the ethnic tension. This was particularly demonstrated in the community security sphere, in the police reform context. The number of police officers in regions decreased because of the recent lay-off of police officers as part of the police reform. New replacements arrived; however, most of the newly recruited officers were ethnic Georgians. This was because of the new language policy: the governmental officials are obliged to possess enough Georgian skills in speaking and drafting. This language requirement prevented ethnic Armenian and Azeris from the minority dominated regions such as Kvemo Kartli and Samktskhe-Javakneti from being recruited.

[172] The Chapter of Regional Language has not been adopted as of May 2005.

In Kvemo Kartli, different social groups expressed different degrees of mistrust against the police. In Marneuli, male Georgian participants reported troublesome relations between the Azeri community and the police in the Kvemo-Kartli region.[173] Emphasising that the tension between ethnic Azeris and the police was much less in Marneuli, the Georgian participants claimed that the Azeri population were afraid of the police and collectively resist the police when an Azeri citizen were arrested, especially in the rural areas.[174] The Azeri participants expressed mistrust against and tension with the police. Some male Azeri participants believed that the police treat Azeris unfairly.[175]

The reason for the current frustrations among the Azeri population was, however, not only due to ethnicities, but also due to the state language problem. The male Azeri participants claimed that the Georgian language requirement for state officials reduced the number of Azeri police officers.[176] According to them, although there were no official regulations to discharge non-Georgian speaking personnel, Azeri officers felt pressured to leave their office if they were not competent in Georgian.[177] Consequently, the decreased number of ethnic Azeris in the state structure deepened the distance between the Azeri community and the police. The increasing sense of mistrust with the police drove ethnic Azeris to call for their own community network to settle conflicts and resolve problems.

7.4.3.3 Domestic violence

Women were constantly afraid of being robbed on the street. Compared to the Soviet times, women report that street safety had deteriorated significantly in the last 15 years. In Marneuli, women felt less secure on street as a result of the abolishment of the Traffic Police by the Saakashvili government.[178] While the general public supports the abolishment, female participants in Marneuli claimed that the less visibility of police officers contributed to the increase in street crimes, and confine themselves to their houses, because: “We are afraid of walking down

[173] Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid.

the street, because we are afraid of being robbed."[179] Ironically, they stated that they felt more insecure after the police reform.

Some of the causes of crimes were attributed to the collapse of the Soviet system, difficulties in finding jobs and incompetence of the law enforcement bodies, Unemployment among men were considered particularly problematic. In Marneuli, an old male participant expressed that one needed to earn money illegally when unemployed without any social welfare.[180] In Zugdidi, one female participant recounted that she frequently heard stories that wives of unemployed husbands urged them to do anything, even committing crimes, to bring home some money.[181] Given the economic hardship, the workshop participants showed a mixed feeling of sympathy and resignation against criminals.

Gender-based violence (GBV) remained an acute problem in Georgia, yet the issue was neither widely discussed nor recognized as a crime. As a result, the police hardly intervene to solve GBV. As far as what the interviewees in this research told, mostly women were the main victim of GBV.[182] GBV in Georgia often took the form of husbands beating their wives when they were drunk. A female interviewee referred to the frequency of GBV in her community and told: "If you've got a sane husband, you are a very lucky person."[183] In the group discussions, there were clear differences in the attitudes towards GBV between male and female participants. Male participants talked little about violence against women. In one workshop, participants laughed and waved off the topic, failing to engage in a serious discussion.[184] In contrast, female participants sometimes brought up the issue spontaneously, and were willing to discuss it for long periods. A female participant in Zugdidi told:

> "My neighbour drinks a lot. When he is drunk, he beats his wife. They have a 9-year old boy. When the parents start to quarrel, the boy first asks his mother to keep quiet, and then his father not to beat her. Once the woman

[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.
[182] Focus group interviews, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and Zugdidi.
[183] Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.
[184] Ibid.

called the police. She told them that their house was robbed, because she was afraid that the police would not come if she told them the truth."[185]

7.5 Conclusion

Foreign assistance for the SSR efforts between 2003 and 2008 were strongly affected by the strategic interests of the major assistance providers i.e. the Euro-Atlantic allies. The Georgian government under Saakashvili, on the other hand, selected and accepted foreign assistance in areas, such as the defence sphere, where their own political interest could also meet. However, the uncomprehensive SSR implementation and assistance based on political and strategic interests of the Georgian political elites and the assistance providers left Georgia and its people with costly security consequences: persisting community insecurity, tarnished regime reputation and jeopardised state security. The so-called Rose Revolution in 2003 brought young political leadership led by Saakashvili to power by replacing Shevardnadze. Saakashvili and his elite political allies were inclined to liberal democratic values. The post-Rose Revolution period largely coincides with the eastern expansion of the EU and NATO that started in 2004. Unlike this predecessor, Saakashvili made his Euro-Atlantic oriented diplomatic stance and domestic political stance that was anti-Soviet nomenclature from an outset.

Despite the regime change and the subsequent shifts in domestic political dynamics and external relations, the interplay with the external SSR assistance and local dynamics remained the same as the one under the Shevardnadze government. It appears that the provision of the SSR assistance between 2004 and 2008 continues to be driven by the strategic interests among the assistance providers. Georgia actively invited external support in the areas where they found a mutual interest in having reform efforts.

The defence sphere is the prime example. SSR efforts in the defence sphere saw mutual interests of Georgia and NATO, and of the USA to be more precise, met most. As in the times of Shevardnadze, the SSR assistance initiatives provided by the Euro-Atlantic allies mainly focused on the development of border control

[185] Ibid.

and combat capacities. The main objective was to enhance Georgia's capacities to participate as part of the USA and its allies' international operations against terrorism. The assistance was provided to enhance Georgian troops' counter-terrorism combat capacities and NATO compatibility. The GSSOP was provided in this context and succeeded in training Georgian troops that could be deployed in international operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The GSSOP-trained Georgian troops thus contributed to increasing the manpower to the international operations and benefitted to NATO and its allies. In particular, the strengthened partnership between Georgia and NATO, and the USA was a positive achievement for the Saakashvili government whose relations with Russia had increasingly deteriorated and become hostile.

The police and justice spheres were the other areas on which the Saakashvili government focused its reform efforts. Reflecting the strategic interest in ensuring a secure border control, the international community's role in the police sphere was mainly on the border control issues. For instance, the USA had a primal interest in securing the border facing Chechnya; OSCE provided the Border Monitor operations alongside Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and later training of the police. The EU had expanded its engagement to the rule of law and border control issues. On the other hand, most of the foreign assistance in the domestic policing issue was limited, despite the police reform being the priority of the Saakashvili administration. The external assistance providers' approach to the provision of assistance in the police and judiciary was different from the one in the defence sphere. Unlike in the defence sphere, external assistance in the police and justice spheres were provided in an *ad hoc* manner. Most of the assistance took the form of the provision of training, workshops and the provision of equipment.

The analysis in this chapter provides the following observations on the consequences of the external actors' interest-based SSR assistance. First, the SSR efforts focused on external security issues left internal security issues within Georgia little attended. As in the Shevardnadze period, community insecurity persisted. Furthermore, Georgia's state security was jeopardized when the 2008 Georgia-Russia war broke out. The best trained Georgian troops by the GSSOP had been deployed in international operations outside Georgia, leaving Georgia

without its best trained troops when Georgia became engaged in a war with Russia in 2008, and cost Georgia the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Second, since the SSR assistance was driven by the strategic interests of the assistance providers, the direction and content of the engagement of the Euro-Atlantic allies were heavily influenced by their relations with Russia, resulting in compromised SSR support. Saakashvili's Georgia managed to forge a closer relation with the Euro-Atlantic allies and enticed their expanded engagement in SSR efforts. However, as the relation with the Euro-Atlantic bloc and Russia deteriorated, their assistance became significantly affected. The suspension of the OSCE Border Monitor operation is its primal example. This shows that the SSR assistance in Georgia was not only affected by the domestic and external dynamics surrounding Georgia but also the political dynamics within and around the SSR assistance providers.

Third, little effort in civilian control of security forces, particularly paramilitaries, led to jeopardise both regime security and state security. The Saakashvili government received ample reform assistance in the defence and rule of law spheres, based on democratic principles of human rights and democratic control of armed forces. However, most of the assistance remained at a technical level and were provided in an *ad hoc* manner in a short-period of time and did not lead to substantive normative changes in security sector governance. In the defence sphere, for instance, the Euro-Atlantic allies focused on developing the combat capacities of Georgian troops and left Georgia to tackle with the issue of democratic control of its security forces. The two incidents of Okruashvili, the then Ministers of Defence and Internal Affairs, entering into the Abkhazia and South Ossetia territories, are the illuminating example of inappropriate control of the security forces, in particular, those of the paramilitary nature. The Saakashvili government's violent repression of anti-government demonstrators in November 2007 is another example of the persisting repressive nature of the paramilitary forces.

As in the case of the SSR assistance efforts under the Shevardnadze government, external assistance remained supplementary and did not result in the introduction

of normatively driven reform efforts in the security sector. Rather, the overall security sector change is largely superficial change rather than SSR. What is noteworthy is that even during the Saakashvili period with the ample SSR assistance, no substantial SSR efforts and foreign assistance were provided for paramilitary forces. The paramilitary forces were left to be mobilised by individual political elites and/or the government without following a legal procedure. While the other security sector actors underwent varying degrees of reform initiatives, the paramilitaries were yet again left unattended in the SSR process. The next chapter focuses on the paramilitaries and examines why they escaped from substantial SSR efforts throughout the entire period between 1985 and 2008. While its main focus is on Georgia, the next chapter expands its scope beyond Georgia and looks at other countries.

Chapter 8 Paramilitary change in transitional societies

8.1 Introduction

Following the five core chapters on Georgia, Part III of this thesis consisting of this chapter examines how the domestic agenda-setting process for security sector change is driven by certain dynamics and factors, with a focus on paramilitaries. By examining paramilitaries in Georgia and beyond, the chapter explores how closely the overall political process interlinked with the process of paramilitary change, which takes various trajectories largely independent of external SSR assistance.

In doing so, the chapter first builds its analysis on the literature review in chapter 2. The Georgia case study in the preceding chapters of Part II demonstrates and examines the significant roles played by paramilitaries in conflict-affected transitional society in Georgia. Building on the Georgia case study, the subsequent section expands its scope beyond Georgia and fills in the gap in the literature on the security sector actors and political developments by providing an in-depth analysis on paramilitaries in transitional societies. More specifically, the section analyses varying types of paramilitaries and their functions and roles, as well as how paramilitaries in post-conflict interplay with political dynamics in societies.

The next section builds on the liberal peace critiques discussed in chapter 2, in particular, the critical liberal peacebuilding literature from the perspectives of local ownership, actors and dynamics. This section scrutinises these local dynamics in the security sector change process in Georgia and analyses how the paramilitaries escaped from external reform assistance and how local political dynamics drove the course of paramilitary change.

The chapter ends by demonstrating the need for more close examination of paramilitaries and political dynamics surrounding their reform, as a sub-section in the SSR studies. While the chapter develops its argument by being based on the Georgia case study, it also refers to other countries' examples.

8.2 Typology of paramilitaries: state, quasi-state and non-state paramilitaries

The definition of paramilitary is ambiguous, as discussed in chapter 2, reflecting the blurred status of paramilitaries in the spectrum, i.e., between police and military as well as state and non-state actors, in which they are discussed. Their logistical, legal and functional characteristics differ from case to case. However, there are some criteria that help us to classify them into a few clusters. For instance, the IISS Military Balance offers one of the examples of selecting armed forces in a paramilitary category based on the armed forces' military nature in their equipment, function and training.[186]

A common feature of paramilitaries is that their weaponry is typically light infantry, despite of their varying affiliations. Difference in degree and nature of legitimacy of paramilitaries, or their relation to state, can classify them into three types: state, non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries. Depending on whether they are recognized as a full-fledged state organ or not, their types vary over further criteria, i.e., function and, in case of state paramilitaries, mandate and ministerial affiliation.

8.2.1 State paramilitaries

The first type, state paramilitary, include state security sector actors such as military, police, presidential guards and coastal guards. Those paramilitary groups can be further classified based on their governmental affiliation, as discussed in the following sub-section. State paramilitaries are often found in continental European countries and former Soviet Union countries. Prominent examples of state paramilitaries include Italy's Carabinieri and France's

[186] The Military Balance does not include paramilitary forces as part of regular military forces, yet they refers paramilitary forces "whose training, organisation, equipment and control suggest they may be usable in support, or in lieu, of regular military forces." (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994, p. 5) Their definition of the term, armed forces, reflects the inclination of the authors of the Military Balance to categorise non-military actors as armed forces should the armed forces have equipment, function and training of a military nature. The term armed forces "includes paramilitary forces such as the gendarmerie, customs service and border guard if these are trained in military tactics, equipped as a military force and operate under military authority in the event of war." (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999, p. 10)

Gendarmaries.

Either being affiliated to the military or law enforcement bodies, paramilitaries are usually equipped with military weaponry, often with small arms and light weapons, but not with heavy weaponry. They are equipped and trained for operations which require guerrilla fighting and urban combating. Typically, paramilitary forces have relatively small, mobile, light infantry as compared to those of the military. Some law enforcement bodies with paramilitary forces including internal security forces and border control have training, equipment and composition similar to those of the military. Internal Troops of the Russian MIA (MVD) and India's Border Security Force are among the examples. Both non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries are equipped and composed as state paramilitaries.

When it comes to function and mandate, paramilitaries vary its characteristics drastically. As Hills focuses on actual function of policing function of internal forces and rightly points out that paramilitaries have played significant roles in societies. (Hills, 2000) Ministerial affiliation does not necessarily correspond to a type of function that they engage. In some countries, they are engaged in law enforcement functioning, whilst in other countries, they may participate in military operations. In the case of France's Gendarmaries, they are engaged in a wide range of activities including crowd control, counter-terrorism operations, coast guard, control at airports, and so forth. It is not rare that roles and responsibilities of paramilitary forces duplicate or overlap with those of the military and police. In some other countries, function and mandate of paramilitary forces are not clearly specified. This is often the case with special forces such as presidential guards.

State paramilitaries' mandates and functions vary, depending on governance style. In democratically stable countries, paramilitary groups are legitimate and have clear mandates complimentary to those of the military and police. In Britain, policing has been carried out by civilians whilst the military was kept away from intervening in policing.[187] In contrast, in continental European countries, paramilitaries have traditionally engaged in policing functioning. The prime

[187] However, this trend has been changing in the recent years. In the US, some law enforcement functioning has been militaries, especially in the area of boarder control along with the border with Mexico. In UK, urban policing has become militaries since the 9/11 attacks in the US.

example is Gendermarie Nationale of France. Gendermarie is a national police force with military status. It takes charge of law enforcement in rural areas and military installations. Several other continental European countries follow the French model, with paramilitaries responsible mainly for rural area security. Caribinieri of Italy, Bundesgrenzschutz of Germany, Guardia Civil of Spain are such examples. Another type of paramilitary function in democratic countries is intelligence. There are examples where paramilitaries belong to intelligence services such as paramilitary units of the USA's CIA and Israel's Mossad. Those groups are highly trained in commando operations rather than in law enforcement.

The Soviet Union had a distinct policing style from those in the Western European states (Stepanova, 2005). Instead of focusing mainly on crime control as, say, British policing, the focus of the Soviet militia was not on crime control and prevention. Rather, the policing focused on protecting state property and maintaining social and political control (Shelley, 1994, p. 57). In particular, policing in its non-Russian states became political. As Turk observed in other cases, the Soviet policing was also politicised (Turk, 1982). In particular, "As all threats to the political order were perceived as impinging the power of the imperial state, law enforcement in these areas (non-Russian areas) became highly politicized" (Shelley, 1994, p. 57). Therefore, the major aim of paramilitaries was to control the populace of the territory within the Soviet Union, and in order to achieve this goal, a strong centralised policing institution was necessary.

Under the policing style, the Internal Troops' role was to control the population. Among the internal security apparatus, paramilitary troops had a significant role in the control of the populace in the Soviet territory. The internal security organs, the NKVD and subsequently the KGB, had three troops under its control for the purpose of ensuring internal security (Shelley, 1994, p. 57). Those three paramilitary bodies are the Internal Troops, the Security Troops and the Border Troops. The Internal Troops (*vnutrennie voiska*) were first established in 1919 under the NKVD then shifted to the MVD in 1954 when the KGB was established. Until then, the Internal Troops were under the authority of the secret police. The most of their paramilitaries were conscripts. One of their most important functions was that of preventing internal disorder that might threaten the regime's political stability. Other duties of the Internal Troops included controlling crowds in large

cities by supplementing the *militsiia*, and guarding large-scale industrial enterprises, railroad stations, certain large stockpiles of food and material, and certain communication centres.

The Security Troops were affiliated to the KGB, and their duties were not clearly specified by the Soviet sources. Their duties probably included guarding key government and party buildings and officials, as well as counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations. The Security Troops were also reportedly employed along with the MVD's Internal Troops, to suppress public protests and disperse demonstration. The KGB had another paramilitary body, the Border Troops (*пограничные войска*). Although the KGB was an internal security organ, the Border Guards were conscripted as part of the biannual call-up of the MoD. Their duties included repulsing armed incursions into Soviet territory; preventing illegal crossing of the border or the transport of weapons, explosives, contraband, or subversive literature across the border; monitoring the observance of established procedures at border crossing points; monitoring the observance by Soviet and foreign ships of navigation procedures in Soviet territorial waters; and assisting state agencies in the preservation of natural resources and the protection of the environment from pollution. At the republic level, the KGB did not supervise units of the Border Troops.

In case of the state paramilitary forces, they can be further classified depending on their ministerial affiliation. Some are affiliated to the military structure or the police, or to both the military and the police. Some paramilitary forces including gendarmeries with policing function belong to the MoD. Italy's Carabinieri is an example. Other forces belong to the MIA (as in the case in Argentina). France's Gendarmaries belong to both the ministries of defence and internal affairs. There are a few cases of paramilitaries belonging to intelligence services and political entities. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for instance, has the Special Activities Division.

8.2.2 Quasi-state and non-state paramilitaries

There are a number of non-state paramilitary groups that are not recognized by

a state, especially in conflict-affected countries. These paramilitaries are often called guerrillas and insurgents (e.g., Colombia's FARC and ELN) by governments that they are fighting against. While some of such non-state paramilitaries are fighting against a regime in the country, other non-state paramilitaries have a political wing to represent their political position (e.g., Hamas in Palestine and Huzbollah in Lebanon). As Alyev, Carey and Mazzei point out, non-state paramilitaries do not necessarily mean anti-government (Aliyev, 2016; Carey et al., 2013; Mazzei, 2009). As the recent paramilitary literature shows, a number of non-state paramilitary forces are pro-government (Aliyev, 2016; Carey et al., 2013; Mazzei, 2009) Although those paramilitaries are not formerly associated with a state, they play a significant role in executing what the state that they are closely linked to (Aliyev, 2016; Carey et al., 2013; Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016; Mazzei, 2009). In addition, there are private security companies and groups of individuals such as mercenaries that belong to the category of non-state paramilitaries. Paramilitaries under this sub-category usually do not limit their royalty to any particular actors and often shift their reporting line from one party to another, depending on contract.

Some paramilitaries can be termed as quasi-state paramilitaries: they function as a *de facto* state organ although they are not necessarily recognized as state organs in legal terms. This is often the case in societies affected by and/or emerging from armed conflict where the legitimacy over state organs is contested. Such quasi-state paramilitary groups might have certain degree and nature of legitimacy and support from communities, political groups and/or political parties, to which they are associated with.

The first prominent characteristic of contemporary paramilitaries in a fragile state, either affected by a violent conflict or by a radical regime change, is that members often follow individual commanders for personal loyalty rather than because of official affiliation. Those leaders are usually self-made strongmen, often with criminal backgrounds and little professional military experience. In the former Yugoslavia, there were 83 paramilitary groups operating during the conflict (Kaldor, 1999). On the Serbian side, the most notorious groups are 'Tiger' led by Zeljko Raznatovic, also known as Arkan, and 'White Eagle' led by Vojislav Seselji. Arkan was known as a hit man for the communist regime, as well as a criminal

accused of bank robberies and murder. Those strongmen figures mobilise their paramilitaries to achieve their individual political and economic goals. For example, the anti-government armed forces in eastern DRC are under the personal control of individual commanders. Although they are officially, and supposedly, part of the Congolese national army, their actual activities include looting, fighting against other armed factions, often collaborating with other national armed forces, such as Ugandans.

Secondly, the weak or no *de jure* nor *de facto* legitimacy, paramilitary forces in fragile states tend to attract young males to join the force for various reasons. On the war in the former Yugoslavia, Woodward observes that "The war became an opportunity for a revolt of the disadvantaged, for individual enrichment, for political aspirations, and for revenge against the communist regime" (Woodward, 1995, p. 271). Brett and Specht observe that a number of young soldiers join armed forces because of an individual opportunity in a context of war.[188] For young people, especially boys and male adolescents, joining armed forces often means that they become an important member of family and community by protecting family and community members with arms.

The third major characteristic of paramilitaries in fragile states is the lack of formal institutionalisation (or recruiting process) like the conventional military. The armies were not composed of professionals but of fathers, sons, and brothers from the region. The purpose of the warfare was defence of village and land. Except for small elite units, army units were not mobile, were locally recruited among farmers and villages of all ages, tended to be led by commanders from the areas, and were known to be loyal to that local commander, even if doing so meant that they disobeyed orders given higher up the normal chain of command. Localised fighting for the territory and soul of a village drew in villagers who had tried to stay out of politics but found they had to fight or be killed or expelled (Brett and Specht, 2004, pp. 31–32).

Yet, there are several kinds of combatant. There are those who took arms to defend their lands, the unemployed youth, the right-wing teenagers, militant

[188] Brett and Specht, pp.31-32.

extremist volunteer, and criminals released from jails (Woodward, 1995, pp. 249–250). When the state collapsed, the recruitment of soldiers reinforced the class division, because the unemployed, poorer village youth, and industrial workers, unpaid for months were more vulnerable to the draft and promises of pay and veterans' benefits. In the former Yugoslavia, paramilitary forces were full of teenagers faced with the choice either to leave the country or to join in a military organisation, but under little organised command or adult standard of behaviour (Woodward, 1995, p. 249). Many of Arkan's paramilitaries were recruited from a fan club of Belgrade's football team owned by Arkan. Following unprofessional commanders driven by personal interests, many of the soldiers did not understand what they were fighting for, nor approved a war in which the two formerly living closely were fighting and killing one another.

The difference between state paramilitaries and non-state/quasi-state paramilitaries is that the paramilitaries in fragile states take a wider function than those of stable societies. Paramilitaries in fragile states often have political and social roles in addition to usual roles as security forces, as seen in the case of Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Some paramilitaries such as IRA and Hamas have a political wing to represent their supporters. As non-state paramilitaries operate outside of the state structure, they are not mandated to function neither as the military and/or law enforcement bodies. On other hand, in some cases, it is observed that some of non-state paramilitaries do provide a certain degree of law enforcement, whether they are fully endorsed by local populations or not. Some non-state paramilitaries such as Hamas and Huzbollah also provide a much wider range of services other than security, including socioeconomic services in communities. Others play a role as a cultural symbol for youth groups, as in the case of Arkan's Tigers in the Balkans.

In addition to these political and security perspectives, paramilitaries in unstable societies such as ones in fragile states have strong socio-economic characteristics. In some cases, paramilitaries fill in a governance gap left by malfunctioning government. In the Middle East, Hamas and other paramilitaries cover socio-economic roles by providing community services such as health and education. Some paramilitaries such as FARC in Colombia provide job opportunities for poor communities, particularly in rural areas, by recruiting their

members as porters and soldiers. Also, as seen in the case of Serbia, paramilitaries headed by Arkan offered some sort of social roles for unemployed young male.

8.2.3 Paramilitaries in political transition

Unlike the other security sector apparatus such as the military, police and judiciary, the role and function of paramilitaries are less clearly defined. Paramilitaries' function and role are often revisited, redefined and sometimes blurred during a political transition. There are two major paths of political transition in which paramilitaries face substantive transformation, i.e., a) transition from war-torn, fragile state to a stable state (reconstruction) and b) transition from authoritarianism to democracy (democratisation).

Reconstruction takes place after violent conflict. In a reconstruction process, efforts are often made to transform a war-torn, fragile state to a more stable state. Reconstruction efforts often aim at building a liberal democratic state, especially in post-conflict societies for which the international community, namely of the Euro Atlantic countries, provides reconstruction assistance. This is because their assistance tends to aim at transforming into a liberal democracy, as the international assistance is often provided in accordance with liberal democratic values such as the rule of law, independent judiciary and protection of human rights.

The second type of transition is democratisation. Post-authoritarian democratisation takes in various contexts. In the 1990, for instance, South Africa underwent a democratisation process in which their transformed from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy by ending apartheid. The paramilitary forces, along with the police, experienced substantive reform and transformed from a state apparatus serving the regime to an institution serving for the people. Efforts for democratisation took place in Latin America (since the 1980s) and post-Communist Europe (since the 1990), too.[189] Unlike South Africa, however,

[189] According to Linz and Stepa, South American countries have reached a certain level of consolidated democracy (p.221), many of the post-Communist countries remained non-democratic (p.436) (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

to what extent their paramilitaries have become aligned with liberal democratic standards is yet to be examined.

As the previous sections in this chapter show, both in conflict-affected and authoritarian societies, paramilitaries are often mobilised to engage in function, such as serving specific political and/or ethnic groups and/or political elites (e,g, the Chilean Anti-Communist Action (AChA) in Chile in the 1940s, Tiger in the Balkans, oppressing dissident populations (e.g. Internal Troops in the former Soviet Union). Both in the transitional phases from authoritarianism to democracy (democratisation) or from war to peace (reconstruction) paramilitaries face the need to transform themselves.

Needless to say, the two transition paths, reconstruction and democratisation, may happen at the same time as in the cases of Cambodia (post-Khmer Rouge), the DRC (post-Mobutu), Georgia (post-independence) and former Yugoslavia (post-conflict). However, this does not mean that reconstruction automatically leads to democratisation. Unless normative democratisation efforts are substantial, reconstruction efforts can merely mean stabilisation of post-conflict societies. Reconstruction may lead to (re-)building an authoritarian regime rather than a liberal democracy.

As this section shows, paramilitaries vary among themselves in terms of their statutory status, equipment and composition, as well as function and role. In a transitional society, either in the process of reconstruction or democratisation or both, understanding specific characteristics of paramilitaries is crucial to examine whether and how the transition leads to a liberal democracy or re-emergence of an authoritarian state or not. In other words, paramilitary change is closely interlinked with political processes in a transitional society. In order to examine the inter-link between the political processes and paramilitary change, the next section takes a close look at post-independence Georgia which underwent both reconstruction and democratisation processes.

8.2.4 Patterns of paramilitary change in transitional societies

When a SSR process begins in transitional societies undergoing either reconstruction and/or democratisation, paramilitaries take varying courses of change. There are four main patterns of paramilitary changes.

Disbandment: one scenario is that paramilitaries are disarmed and demobilised. This scenario takes place in both post-conflict and non-conflict-affected environments. Since the beginning of the 1990s so-called disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes have been implemented and dismantled armed forces in post-conflict societies such as Angola, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia and Nicaragua. The Soviet Internal Troops is another type of dismantlement in a non-post-conflict setting, where the political change (the dissolution of the Soviet Union) led to the dismantling of the paramilitary forces, rather than assisted by the international community as in the case of the South African and Latin American countries.

Reintegration into (new) security forces: in other cases, paramilitaries are sometimes integrated into (new) national armed forces, usually, the police and the military. Paramilitaries restore their political influence, by obtaining a political status. Whether the paramilitary leadership share power in a public office is one of the most crucial issues in peace-building negotiation.

Transformation into a political party: when paramilitaries are re-inserted into the new armed forces and the demilitarised paramilitary force gains a political party status, the leadership of the paramilitary force often become politicians or high ranked governmental officers. In Serbia, a former commander of the powerful paramilitary unit ‘White Eagle’, Seselj, ran for a presidential election in 2002, andreceived 36.6 per cent of the votes. In Iraq, the paramilitary head in Meysan now holds a seat in the governmental council and his militia have become local police officers (Kaldor, 1999, p. 3).

Transformation into democratically controlled armed forces: in societies emerging from violent conflict or authoritarian regimes, paramilitaries may take further reform efforts to establish civilian control and to demilitarise non-military security apparatus (including the police and the intelligence). This path of transformation requires the most significant normative change.

8.3 Paramilitary change in Georgia between 1985 and 2008

Having emerged from a violent conflict and an authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union, Georgia between 1992 and 2008 has characteristic features of a fragile state and a post-authoritarian state. Paramilitary change in Georgia during this period thus took place in the reconstruction and democratisation processes. It was in this context that SSR in Georgia took place. As discussed in the previous chapters in Part II (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7), SSR assistance in Georgia concentrated on a selective list of security sector spheres such as the defence and judiciary. As examined in chapters 5 and 7, the Euro-Atlantic allies as the major assistance providers provided their assistance either along with their geopolitical strategy (the USA) or in accordance with their liberal democratic values (the EU). As for thematic areas, the majority of the assistance was thus provided in the areas of border control and rule of law. This section focuses on the area of SSR what had received least external SSR assistance, i.e., paramilitaries, by closely examining the various types of paramilitaries and a number of change paths that those paramilitaries take in post-conflict Georgia between 1992 and 2008.

8.3.1 Types of paramilitaries

Between its independence in 1991 and the return of Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, as the head of the new state in 1992, Georgia experienced a complex of violent conflicts, as discussed in chapter 3. In post-conflict Georgia, a number of varying types of paramilitary forces existed in each of the three paramilitary types: non-state, state-, quasi-state and state paramilitaries.

While the paramilitary forces varied in their legal status: they had a number of common features. First, their weaponry consisted of light infantry equipped with small arms and light weapons, as other countries' paramilitaries. (Feinberg, 1999) Second, except in the case of a few state paramilitary forces, few paramilitary forces and their leaders had received professional training. Most of the troops

were non-professional personnel and they were often volunteer civilians and/or conscripts (Darchiashvili, 1997c). This tendency was particularly prominent among the paramilitary forces in the early days in post-independence Georgia. The third common features of the Georgian paramilitaries lies in their mobilisation style which is based on personal royalty towards paramilitary leaders. In the early post-independence period, paramilitary forces such as the Zviadists and the Mkhedrioni gathered under prominent political and social figures. Those features of paramilitaries in post-conflict Georgia, except its weaponry, make a contrast to the paramilitaries in most of Western states. In other word, there was no or weak civilian control governing those paramilitary forces established. Another specific characteristic of the paramilitaries in post-conflict Georgia as compared to those in Western states is that some of the state paramilitaries remained the Soviet style. This was particularly the case with the Internal Troops and the MSS troops. In addition, they had a paramilitary force, the Rescue Corps, consists of former Mkhedrioni members, which was Georgia-specific with no equivalent in Western states. It was in this context that Georgian began its SSR process and receiving external assistance to SSR.

8.3.1.1 Non-state paramilitaries: The White Legion and the Forest Brothers

There were a handful of non-state paramilitaries in Georgia in 1992. The major Georgian paramilitary groups under this category include the White Legion and the Forest Brothers. Both the White Legion and the Forest Brothers consisted of volunteers from the Georgian IDP population from the Mingrelia region. Many of the volunteers were the Zviadists, supporters of the former President Gamsahurdia. The commander of the Forest Brothers was previously a member of the Mkhedrioni (Feinberg, 1999). According to Abkhaz Security Ministry, the White Legion also absorbed former employees of the Sukhumi, Gali, and Gulripsh District Militias.

There is no official number for the size of the manpower of those paramilitary forces. The White Legion was said to have a contingent of some 3,000 ethnic Georgian former members of the Abkhaz police forces and Abkhaz militia forces.

The then Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze claimed that the Georgian armed forces numbered 49,000 (Fuller, 1997) but independent observers considered the figure inflated (Fuller, 1997a). Their level of training and combat capacities seemingly exceeded the level of mere amateur. It is reported that the White Legion was a "well-organized and highly trained group of several hundred Georgian militants committed to restoring Abkhazia to Georgian control" (Fuller, 1997b).

The White Legion and the Forest Brothers could be termed as 'state-parallel' paramilitary forces, according to the definition by Aliyev. Both the White Legion and the Forest Brothers had alleged ties with Tbilisi and ethnic Georgian Abkhaz parliament-in-exile.[190] According to one report, the White Legion and the Forest Brothers did "subordinate to the so-called Abkhaz parliament in exile – the ethnic Georgian deputies to the Abkhaz parliament" (Fuller, 1997b) and both the groups did "advocate a new Georgia's hegemony over Abkhazia by force" (Fuller, 1997b). Babenkov claimed that the While Legion had links to unspecified Georgian "power structure" (Fuller, 1997b). Abkhaz spokesmen, too, repeatedly claimed that the White Legion was subordinated either to Georgian intelligence, or, according to Interior Minister Alika Kchach, to Nadareishvili, who has voiced is approval of the terrorist activities of Georgian militants in Abkhazia" (Fuller, 1997b).

Both the White Legion and the Forest Brothers were active in hostilities against Abkhaz armed forces. In July 1992, the Georgian paramilitary forces "moved into Abkhazia and stormed the capital city of Sukhumi, forcing the local Abkhazian government to flee to the neighbouring town of Gudauta. Fighting broke out in earnest between Georgian and Abkhazian units in August 1992" (Finch, 1996).

[190] It was not only ethnic Georgian paramilitaries but a number of armed groups and individuals with various backgrounds fought on the side of Abkhazia. Finch reports that "a host of various representatives from Russia aided the Abkhazians in their fights against Georgian nationalists. There were units of the Russian Army, quartered in Abkhazia, providing equipment and expertise to the Abkhazians. It is not clear whether they were acting independently or following orders from Moscow. Russian veterans living in Abkhazia also provided their services. Members of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC), which is a recently formed organization representing a member of different ethnic groups living in the Caucasus area, volunteered their fighting expertise. Russian Cossacks and mercenaries also aided the Abkhazians" (Finch, 1996).

8.3.1.2 Quasi-state paramilitaries: The National Guard, the Mkhedrioni and the Adjara paramilitary forces

Georgia had a number of quasi-state paramilitaries during the transitional period between the late 1980s and 2008. During the period, a full-fledged functional state apparatus was yet to emerge. Quasi-state actors prevailed and filled in power and organisational vacuum. In the early 1990, Georgia went through a transition from a Soviet republic to an independent state as discussed in chapter 3. This political transition provided Georgia a vacuum in power and governance structure, including in the security sector. In the absence of national security institutions of its own, a few armed forces emerged as influential armed forces and groups under influential social and political figures. The National Guard led by Kitovani, and Ioseliani's Mkhedrioni, and Abashidze and his paramilitaries in Adjara are the prominent examples of the quasi-state paramilitary forces.

Those are a mixed group of quasi-state paramilitaries with different degrees of legality. Among the three quasi-state paramilitaries, the National Guard achieved the highest degree of legality as they were first established through a legal procedure. The National Guard was established on 20 December 1990 by the Georgian Supreme Soviet as Internal Troops of Georgia. ("Reserve Force/National Guard," 2017) Apart from the legal procedure, the National Guard was far from being a professional army. The size of the National Guard was as large as 15,000 at its peak according to one of the founders of the National Guard (Feinberg, 1999). They were mostly volunteers loyal to Kitovani.[191] Neither the commander nor most of the paramilitary forces had little professional military training.

Even after they became affiliated to the MoD, the National Guards remained under the control of its commander, Kitovani. The National Guard's members remained under the control of Kitovani. In early 1991, OMON[192] was created by the then President Gamsakhurdia for cutting the influence of Kitovani over the armed forces. The National Guard was ordered to become a subunit of OMON,

[191] Kitovani's followers referred Kitovani as '*batia*' or 'little father' (Jones, 2015, p. 68).
[192] Or, the Special Service Militia Detachment, according to Stephen Jones' translation (Jones, 2015, p. 68).

but Kitovani refused to follow the order.

Another prominent quasi-state paramilitary, the Mkhedrioni, has an even more controversial background. Gaining influence in the political scene and criminal activities, the Mkhedrioni became one of the two only effective armed groups, along with the National Guard in the early 1990. The Mkhedrioni emerged as an armed group of members with criminal backgrounds, with approximately 5,000 members. As the political turmoil escalated in December 1991, many of the Mkhedrioni members were released from prisons and mobilised to fight in the civil war in Georgia against the Gamsakhurdia side, as well as in Abkhazia. On the ground, the Mkhedrioni members demanded `tax` from the local population for the war effort. They also financed themselves through the control over the distribution of lucrative commodities. In local administrations, the Mkhedrioni penetrated into the police force, and many members of the group reportedly became police officers afterwards.

Despite the controversial background and activities by associated members, the heads of the Mkhedrioni, Ioseliani, led the Military Council along with Kitovani, another head of the paramilitary forces, the National Guards. Gamsakhurdia ordered the Mkhedrioni was ordered to transform to the Rescue Corps, state paramilitary forces which had no institutional precedent in the Soviet Union or the West (Belkin and Schofer, 2005). Ioseliani and his followers did not follow the order and they remained outside state control.

All three quasi-state paramilitaries remained outside the state control. For instance, the National Guard, along with the Mkhedrioni, engaged in the fight against Gamsakhurdia and his armed supporters, Zviadists, in Tbilisi, the capital city, and ousted the first President. The National Guard and the Mkhedrioni also engaged in the violent clashes in Sukhumi in 1992, although they had not received such orders from Tbilisi (Coppieters et al., 2000, p. 24).

Shevardnadze’s stance towards the territorial dispute in Abkhazia was moderate, while Kitovani and other political oppositions had a stronger orientation towards the restoration of Georgian hegemony. The National Guard marched into Abkhazia in August 1992. On 14 August 1992, Georgian troops under the

command of the then Defence Minister Kitovani marched into the Akbhazia capital, Sukhumi, and opened fire on the parliament building. That action triggered a 13-month war between the central Georgian government and the secessionist Abkhaz leadership, which culminated in Tbilisi's loss of jurisdiction over Abkhazia and the exodus of some 250,000 ethnic Georgians who lived there." This militant approach of Kitovani to the territorial disputes in Abkhazia hampered Shevardnadze's more modest approach, and contributed to further deteriorating the political relationship between Kitovani and Shevardnadze. Similarly, Abashidze's paramilitary group remained royal to Abashidze himself rather than Tbilisi until they were ordered to dissolve by the President Saakashvili after the 2003 Rose Revolution.

8.3.1.3 State paramilitaries: armed forces under the 'power ministries'

Besides the quasi-state and non-state paramilitaries, Georgia quickly developed several paramilitaries that belonged to the state. Those state paramilitaries affiliate to a number of state organs. In particular, all the three so-called 'power ministries', i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Defence and State Security, had their own paramilitary forces.

Like the continental European countries such as France and Italy, some paramilitary forces were affiliated to the MIA. The Internal Troops were formed on 12 September 1991, i.e., five months after Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union. Affiliated to the MIA, Internal Troops were mandated to assist local police and security services in maintaining law and order, fighting terrorism, and organized crimes, defending the most important state objects and protecting special cargo transportation, and supporting the military in wartime (Feinberg, 1999). According to one report, "Internal Troops were staffed through conscription but were also partially contract-based" (Belkin, 2005), as similar to the Soviet practice. In September 2004, the Internal Troops was then transformed into the 4th Infantry Brigade of the MoD ("Internal Troops abolished, units merged with the Defense Ministry," 2004).

The Ministry of National Security, later reorganised into the MSS and the State

Intelligence Department, also possessed its own paramilitary forces. This feature was also found in the other former Socialist and Soviet republic countries such as Ukraine. The armed unit of the Ministry of National Security was mandated for counter-surveillance and anti-terrorism. Apart from the mission, information about the armed unit under the Ministry of National Security is not available. Similarly, it is unknown whether the State Intelligence Department had its own armed forces.[193]

In addition to the paramilitaries under the so-called power ministries, i.e., the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and State Security, there had been a number of state paramilitaries in Georgia. The Office of the President also had its own paramilitary unit: Special Service of State Protection. Its mandate includes pprotecting all strategic state objects such as President's office, parliament and the oil industry's infrastructure. There are approximately 6,000 personnel in the Service.

The State Department of State Border Defence (SDBD) is another state organ with paramilitary forces, although details as to the size of manpower are not available. Its mandates include apprehending smugglers, drug traffickers, poaches, and illegal immigrants.

Table 7 List of paramilitaries in Georgia between 1985 and 2008

	Professional personnel	Influential leadership figure	Political wing	Ministerial affiliation			Function		
				Defence	Internal Affairs	Other	Military	Police	Other
Non-state paramilitary									
The White Legion	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
The Forest Brothers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
The Zviadists	—	X	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Quasi-state paramilitary									
The National Guard	—	X	—	—	—	—	—	—	X
The Mkhedrioni	—	X	X	—	—	—	—	—	X
The Adjara	—	X	—	—	—	—	X	X	X

[193] The Department was mandated for intelligence collection outside of Georgia.

paramilitary forces									
State paramilitary									
The Internal Troops (renamed the 4th Infantry Brigade)	X	—	—	X (since 2004)	X (1991-2004)	—	—	X	X
The special purpose unit (a.k.a. 'Gulua')	X	—	—	—	X (since 2004)	X (MSS until 2004)	—	—	X
The Special Service of State Protection	X	—	—	—	—	X	—	—	X
The State Department of State Border Defence (SDBD, renamed the Border Police in 2006)	X	—	—	—	X	X	X	X	X

8.3.2 Paramilitary change, not paramilitary reform

External assistance to SSR in Georgia mainly focused on the military, police and justice institutions. In the vacuum of external assistance, the trajectory of the non-state and quasi-state paramilitary change charted different paths, including dissolution/disbandment, integration into state institutions, and transformation into a civilian political actor. If they became state institutions, some of the paramilitaries experienced changes in ministerial affiliations.

8.3.2.1 Non-state paramilitaries

Non-state paramilitaries such as the Zviadists, the White Legion and the Forest Brothers were either ordered to disband or remained outside any reform efforts. There was no official DDR with a systematic assistance programme or timeframe took place in Georgia. Since the ousting of Gamsakhurdia and the defeat in Abkhazia, those armed men (and women) went back to the civilian life voluntarily, mostly thought their own informal network, such as community and family network

and so forth.[194] Georgia's defeat in Sukhumi in 1993 further accelerated the voluntary disbandment of individual combatants.

8.3.2.2 Quasi-state paramilitaries

The quasi-state paramilitaries were once the most influential actors in early post-independence Georgia, not only as security sector actors but also political actors. They eventually ceased to be influential or functional after following a series of organisational reshuffles under the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments.

The transformation of the quasi-state paramilitary forces such as the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni reflects the socio-political dynamics as well as the power struggle among Georgian political elites in the early 1990. As chapters 3 and 4 reveals, the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni filled in the vacuum left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its state apparatus. While being as the most influential security sector actors, those two paramilitary groups, along their leaders, existed as *de facto* state institutions.

However, neither of them underwent a legitimate process of formalizing their status as a state apparatus. The National Guard was originally a group of volunteers loyal to Kitovani. The National Guard had gradually grown to be a quasi-state actor as Georgia underwent the transition from the Soviet republic to an independent state. Their influence peaked when Kitovani and Ioseliani, the Mkhedrioni leader, brought Shevardnadze back from Moscow to Tbilisi and ousted the President Gamsakhurdia.

Back in the early 1990, the National Guard was initially established with an aim to become a national army. However, the National Guard had never become full-fledged national military forces. Since the arrival of Shevardnadze as the head of the state, the National Guard and its leader, Kitovani, had become side-lined. The influence of Kitovani was curtailed by a number of the organisational transfer of

[194] According to an International Centre of Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN) programme officer, most of the combatants volunteered to the fight. The demography of them is namely the middle-aged men. The gap between demand and supply on the trauma of the violent conflicts was clearly expressed in an international conference for war veterans in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 2000, too. Author's interviews, November 2000, Tbilisi.

the National Guard from the MoD, to the MIA then back to the MoD again, this time with a much-limited mandates. As the next section shows, the reform of the National Guard was not straightforward. By the end of the 1990, the National Guard had become an insignificant security sector figure in Georgia.

Another quasi-state paramilitary force, the Mkhedrioni, took a different change trajectory. As in the case of the National Guard, the Mkhedrioni started as a non-state paramilitary group consisting of individuals loyal to its leader, Ioseliani, and eventually became a government organ although for a brief period of time. Like the National Guard' leader, Kitovani, its leader, Ioseliani was also an influential political figure in the new regime after the outcast of the former President Gamsakhurdia. Upon the peak of their political influence, the Mkhedrioni obtained the governmental status as Rescue Corps in 1993. In 1994, the Mkhedrioni declared a voluntary disarmament, but in reality the process is not clear and they allegedly restored armaments. Ioseliani established a political organisation based on the Mkhedrioni. But after the attempted assassination of the President Shevardnadze in 1995, several members of the Mkhedrioni including Ioseliani were arrested. The armed group was disbanded by the government. Ioseliani was, however, later given amnesty.

Another important quasi-state paramilitary group is the paramilitary forces in Adjara. Like the previous two paramilitary groups, the Adjara paramilitary forces consisted of individuals loyal to Abashidze. The Adjara remained immune to any reform efforts by Tbilisi under the Shevardnadze period. They remained a personal protection force for Abashidze until a newly elected president Saakashvili ordered to disband. This is thus another example of a paramilitary force which started as a non-state actor, grew to become a quasi-state actor led by prominent political elite, then disbanded due to a political rivalry between its leader and the head of the state.

As discussed in chapter 3, quasi-state paramilitary change was largely driven by a domestic power struggle. The rivalry among the quasi-state paramilitary leaders sometimes took the form of an armed clash by involving their paramilitary forces. The power dynamics among the paramilitary leaders led to the creation of a paramilitary, OMON, which was created by Gamsakhurdia to counter the National

Guard and the Mkhedrioni. The quasi-state paramilitaries dominated Georgian politics and played a central role in replacing Gamsakhurdia with Shevardnadze who returned from Moscow to Tbilisi in March 1992. In the early times of the Shevardnadze regime, the paramilitary leaders held key governmental positions. For instance, from April 1992 until May 1993, Kitovani headed the MoD.

As Shevardnadze consolidated power, the quasi-paramilitaries and their leaders became targeted for disbandment and/or institutional transfer. During 1993 the co-operation between Shevardnadze and Kitovabi dissolved, and the latter was dismissed as the Minister of Defence. As chapter 4 shows, Shevardnadze commenced a military building process to professionalise the armed forces and reduce the individual influence of the leaders. The National Guard, which was renamed as the Rapid Reaction Forces at the time, was abolished as a separate unit. However, the disbandment of unaffiliated armed forces was not a smooth process. In January 1995, Kitovani departed with his 1,000-armed supporters and invaded Abkhazia. After clashes with forces of the Georgian MSS, he was arrested, and his men were disarmed, which put an end to the power struggle between the quasi-paramilitary faction and Shevardnadze.

8.3.2.3 State paramilitaries

In addition to the National Guards, quasi-state-turned-state paramilitary, Georgia had had a number of state paramilitary forces. Reflecting its legacy as a former Soviet Union republic, the paramilitary forces affiliated to the former Soviet power ministries, i.e., Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and State Security. Furthermore, a handful of other state paramilitary forces such as State Department of Border Defence, Border Guard and Presidential Guards, were created and/or reformed under the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili administrations in the SSR process.

Issues that need to be tacked with in the SSR in Georgia were rather straight forward. As the ISAB members pointed out at the early stage of the SSR planning, the requirement for the security sector in Georgia was the adjustment actual security needs and the demilitarisation of non-defence actors, namely, the

paramilitary forces. As early as 2002, the ISAB set out and shared with the Georgian National Security Council a list of issues that need to be tacked by SSR efforts, including on the issue of the demarcation among various paramilitary forces, clearly.[195] The outcomes of the change of the state paramilitaries, however, were far from what the international advisory group envisaged.

Table 8 Change trajectories of paramilitaries in Georgia between 1992 and 2008

Statutory type of paramilitary	Paramilitary forces	Type of change
Non-state	White Legion	Disbandment (voluntary)
	Forest Brothers	Disbandment (voluntary)
	Zviadists	Disbandment (voluntary)
Quasi-state	Adjara paramilitaries	Disbandment (ordered)
	Mkhedrioni	Disbandment (ordered)/transformed to a political party
	National Guards	Transformed to a state organ
State	National Guards	Ministerial affiliation change (MoD→MIA→MoD)
	Internal Troops	Ministerial affiliation change (MIA→MoD)
	Special Purpose Unit ('Gulua')	Ministerial affiliation change (MSS→ MIA)
	The State Department of Border Defence force	Ministerial affiliation change (MSS→MIA: renamed 'The Border Police' in 2004, mandated to function as a military force in 2006)

[195] Johnson (2005). "The requirements for the various sectors are fairly clear. In the military it requires a move from quantity to quality, a reduction of numbers and an enhancement of capability to provide a more flexible military which is interoperable with NATO and other western forces. In the Interior Ministry it means moving from Interior Troops in the military model to a gendarmerie force which is essentially an enhanced police component. In order security it means changing the military Border Guards to a largely civilianised security agency for border security and control. In the Security Ministry it means moving to a plain-cloth agency basis, with no place in the prosecuting procedures. The thread which runs through all these requirements is that of demilitarisation, for security is not just about tanks in the modern era. It also means an acceptance of some form of democratic oversight and an understanding of how to apply that without it turning into an unreasonable and potentially dangerous form of political control" (Johnson, 2005, pp. 53–54).

8.3.3 Driving factors for the paramilitary change

As discussed above, despite the international advisory group's clear recommendations, i.e., setting up security concepts, demilitarisation, establishing civilian oversight, the SSR efforts in Georgia did not follow the recommendations. Rather, in post-independent Georgia, the trajectories of the paramilitary change were shaped by a range of political factors rather than SSR priorities.

8.3.3.1 Political dynamics among key actors: power struggle between security sector actors

The personalised and politicised nature of the paramilitary forces was the most significant driving factor for the change of those forces. As early as in the times of President Gamsakhurdia, Georgia saw the creation of OMON by Gamsakhurdia in trying to rival the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni. OMON soon faded away along with Gamsakhurdia himself in the subsequent political chaos. However, the change of Georgia's paramilitary forces, especially of quasi-state nature, remained subject to political dynamics.

The prime example is the disbandment of the Mkhedrioni. As seen above, the Mkhedrioni was one of the two most prominent paramilitary forces in the early 1990 in Georgia. Its leader, Ioseliani brought Shevardnadadze back to Georgia and supported replacing Gamsakhurdia. Furthermore, the Mkhedrioni also rivalled against other powerful figures in society, especially those associated with the so-called 'power ministries'. In the power struggle, some of his Mkhedrioni members allegedly got involved in politically motivated assassinations targeting high-ranking officials of the 'power ministries' along with other political figures including President Shevardnadze, while they were also often targeted by their political rivals.[196] In addition to Mkhedrioni members, the involvement of the MSS

[196] Gocha Tediashvili, a member of the Mkhedrioni, told the Georgian Supreme Court in 1997 that he was involved in the murders of three prominent Georgian political figures. Tediashvili confessed to having taken part in the 1994 killings of Deputy Interior Minister Giorgi Gulua, Shevardnadze Fund President Soliko Khabeishvili, and Georgian National Democratic Party leader Gia Chanturia ("Mkhedrioni member confesses to involvement in political assassinations," 1997)..

was also suspected in the assassination attempts against Shevardnadze.[197]

Security institution officials were often targeted by violence in the mid-1990s. For instance, a Deputy Interior Minister Giorgi Gulua was murdered along with his driver and another Interior Ministry official by machinegun fire in Tbilisi. This was among several assassinations attempts against the 'power ministries' officials around this period of time (Fuller, 1994a). Another high-ranking 'power ministries' official assassinated around this period is the deputy defense minister Nikolai Kekelidze who was killed when a bomb exploded in his apartment (Fuller, 1994b).

It was not only the Mkhedrioni members but also some 'power ministries' officials who became involved in murder during this period. The then State Security Minister Shota Kviraya allegedly killed Mkhedrionis and link to Russia ("Georgian prosecutor-general to access charges against security minister," 1997). Those assassinations of the 'power-ministries' officials and the Mkhedrioni members show how heavily the security sector officials and the paramilitary group were involved in violent grievance.

8.3.3.2 Territorial disputes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara

The low-intensity, violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had played a significant role in the transformation of the Georgian paramilitaries, in particular, the quasi-state paramilitary forces such as the National Guard.

The unsettled political status of Abkhazia prevented an official DDR process from taking place. A cease-fire was signed on 27 July 1993. The cease-fire agreement provided for "disarmament by both sides, to be accompanied by a prompt withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia and the return of the legitimate government of the capital city of Sukhumi" (Finch, 1996). A tripartite commission consisting of Russia, Georgia and the Abkhazian authority to monitor a ceasefire and the removal of military armaments was established in July 1993.

[197] Prosecutor Dzhamlet Babilashvili told journalists in Tbilisi that the assassination attempt in August 1995 was "planned by former Georgian security service chief Igor Giorgadze and Mkhedrioni leader Dzhaba Ioseliani, who had worked with Russian intelligence agents to eiminate Shevardnadze and install Giorgadze as Georgia's leader" ("Georgian prosecutor-general to access charges against security minister," 1997).

Shevardnadze was said to lose support among the Georgian army (paramilitary) significantly due to the agreement as it was regarded as “humiliating and detrimental” to Georgian national interests (Finch, 1996).

The National Guard and its leader, Kitovani enjoyed an autonomy to an extent to draft a military doctrine. Citing “well-informed sources in Tbilisi”, Interfax reported on 4 October that the Georgian leadership intended to integrated the semi-autonomous National Guard into the country’s armed forces, apparently in response to the creation by opposition political figures, including former Defence Minister and National Guard leader Kitovani of the National Union for the Liberation of Abkhazia, which aims to restore Georgian hegemony over the breakaway region by military means. Kitovani was said to have circulated his draft of an “exclusively defensive” military doctrine for Georgia, which provides for the expansion of the army from 15,000 to 20,000 men. This draft and alternatives will be debated by the Georgian parliament” (Fuller, 1994c).

Thus, the quasi-state paramilitaries grew in response to popular and political support for them in the conflict in Abkhazia. Their political status started to decline when Georgia was defeated in Abkhazia in September 1993. The Abkhaz side forced out the Georgian armed forces along with the Georgian population out of Abkhazia. Since the defeat in Sukhumi, the National Guards and other quasi-state paramilitaries lost popular support as well as their combatants who returned to civilian life voluntarily (Darchiashvili, 1997c).

8.3.3.3 The ‘power ministries’ as a regime symbol under Shevardnadze

After Shevardnadze succeeded in curtailing political influence of the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni, the SSR process came to a halt, despite the NATO allies offered a set of assistance, including the group of SSR advisers, the ISAB. The ISAB recommendations were straight forward. The recommendations included defining the security concept; defining the responding architecture of the SSR such as defence, paramilitary, police and border control. The Shevardnadze government did not follow the ISAB recommendations (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 17). As chapter 5 shows, during the Shevardnadze times between 1992 and 2003,

few reform efforts took place apart from receiving the military assistance from NATO allies to the military. Consequently, the paramilitary forces were left without any reform efforts.

The reason behind the absent reform efforts can be attributed to the power relation between Shevardnadze and the 'power ministries' as well as the different ministries among the 'power ministries'. Having served as the head of the MIA in Soviet Georgia, Shevardnadze had had his power base in the MIA. Shevardnadze also had been influential over the over security sector organs, including the other 'power ministries' and the National Security Council (NSC). For instance, during the Shevardnadze period, the NSC was an incubator of senior management officials of the security sector institutions. Under its secretary, Nugzar Sajaia, the NSC produced a number of senior officials affiliated or close to the power ministries.[198] Having been one of the closest allies of Shevardnadze, Sajaia held the position between 1996 and 2002, until his death.[199] It is said that Sajaia himself exercised strong influence over the MIA, Kakha Targamadze, not to engage in open conflict with anti-government factions, including the anti-Shervardnadze block, so-called "reformists" led by Zhvania, the then Speaker of Parliament, and Saakashvili, the then Minister of Justice (Chiaberashvili and Tevradze, 2005, pp. 200–201). After the death of Sajaia, Shevardnadze appointed Sajaia's protégés to heads of the key "power ministries", i.e., the Ministries of State Security and Internal Affairs.[200]

8.3.3.4 Reform of the 'power ministries' as a political demonstration under Saakashvili

In contrast, the Saakashvili government placed its priority in reforming the 'power ministries'. As chapter 6 details, Saakashvili and his political block, the 'reformists', emerged as a counter movement against the old regime of Shevardnadze. While Shevardnadze remained the most prominent political figure, a new leadership

[198] For instance, the Ministers of State Security and Internal Affairs and the Head of the Service of Government Protection.
[199] Sajaia died in February 2002. The cause of the death was reported to be a suicide ("Death of the Georgian National Security Council secretary still a mystery," 2002).
[200] Valerie Khaburdzania as the Minister of State Security and Koba Narchemashvili as the Minister of Internal Affairs ("Death of the Georgian National Security Council secretary still a mystery," 2002).

emerged from the reform-minded wing of the CUG, including Zhvania and Saakashvili.[201] However, as the political situation in Georgia stagnated, they formed their own political factions. Among them, Saakashvili took a more radical stance against the President than Zhvania, accusing the Shevardnadze government of corruption and "power ministries" of being the stronghold of corruption.

When Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze as the President, his priority was to combat corruption in the security apparatus, namely the 'power ministries'. The subsequent reform efforts, detailed in chapter 6, were driven by the political motivation. Even then, external SSR advisers had stressed the need for the reform of the security sector based on a clearly defined political and security framework. Sir Garry Johnson, one of the ISAB advisers, for instance, pointed out that the importance of "clarifying at the onset the political and security framework within which reform is to take place" (Johnson, 2005, p. 55). This was based on lessons learnt from the SSR experience in Georgia between 1993 and 2003, during the Shevardnadze period. The very task of clarifying the political and security framework itself was, however, the biggest challenge and dilemma for the SSR in Georgia under Saakashvili, too. The political symbol of the reform of the 'power ministries' had a more priority than reforming them based on a security framework.

As discussed above, the case of Georgia illustrates some characteristics and challenges that a country in the reconstruction and democratisation processes may face in the course of paramilitary change. The lack of systematic DDR efforts left negative consequences such as the insertion of former adversaries to the state security institutions and the persisting proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The lack of substantive normative reform efforts in the state paramilitaries left controversial ambiguities over their mandates, demarcation of roles and definition of key conditions for paramilitary deployment such as 'public orders' and 'emergency'. In other words, the reform of paramilitaries in Georgia did not take place in accordance with liberal democratic standards as proposed

[201] Both Zhvania and Saakashvili had been members of the CUG, the political party led by Shevardnadze. Both of them were regarded as future leadership of the Georgian politics to replace Shevardnadze in the future.

by external advisers such as the ISAB. The Saakashvili government's response to the anti-government demonstrations in 2007 illustrates this point. The paramilitaries were dispatched to violently supressed peaceful anti-government demonstrators, which had never been done under the Shevardnadze rimes. For this action, the Saakashvili government was criticised to be of authoritarian by international and domestic critiques. The incident of the 2007 anti-government demonstration shows that the paramilitary change under Saakashvili could reverse the democratisation process.

8.3.4 Characteristics of the politically-driven paramilitary change

As discussed in the previous section, in the absence of substantial international assistance and domestic political dynamics as main driving factors for change, the paramilitary sphere did not experience reform but change. The Georgian paramilitaries did not undergo substantial SSR efforts. Instead, they experienced institutional change, i.e., disbandment, transformation to a political party, or ministerial affiliation change. More specifically, internationally-supported establishment of civil control and the demilitarization of non-military paramilitary forces, did not take place in Georgia. Moreover, the area of paramilitaries fell into a policy gap among external SSR assistance providers. Those characteristics of paramilitary change in Georgia left unsolved security and political issues in its society.

8.3.4.1 The absence of internationally-supported official DDR initiative

What is noteworthy is that no systematic DDR efforts took place in post-conflict Georgia. Post-conflict societies which receive international assistance often undergo an official DDR process. However, in case of Georgia, no formal, organised DDR efforts besides the disbandment orders were implemented neither by the government or the international community despite of a large number of individuals who participated in the violent conflicts in the early 1990.

Individual combatants of the non-paramilitary forces, the Zviadists, the White Legion and the Forest Brothers, left the armed forces on their own. The number

of such former combatants, however, remains unknown. For instance, the non-state paramilitary group, the White Legion, consisted of volunteers. Its members were mostly former Soviet army officials. Even after their influence in society significantly weakened after the defeat in Sukhumi, they continued engaging in violent hostilities against Abkhazian counterparts. The While Legion engaged in armed attacks in Abkhazia during 1996. The White Legion was allegedly responsible for numerous attacks against Abkhaz police forces and the Russian Peacekeepers, too. The Forest Brothers played a major part of the May 1998 violent clashes between Abkhaz police forces in the Gali region. Despite the influential and significant impacts of those non-state paramilitary forces, there was no attempt of systematically disarm, demobilize and reintegrate those paramilitary group members, either by the Georgian government nor international community.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, most of those former volunteered combatants affiliated to non-state paramilitaries went back to the civilian life. Some of them who fought under troops submissive to the MoD received governmental supply as war veterans received limited financial support from the government via the Ministry of Finance.[202] Psychosocial support was a strong yet unmet need among the ex-combatants. While the families of ex-combatants often claimed for financial support from the government and the international organisations, the ex-combatants themselves demanded rather mental support (which they termed 'spiritual support') from the society, having pointed out the alienated position of them from the rest of the populations.[203] Responding to those needs, some of the former members of the White Legion and the Forest Brothers organised veteran associations[204] and received support from local and international NGOs.[205] However, the majority of ex-combatants received little support in financial and/or psychological rehabilitation either from the government or the international community.

[202] Author's interviews, November 2000, Tbilisi.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Author's interviews, March 2005, Zugdidi. Women ex-combatants were not seen in those gathering, and one interviewer told that they were afraid of being discriminated in society.
[205] In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, International Alert, for instance, carried out a project to support ex-combatants of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Project activities included confidence building workshops with former combatants from the three countries. Women ex-combatants were not seen in those gathering, and one interviewer told that they were afraid of being discriminated in society.

As examined in the previous chapters, the overall SSR process was affected by domestic political factors. The absence of internationally-supported DDR efforts means that there were no international actors to monitor the movement of demobilised former paramilitary members. The 1995 Constitution restricting the quasi-state paramilitaries having become in effect, the official process of disbanding the National Guards and the Mkhedrioni became complete. However, some of the former members of the National Guards and the Mkhedrioni reportedly joined the newly established police and the military.[206] For instance, according to an interviewee, a large number of former Mkhedrioni members joined the police without any background check.[207] The informal nature of the demobilisation and reintegration process, in particular, the insertion of the former Mkhedrioni members, jeopardized the confidence in the security sector institutions. Moreover, the disbandment of some of the non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries were carried out in a way a political purge of anti-Shevardnadze groups rather than institutional reform. As for the armed groups such as the Zviadists[208] and the Mkhedrioni,[209] many of the members were arrested due to alleged criminal acts. Human rights NGOs claimed that they did not received fair investigations or trials, therefore that they were political prisoners. Other Mkhedrioni members who escaped the arrests declared voluntary disbandment in 1993, although it is believed that they restored arms (Feinberg, 1999).

Another negative remnant of the absence of formal DDR is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in society. In Georgia in the early 2000s, there was still guns remaining in circulation and caused serious security threats to local populations, especially in conflict-affected communities in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the 1990, the government, with the help of the international community, carried out weapons collection initiatives. Disarmament had been

[206] Author's interview, November 2000, Tbilisi.
[207] Author's interview, November 2000, Tbilisi.
[208] The supporters of the former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia who died in disputable circumstances in the end of 1993.
[209] According to Darchiashvili, during the political turmoil, armed men were acting according to their own desire or at the order of certain charismatic military leaders, and there was little organised framework in those armed forces. In some cases, individual soldiers or officers acted voluntarily and they could join and leave the unit whenever they wanted and join in the other. As for the National Guard, Darchiashvili points out that having low level of discipline the armed force was actually a militia although it was never regarded as such (Darchiashvili, 1997c).

carried out by the MIA throughout the country, except in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Between late 1995 and early 1996, 9,717 small arms and light weapons were collected (Demetriou, 2002). 60 per cent of them were collected from former Mkhedrioni members, 28 per cent were collected from National Guards members, and 12 per cent were voluntarily turned in by civilians (Demetriou, S., 2002). It was only 2005 when the Georgian government recognised the small arms issue as a problem and an internationally-supported program on the small arms control began.[210]

8.3.4.2 The absence of normative changes within paramilitary forces

The lack of substantive reform efforts are reflected in some controversial issues: a) the duplication of mandates among state paramilitaries; b) blurred demarcation between law enforcement and military domains; and c) ambiguous definition of 'public order' and 'emergency'.

Duplication of mandates among state paramilitaries

The lack of substantial reform efforts in state paramilitaries left mandates among state paramilitary forces, namely, the National Guards, Internal Troops and State Safeguard Service, duplicated and sometimes conflicting. For instance, the National Guard was subordinated to the MoD in 1994 as a mere department, not as a main armed force. Taking a model from the American national guards, new roles of the National Guards were examined. According to the National Guards Department of the MoD, the Guard's missions and functions in peacetime included: reserve training; training of "additional special forces" for the army; ceremonial functions; training and material and technical maintenance of peacekeeping troops; and participation in disaster relief operations. In wartime, the National Guard Department is responsible for local defensive operations and defence of vital state objects. Some of the mandates of the National Guards

[210] A London-based NGO, Saferworld, began a SALW-related project in 2005. Furthermore, in 2005, local community members reported that they replied on themselves for protection and security rather than on the police. Due to the lawlessness in the society in the beginning of the 1990s, small arms proliferation among civilians increased rapidly. Studies conducted by CIPDD in Kvemo Kartli in 2004 shows that people still retained interest in acquiring arms. In the CIPDD study, inhabitants of the region explained that the failure of local authorities to guarantee their security and the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of law enforcement bodies drove them to arm themselves.

overlapped with the other existing armed forces. For examples, disaster relief operations were mandated to Internal Troops, and the protection of vital state objects to State Safeguard Service. During the Shevardnadze period, no reform to address the duplicating mandates among various state paramilitaries took place.

By contrast with the Shevardnadze government, the Saakashvili government advanced to reform quasi-state and state paramilitaries. As discussed in chapter 6, the Saakashvili government disbanded the Adjara's paramilitary forces, transferred the Internal Troops to the MoD, and removed the paramilitary forces from the MSS and transferred to the MIA. By abolishing the MSS and transferring the more militant paramilitary forces to the MoD, the Saakashvili government managed to bring its paramilitary forces along with the Western standards. However, this controversial issue of the lack of clear demarcation in mandates between paramilitaries under the defence and law enforcement bodies persisted under the Saakashvili government.

The lack of a clear demarcation of mandates between the MIA and the MoD troops remained under the Saakashvili government. In a way, this issue of duplication of mandates among the state paramilitaries illustrates the specific security challenge that Georgia faced in the post-conflict and post-independence context, i.e., the definition of its security threats. In the early 2000s, Georgia's territorial integrity was challenged by the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the 2005 National Security Concept highlighted, border security was one of the top security priorities for Georgia. Emerging security challenges in the bordering regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia required military operations. Yet, for Georgia, those separatist regions were 'internal territories' and not external adversaries. Thus, the security challenges there needed to be tacked by law enforcement bodies.

Instead of having the defence forces take an overall control over the military operations, both the MIA paramilitaries were requested to take a leading role. The Strategic Defence Review assumed that the MIA to take a leading role in dealing with domestic threats such as terrorism, whilst the MoD leads defence planning. The Strategic Defence Review highlighted the need for inter-agency cooperation

between the MoD and the MIA, and their paramilitaries, rather than recommending to uniting paramilitary affiliations. In case of domestic threats, according to the Strategic Defence Review, the MoD would assist the MIA. The assumption for the inter-agency cooperation was that it is "impossible to separate defence and law enforcement in the contemporary security environment". (Darchiashvili, 2008, pp. 20–21) Defence Review, however, both Interior Troops, then affiliated to the MIA, and the MoD's troops were criticised for their uncoordinated actions during the armed clashes with the South Ossetian militia groups in summer 2004 ("Internal Troops abolished, units merged with the Defense Ministry," 2004).

Blurred law enforcement and military domains

The second controversial issue left behind the non-substantial paramilitary reform is the lack of clear demarcation between state paramilitaries in law enforcement and military domains. This was particularly the case for border control. The State Border Protection Department, created in 1996, was tasked to carry out both law enforcement and military services (Krunic and Siradze, 2005, p. 32).

The blurred demarcation between the two security domains also reflects the legacy of the Soviet Union in which Soviet Internal Troops were subordinated to MVD (*Ministrestvo vnutrennykh del*: Ministry of Internal Affairs), not to the defence ministry.[211] During the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili periods, the power-ministry paramilitaries including Internal Troops changed their ministerial affiliations frequently, especially between the Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs. The National Guard was, for instance, initially a quasi-state paramilitary. It then received an official status and became subordinated to the MoD. Later it was transferred to the MIA. Again, the National Guard became affiliated to the

[211] The MVD was responsible for uncovering and investigating certain categories of crimes. The mandates of the MVD had a wide range of activities, including apprehending criminals, supervising the internal passport system, maintaining public order, combating public intoxication, supervising parolees, managing prisons and labour camps, providing fire protection, and controlling traffic. Until 1968, the MVD was also in charge of special psychiatric hospitals. This means that the MVD was not only in charge of controlling ordinary crimes, but also policing political dissidents in society. In order to ensure the Kremlin's control over the anti-Soviet and anti-Moscow dissenters, the MVD was subject to dual subordination. Local internal affairs offices reported both to their local soviet and to their superior offices in the MVD hierarchy in Moscow (Finch, 1996).

MoD. The change of Internal Troops is another example illustrating the issue of blurred demarcation between law enforcement and military domains. Internal Troops changed its ministerial affiliation. Initially, it subordinated to the MIA, as the Internal Troops in the other Soviet republics like Russia. Initially, Internal Troops were to be reformed to become like the Turkish Jandarmes. ("Internal Troops abolished, units merged with the Defense Ministry," 2004) However, Georgian Internal Troops became increasingly engaged in low-intensity combats in the separatist regions under the Saakashvili administration. The MIA and its Internal Troops were actively engaging in the low intensity military operations under the then Minister of Internal Affairs and militant nationalist political figure, Okruashvili. Despite the recommendation for the inter-agency coordination by the Strategic It was at this time that Internal Troops was transferred to the MoD in September 2004 ("Internal Troops abolished, units merged with the Defense Ministry," 2004).

Ambiguous definition of 'public order' and 'emergency'

Another characteristic of the change of state paramilitaries in post-independent and post-conflict Georgia is the lack of clarity in the definition of key terms such as 'public order' and 'emergency'. In the late 1990 and the early 2000s, the reform of the paramilitaries was carried out with a focus on 'public order'. However, a lack of clear definition of key terms added further confusion to the formation of the paramilitaries. For example, the security forces under MoD, including the National Guards, were not only responsible for defending territorial integrity but also to ensure 'civil order' by defeating any types of armed forces that might seek to divide Georgia or to change, by force of arms, its political systems or form of government. In extreme situations, the paramilitaries under the MoD might be called on to assist civil authorities in maintaining order and perform police functions. Therefore, both the defence and law enforcement paramilitaries were mandated to restore 'public order' during a state of emergency was of both security and law enforcement forces.

The definition of public order was key to determine which state paramilitaries would be deployed. However, there was little consensus or discussion over what consists of 'public order' and how to demarcate labours among the Ministries of

Internal Affairs, State Security and Defence, which the majority of the paramilitaries belonged to. A working definition of emergency and roles of the paramilitaries in such a situation would depend upon whether the situation is interpreted as 'disorder' (for which the police will be dispatched) or 'violent conflicts' (which is the responsibility of the military), rather than by an objective security assessment. The definition of the term 'public order' remained rather ambiguous, except that the emphasis was put on the protection of the President and state property and left free for interpretation. More concrete definition had not yet been made public. In addition to the regular armed forces, Georgia had reservists. The Law On Reserve Military Service states that reserve forces can be used both during a state of war or a state of emergency, as well as in other special situations.[212] The Law, however, did not specify criteria for determining 'special situations', nor roles of the reserve under such situations (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 61). This devoid of clear and objective definitions had a risk to create confusion within the security sector among the 'power ministries', i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security, which had the power to mobilise Internal Troops in an emergency. The lack of clear definition blurred the distinction among the internal security forces of the military and law enforce, especially in the case of internal disorder.

The duplication of mandates between the paramilitaries of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence, as well as the ambiguous definitions of terms 'public order' remained unsolved throughout the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili times. Similarly, the lack of clear definition key terms including 'public order', 'disorder', 'violent conflict' and 'special situations' remained ambiguous, leaving room for various interpretations that would allow a dispatch of a number of state paramilitary forces (and reserves) simultaneously. This situation suggests that the paramilitary change process under the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments produced an outcome opposite to what the international military advisers recommended: the separation of the defence forces from non-defence forces.

[212] The Law On Reserve Military Service, Article 2, Paragraph 1, cited in Darchiashvili (2008), p.61 (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 61).

8.3.4.3 Uncoordinated external assistance to ‘non-military‘ security sector issues

Since the late 1990, Georgia had received ample external support for its SSR. As the chapters in Part II discuss, the majority of the external assistance came from the Euro-Atlantic allies and spent on the fields of defence. Paramilitaries were not the main target of the external assistance, except some cases of the border control paramilitaries that received US assistance in combat capacity development. This lack of external assistance efforts for paramilitaries contradicts with what a group of international advisers have recommended for.

In March 2005, the ISAB published a report on the progress in Georgia’s SSR.[213] The ISAB 2005 Report reviews the reform process in the security sector since 1999, when the ISAB submitted its initial report. This ISAB report claims that unlike in 1999, the government of Georgia has a clear strategic goal for the SSR, i.e. the full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and its institutions. While the 2005 ISAB report acknowledges irreversible progress in the modernisation of the security sector, in particular, the MoD and its armed forces, the report points out that the field of police and public order requires further reform. In particular, the ISAB report urged the MIA to clarify plans for conducting the public order function, which lacked clarity, as discussed in the section above.

As the 2005 ISAB report pointed out, Georgia had a need for reform in the area of non-military security sector, especially in public order issues. However, this was the area that fell in a vacuum of external assistance. NATO and the EU were the major assistance providers, but neither of them had programs focused on paramilitaries and public order issues. Johnson who headed the ISAB team at that time describes the chasm of the SSR assistance over the non-military part of the security sector, by pointing out an inactive role of the EU in this area:

> “On the military side NATO provides some of the cohesion required through the PfP and other programmes, but NATO only deals with the

[213] ISAB was established in 1998 at the request of the Georgian government. The Board consists of experts from UK, US, Germany and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

> defence component. The EU, although it puts a great deal of financial and technical assistance into Georgia, is less good at coordinating its efforts and curiously reluctant to mirror NATO's lead role in the non-military parts of the security sector. In the absence of effective official international coordination mechanisms much reliance is placed on the efforts of embassy staff in country and on quasi-international organisations such as ISAB. There are improvements in sight in this area" (Johnson, 2005, p. 54).

The EU had its own policy framework for assisting Georgia. In 1996 the EU and Georgia agreed on a PCA[214] which served as the basis for the 2006 EU-Georgia European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP), which was in force for a period of five years (Simons, 2012, p. 280). The primary objectives of the PCA included to:

- ensure enhancement of political dialogue between the parties through establishment of relevant structural framework;
- support Georgia's effort to strengthen democracy, economic development and adaptation of market economy;
- promote harmonised economic relations, trade and investments between the parities and stable economic economy; and
- provide legal, economic, social, financial, civil, scientific, technologic and cultural basis for cooperation.

The PCA required the harmonisation of the Georgian legislation with the EU law, the EU's *acquis communautaire*, the set of rules and regulations for all member states. Those rules and regulations include including in rules on public procurement, indirect taxation and nuclear regulations and transport. In other words, the PCA did not include components directly related to SSR apart from the judiciary, which was conducted within the context of the adaptation of the National Program of Harmonisation of Georgian Legislation with EU law.[215]

[214] The PCA entered into force in 1999.
[215] The preparation process for the adaptation of the National Program of Harmonisation of Georgian Legislation with EU law started in 2001-2003.

The policy gap over the non-military issues thus appeared. OSCE was the organisation that could potentially fill in the policy gap. OSCE was launched in December 1992 on a request from Georgia. The OSCE mission was political, aiming at reaching a peaceful political settlement for the South Ossetia conflict. The mission became further tasked with supporting to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, which was a responsibility of UNOMIG primarily. The mandates of the OSCE mission included SSR-related issues, such as helping Georgia to become a democratic state under the rule of law, promoting human rights and coordinating its work with the UN, the EU, and the Council of Europe (Stöber, 2010). The OSCE Mission shifted its mandates to SSR-related issues, in particular, non-military areas such as community policing and police reform. However, the OSCE Mission's activities were hampered and came to an end, due to the political strife between Russia and other OSCE members over Kosovo's status as mentioned in chapter 7.

The area of non-military security sector and, the controversial issue of 'public order' in particular, thus fell into a policy gap among SSR assistance providers and remained unattended.

8.4 Paramilitary change in transitional societies

Those characteristics of paramilitary change are not unique to Georgia but also found in other transitional societies. Most of paramilitary forces do not undergo substantial reform efforts. This section first turns to other transitional societies where those characteristics of paramilitary change are present and discusses emerging issues that require further research. The section then discusses the need for better understanding of paramilitaries by exploring recent paramilitary research and potential research agenda in this field.

8.4.1 Issues in paramilitary change in transitional societies

As discussed in the previous chapters on Georgia, the regime in power does not show a strong political will to reform paramilitaries unless it is necessary for regime security. If paramilitaries are targeted for reform, they hardly undergo

substantial reform but mere change. This was the case of the Georgian state paramilitaries, as presented in the earlier sections in this chapter. Similarly, in many other post-conflict societies, paramilitary forces often bypass reform and continue exercising its political and social influence. They often remain immune to substantial reform efforts in the absence of normative changes and solid external assistance to paramilitary reform. The consequence of the lack of paramilitary reform is often a negative one. Paramilitaries, i.e., either non-state, quasi-state, or state paramilitaries, continue committing atrocities.

8.4.1.1 The absence of normative changes within paramilitary forces: Colombia and Serbia

Whilst disarmament and demobilisation efforts have been paid, in many post-conflict countries, non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries remain armed and often continue committing atrocities. In Colombia, for instance, a human rights organisation Human Rights Watch reports that demobilised paramilitaries continued to have a regional city under their control and even increases their involvement in local politics (Human Rights Watch, 2005b, p. 5). The report claims that Bogota concentrates merely on disarming and giving benefits to the paramilitary groups and that it does not make an effort to dismantle an underlying structure and financial power of these groups, which penetrate into the whole Colombian society (Human Rights Watch, 2005b, p. 3).

A similar observation is made on the case of Serbia where paramilitary forces played significant role in wartime atrocities.[216] According to a report by International Crisis group, despite a cut of a formal tie between the governmental security sector and paramilitaries, the wartime time between them persisted in society (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 14). Despite the official peace process and its arrangements, fundamental power structures of paramilitary groups were hardly dismantled. Some scholars claim that this was a deliberate outlook,[217] as the governments in those conflict-affected societies needed the paramilitaries

[216] As in the case of Georgia, those paramilitary soldiers were mostly amateur without professional training. According to Woodward, "Paramilitary forces were full of teenagers faced with the choice either to leave the country or to join in a military organisation, but under little organised command or adult standard of behaviour" (Woodward, 1995, p. 249).
[217] "PMGs need the state to overlook then, or provide impunity" (Mazzei, 2009, p. 12).

closely associated with, yet unofficially, with themselves to continue engaging in violence against dissidents.

8.4.1.2 SSR without solid paramilitary reform: Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo

In Afghanistan, the international community divided the tasks among bilateral donors, each of which took a lead to implement each reform at the Bonn Conference in 2002. The USA became a leading donor for military reform, Germany for police reform, Italy for judicial reform, and Japan for DDR. The issue of paramilitaries fell into the chasm of the silo approach. Insecurity persists in the country because of insurgence by various paramilitary forces (i.e. Taliban, Al Quaeda and Hizb-I Islami). Other irregular armed figures including local militias and warlords prevent rule of law from being implemented in communities.

Paramilitary reform is a challenging task even if a coordination mechanism for external assistance is in place. The example of the DRC shows that the assistance recipient country's resistance against paramilitary reform efforts. As in the case of post-conflict Georgia, there are various paramilitary forces in the DRC. The SSR in the DRC therefore requires modernising and professionalizing those paramilitaries to function as modern military forces. However, there is no mentioning of reforming paramilitaries, those most highly trained and best equipped such as the presidential guards in the SSR policies. The paramilitaries fought in the civil war remain affiliated to their political leaders. The DRC received amble external assistance for SSR. Their SSR efforts were coordinated by the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), then the UN peacekeeping mission in the country.[218] Unlike the case of Afghanistan, the UN played a pivotal role: MONUC coordinated the international donors and encouraged the Transitional Government to enhance the speed and commitment to SSR through the Joint Commission for Security Sector Reform.

[218] The Security Council mandated MONUC to assist the then Transitional Government by providing advice and assistance on SSR: "including the reintegration of national defence and internal security sector forces together with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms" (United Nations, 2004).

Despite the coordination mechanism in place, however, SSR was done in a silo manner. The police reform was dealt with separately from the military reform.[219] Paramilitary forces were not included in the reform plan of neither the military nor police. The question of the status and role of paramilitaries was unquestioned in the SSR plan. As in the case of Georgia, paramilitaries fell out of the SSR assistance framework. In addition, the Transitional Government was reluctant to address paramilitary issues in the SSR process. As his power base, the President Josephe Kabila had to rely on his own elite unit.[220] It appears that Kabila was not interested in advancing the SSR process since Kabila had tried to absorb the other forces into his own armed forces, "rather than allowing a genuine integration of command and control" (International Crisis Group, 2005).

The lack of paramilitary components in the SSR in the DRC has resulted in a large scale of violence against people in the country. Irregular forces have continued causing atrocities against civilian populations, especially in Katanga province and the eastern region. The heavy military clash between the paramilitaries of the President and the former vice president Bemba in March 2007 in Kinshasa ("EU says up to 600 killed in Congo fighting," 2007) is another illustrative example of a violent consequence of the absence of paramilitary reform.

Those cases from the post-conflict societies present an illustrative example of paramilitaries playing crucial role in domestic politics and being separately dealt with from the military and police issues and, consequently, with little reform efforts about paramilitaries. In such societies where the role of paramilitaries is significant, those paramilitary forces remain outside substantive normative changes. Despite the controversial issues and challenges found in the paramilitary domain, the international community has started adopting a new

[219] As for the police, France and the European Union provided technical and financial assistance to reform and strengthen the Congolese National Police, whilst MONUC provided training for the National Police, including human rights training for police officers. As for the military, EUSEC proposed the Transitional Government their assistance to modernise various managerial functions within the army, in particular, the creation of an effective salary management.

[220] *Groupe spécial de sécurite présidentielle* (GSSP), consisting of 10,000 to 15,000 strong presidential guards. When Josephe Kabila became the president after his father's assassination in 2001, the GSSP was reinforced with his father's tribe, creating his own military office, *Maison militaire* and controlling many military resources.

approach to paramilitaries: training local police and militias to have paramilitary capacities, rather than reforming paramilitaries.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided a close examination of paramilitaries in Georgia and other transitional societies and their change process and provided a detailed account on them.

The close examination of the paramilitary typology shows both similarity and differences among themselves. On one hand, paramilitaries share common features in equipment and composition: most of they are equipped with light military weaponry. On the other hand, paramilitaries differ significantly in the statutory status. Paramilitaries can be either state quasi-state or non-state actors, depending on their degree and relations with a state. Furthermore, different function and role can be found even in the category of state paramilitaries. The deference does not stem from ministerial affiliation. Rather, as Hills points out, (Hills, 2000) paramilitary's function and role are defined by how the state's approach to internal security the regime security. The detailed examination of the example of the Georgian paramilitaries in this chapter confirms the point. To be more specific, having examined their socioeconomic, political and security roles, the chapter examined the trajectories of institutional change and change of those paramilitaries in Georgia.

The analysis on the paramilitary change in Georgia further examines the change process and shows that paramilitaries' change trajectory saw varying patterns such as emergence, evolution and dissolution. The analysis demonstrates that the paramilitary change process was driven by a number of political factors, i.e., a) domestic political dynamics among political elites and institutions and b) the regional violent conflicts. These factors affected different types of paramilitaries and their change trajectory differently.

For example, the non-state paramilitaries were mostly disbanded in a voluntary manner after having lost popular support due to the loss in the armed conflict over

Abkhazia. The non-state paramilitaries had no formal legitimacy as a state actor and heavily relied on the popular support. Once they lost the support from the general public, disbandment of these forces did not meet strong resistance. The regional conflict developments, in particular, the 1993 defeat of Georgian paramilitaries in Sukhumi was the significant factor to reduce the popular support as well as the number of volunteer fighters for the non-state paramilitary forces.

The quasi-state paramilitaries had two change courses: disbandment and transformation into a state organ. As for the quasi-state paramilitaries that underwent the disbandment, the deciding factor was the political dynamics among a handful of political elites determined the course of their change. This was since these quasi-state paramilitaries were led by influential political figures such as Kitovani and Ioseliani who become political rivals of the other political actors, i.e., the President: first Gamsakhurdia, then Shevardnadze. In the power struggle context, both the Presidents ordered the quasi-paramilitary forces to disband in order to curtail their influence. This makes a contrast with the non-state paramilitaries that underwent a voluntary disbandment. During the Shevardnadze period, the National Guards avoided the forced disbandment and went under the control of the MoD. This transfer brought the National Guards and its commander, Kitovani, under the control of the state executive body and the President Shevardnadze. In other words, the transfer to the defence ministry was not an upgrading but subjugating the paramilitary force and its commander under his political rival, Shevardnadze.

Unlike the non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries, most of the state paramilitaries survived without undergoing disbandment. However, some of them experienced a number of ministerial affiliation changes as a result of an abolishment of their affiliating ministry (the MSS) as it was involved in the political struggle with the then President. In other words, the paramilitary change in Georgia was largely driven by those domestic and regional political factors, rather than SSR principles and a security policy framework.

The political nature of paramilitary change made it challenging for external SSR assistance providers to engage in paramilitary reform. The earlier chapters in Part II examined the process of security sector change and SSR efforts. In the case

of Georgia, both the domestic and external assistance providers hardly implemented paramilitary reform efforts. The reform of paramilitaries remained outside the scope of external SSR assistance, except the ISAB recommendation for the separation of the military and law enforcement forces.

The political dynamics among the external actors can be attributed to the lack of paramilitary reform. Among the international actors, Russia's diplomatic stance towards Georgia played a determining role. Russia utilised its veto power both at the UN and OSCE, managed to keep the international organisations' role in SSR support minimum, except small-scale weapons collection programmes and humanitarian assistance. The lack of systematic, internationally supported DDR programme is another example of the weak engagement of the UN and its agencies concerning the SSR-related issues. Apart from the UNOMIG presence, the UN kept a low profile in Georgia in the post-independent period.

The other actors in the international community did not counter Russia's pressure robustly. Their priority seemed placed in establishing and maintaining stable Georgia. The paramilitary change process in Georgia was far from being a reform process guided by SSR principles. Nonetheless, the process led to the removal of the potential destabilisers and quasi-paramilitary leaders, i.e., Ioseliani and Kitovani for Shevardnadze; and Abashidze for Saakashvili, which did not meet any critiques from the international community.

The absence of the paramilitary reform efforts is not a unique phenomenon. This chapter also examined the cases of other conflict-affected countries (Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC and Serbia) where the vacuum in reform and assistance efforts targeting paramilitaries could be found. The understanding of varying types of paramilitaries, different change patterns and driving factors that determines the change charts would be useful to better equip the SSR research and practice, with paramilitary as a subject for analysis.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

The thesis set out to develop a better understanding of factors driving and shaping security sector change in transitional societies, by focusing on Georgia as its case study. The thesis examined how the security sector actors interacted with socio-political dynamics between 1985 and 2008.

More specifically, the thesis examined the processes and drivers of security sector change in Georgia during the transitional period, and their inter-relations with SSR agendas and donor supported programmes. By analysing security sector change from political economy perspectives, it explored varying socioeconomic and political dynamics that influenced the change process of security sector actors. The thesis particularly examined processes and drivers of change of policing institutions, namely, paramilitaries.

The subsequent section presents findings in relation to the overall inquiry. The second section discusses the findings' implications for the literature on the relation between security sector and political developments. The last section concludes the chapter and thesis by discussing future research considerations.

9.2 Research findings

This thesis provides rare research extensively examining the chronological security sector change in the post-Soviet space. The close examination of the case study on Georgia in this research produced a series of findings in relation to the main research questions concerning a) the determining factors in agenda-setting for security sector change, b) the interrelation between security sector change and SSR activities, and c) objective and dynamics in the paramilitary change process. The research revealed that the security sector actors were politically active actors in the Georgian politics and society throughout the transitional period between 1985 and 2008. Similarly, agenda setting for security sector change of these actors was a highly political process. Among the security

sector actors in Georgia, those with policing functions, especially paramilitaries, were the most influential actors and escaped from substantial reform efforts. What took place in the Georgian security sector sphere during the transitional period is better described as security sector change rather than normatively informed SSR.

The following sections present specific findings in relation to the aforementioned research questions.

9.2.1 Factors determining agenda setting for security sector change

The following section presents findings in relation to a set of key determining factors: power struggle among political elites and regime security as an incentivising factor for security sector change.

9.2.1.1 Power struggle among political elites

The analysis on the security sector change process highlighted actual driving factors that shaped the trajectory of the change of the security sector actors. In particular, power dynamics among a handful of political elites were key determining factors in the agenda-setting process of security sector change. The chronical investigation over the period of 1985 and 2008 revealed that this phenomenon has been consistent throughout the three different transitional periods studied in this research.

Within the power dynamics, a handful of actors played influential roles in agenda-setting of security sector change. The first group of actors is those who served as the President, i.e., Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili. In post-Soviet Georgia between 1985 and 2008, democratic governance and state institutions were yet to grow and mature. In the political context, power consolidation was a constant challenge for those in the executive position, and the President always played a central role in the power struggle. (See, chapters 3, 4 and 6)

The second group of key actors in the power dynamics was the security sector actors. In Georgia's infantry and fragile democracy, the security sector actors, in particular, paramilitaries and the so-called 'power ministries': the MIA and the MSS as well as paramilitaries played a pivotal role in power struggle among political elites.

As in the case of the overall security sector change, the change in paramilitary was heavily influenced by the political dynamics among a handful of political elites. The creation of state paramilitary forces, i.e., OMON and the disbandment of quasi-state paramilitaries in the early 1990 were direct results of the rivalry among political leaders. The first of such a rivalry took place between the President Gamsakhurdia and two paramilitary heads: Kitovani and Ioseliani, followed by the power struggle among Kitovani, Ioseliani and Shevardnadze. (See, chapters 3 and 4).

The MIA and MSS had been the most powerful state apparatus in the Soviet regime and called 'power ministries', too. (chapters 4 and 6) Having inherited the Soviet nomenklatura and closer tie to Moscow, and Soviet-style systems, the MIA and MSS became the strongest resistance towards the democratisation efforts in post-Soviet Georgia, as well as SSR efforts informed by democratic norms.

In the context, how to handle these 'power ministries' was key in the power struggle process. The approaches took by Shevardnadze and Saakashvili makes a sharp contrast. Shevardnadze choose not to reform either of the 'power ministries': he had his power platform, the MIA, and its rival ministry, the MSS, hardly underwent any reform efforts. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Shevardnadze allowed the 'power ministries' to continue surviving on the informal economic activities so that he could secure regime stability, unchallenged by these ministries and subsequent political blocks. (See, chapter 4)

On the other hand, Saakashvili took an opposite stance towards the MIA and MSS: his administration regarded the reform of the MIA and MSS as key political agenda, and carried out substantial reform efforts, including the abolishment of the MSS. The purpose of the reform efforts was the opposite of Shevardnadze: the removal of the Soviet nomenklatura. The reform efforts of the MIA and MSS

under the Saakashvili administration were more of a purge of the anti-Saakashvili block, namely the Soviet nomenklatura, and largely remained just as so. (See, chapter 6)

9.2.1.2 Regime security

Once these political elites consolidated a certain degree of power, the next challenge for them was to sustain its regime. The political elites' regime security concerns became the other influential factor to shape the course of security sector change. The consolidation of public order and power-sharing among political elites drove the direction of the security sector change process. In spite of the changes in political ideologies (i.e. from communism to democracy) and diplomatic orientation, i.e., from the balancing diplomacy between Russia and the West to the diplomacy centred on the Georgia-US/Georgia-EU relations, the principle of preserving elites' security was consistent throughout the period examined by the research. The regime security concerns prevailed over other security concerns such as state security and community security.

Under the Shevardnadze regime, the absence of substantial reform in the power ministries was beneficial for the early stage of the Shevardnadze regime during the power consolidation phase. Therefore, a priority in security sector change was not to have any substantial change but rather maintain the *status quo,* especially within the MIA and MSS. Similarly, security sector change had a significant implication for the security of the Saakashvili regime. In the case of Saakashvili with the Soviet nomenklatura as political opponents, reform efforts in the MIA and MSS demonstrated tangible results of the regime change and garnered popular support for his government.

In agenda setting for security sector change, the regime security needs were prioritised over community security and state security needs. Between 1985 and 2008, Georgia had been challenged by a wide variety of security concerns. (See, chapters 5 and 7) Its border was threatened by the territorial disputes; community faced a multi-faceted human security threats; and state security was jeopardized by the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. Under the security environment, it was regime

security concerns that determined the course of security sector change rather than the human security and state security needs. The defeat of Georgia in the 2008 Russo-Georgia War was a primal example in which Georgia did not success in securing its state security despite the heavily invested SSR efforts. SSR's impacts on human security discussed in chapters 5 and 7 also support the observation.

The politically motivated security sector change contributed to building and sustaining regime security only to a certain degree: it did not perpetuate regime security, as shown in the both cases of the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments. For the Shevardnadze regime, the balance of power act involving the MIA and MSS did not sustain regime stability. Resentment against the corrupt regime saturated and eventually led to the overturn of the Shevardnadze government. (See, chapter 4) For Saakashvili's government, the reform effort remained as a political performance, without yielding any practical results in terms of state and community security, as discussed in chapter 7.

9.2.2 The interplay between normatively informed SSR agendas and politically driven security sector change

Having been heavily influenced by the political factors and regime security priorities, how did security sector change interact with the norm-based SSR interventions? The SSR assistance was based on liberal democratic norms and required Georgia to develop its security sector along with principles such as civilian control of armed forces, the separation of defence and law enforcement forces and the independence of the judiciary of the executive. The findings in the thesis suggest that these norms were adopted only partially.

In Georgia, the efforts for SSR took place in parallel to the overall security sector change process. Domestic and external actors engaged in both the processes: the overall security sector change and SSR. On one hand, the security sector actors engaged in the overall security sector change. On the other hand, there were a group of actors including some international and Georgian experts, civil society leadership and so on who envisaged SSR as reform efforts informed by

liberal democratic principles such as accountability, transparency and right-based approach. A group of Georgian experts, civil society leaders and lawyers, for instance, drafted the 2005 National Security Concept with an emphasis on people-centred approach to security. (See, chapter 7)

Their efforts did not yield tangible results either under the Shevardnadze or the Saakashvili periods. For the Shevardnadze administration, the implementation of any substantial reform efforts besides the defence modernisation took place. During the Saakashvili time, reform started to take place especially at the former 'power ministries'. But, as discussed in chapter 6, the civil society became divided along with the line of pro-Saakashvili and those not so close to the regime. Consequently, the Saakashvili administration reduced its widow for policy dialogues by distancing critical experts and civil society organisations. This way, the SSR efforts were sacrificed at the sake of the political rivalry among the Georgian elites.

External actors also involved in promoting SSR, too. The ISAB is an example of such actors who recommended the de-politicization and professionalization of the security sector. Georgia received the group of external advisers, the ISAB, who provided an overall strategic advice and recommendations for the SSR-related issues as early as in the late 1990. The advisory group provided a number of strategic and concrete recommendations to transform the Georgian security sector actors, especially of the military and police, into a professional security sector controlled by democratic control. Their advice, however, was translated into practice only partially. The paramilitaries' example discussed in chapter 8 demonstrates that Georgia did not follow the advice on the separation of the military and police forces, for instance. Besides the ISAB's advisory activities, external support for SSR was largely limited at technical level. NATO Planning Programming Budgeting System/Financial Management System (PPBS/FMS) is one of such support aimed at enhancing managerial accountability within the military. (See, chapter 7)

Besides these few efforts addressing liberal democratic principles, the majority of domestic and external efforts in security sector change targeted either strategic interest of the external partners and/or Georgian counterpart. The defence sphere

is where both the assistance providers and receiver saw a mutual interest for external assistance, largely under the NATO partnership framework. As discussed in chapters 5 and 7, the Western countries, especially the USA, provided an ample of assistance arrived since the mid-1990s. However, external assistance programmes and activities that took place in the security sector were not necessarily informed of liberal democratic norms. The Georgian counterpart received assistance in various forms such as the provision of equipment and combat training. While the defence sphere saw a progress in developing combat capabilities that was brought up to the level of NATO inter-operability standards. The provision of assistance was limited in other areas of the defence spheres, however. (See, chapters 5 and 7)

The SSR assistance provided by the Western ally countries appears to be influenced by their strategic interests rather than liberal democratic values or Georgia's security. The research in the thesis suggests that the reason for the uneven reform efforts in the defence, police and justice spheres can be attributed to two political factors. First, during the 1990 when Georgia was a fragile state, the priority was placed in the stabilisation of the Shevardnadze regime. As discussed in detail in chapter 4, liberal democratic norms in the security sector, in particular, the police, were not encouraged due to the need for reserving the corrupt environment for the regime stability. The Western ally countries accommodated the absence of reform in the police sphere, by prioritising the stabilisation of Georgia that appeared to necessitate the regime security.

The second factor relates to the strategic inter-dependency between Georgia and the NATO ally countries. For the USA and the other NATO ally countries, Georgia's increased geopolitical importance in the post-9.11 period in which Georgia became a frontline for the USA and its allies' anti-terrorist strategy. For Georgia, enhancing a strategic partnership with these Western countries became more crucial during the Saakashvili time in which the diplomatic relation between Georgia and Russia grew antagonistic and volatile. This way, Georgia and its external assistance providers found a common interest in advancing combat capacities immediately rather than norm-based reform efforts which may need substantive time and resources.

9.2.2.1 Compromised liberal democratic SSR norms

The SSR policy discourse and its principles were not the drivers that shaped the change courses of the Georgian security sector actors. Rather, it was the domestic political dynamics that shaped the courses of the security sector actors. The research revealed that how the implementation of the liberal-democratic principles to the security sector governance was compromised. This was particularly prominent in the areas of civilian control and community security.

Since the independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia had developed its own security sector institutions and the institutional framework for the civilian control was established. However, the actual implementation of civilian control was not effective. In Georgia, the fragility of civilian control was displayed by a number of military raids led by the civilian leader, Okurashvili, and the excessively violent suppression of anti-government demonstrations under the Saakashvili administration that was supposedly a liberal democratic government. (See, chapter 6)

A few factors attribute to the phenomena. First, a balance of power between the executive and legislature was weak. The executive, especially the President was too powerful in terms of its governance authority. The dominance of the ruling party in the legislature did not counter the powerful executive body, which disabled an effective implementation of civilian control. In the environment, the effectiveness of the parliamentary oversight was limited. Another factor was the territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The so-called frozen conflicts provided some Georgian elites such as Okruashvili who garnered popular support by appealing to Georgian-centric nationalism with a justification for employing the militant political rhetoric and subsequent militant actions. The general public accommodated such a militant political leadership style for which the early 1990 when civilian paramilitary leaders led the armed forces and the country was not yet a distant memory. The third factor lies within the interplay between domestic political dynamics and external assistance providers. The domestic political factors affected the course of security sector change SSR guidelines and advices provided by the strategic partners such as NATO and the

EU. The SSR assistance providers such as the EU, NATO and the OECD were not prepared or positioned to interfere in the domestic power games. The SSR implementation was heavily affected by the domestic power struggle, and its outcomes became compromised by the domestic political factors.

Another area where the liberal democratic norms were not realised was community security. As discussed earlier, the chronical examination of the agenda setting of security sector change revealed that it was regime security priorities that determined the course of security sector change. The persistent community security challenges also show that the SSR was not sufficiently carried out, especially in the sphere of the police and community policing. Despite the increase in domestic efforts and external assistance in the security sector since the mid-1990s, the security environment at community level, in particular, in rural areas and border regions, human rights abuses and corruption remained an issue. (See, chapters 5 and 7) Even under the Saakashvili period, SSR efforts informed by liberal democratic norms such as accountability, transparency and human rights did not achieve a wide outreach outside Tbilisi where the administration demonstrated police reform initiatives, such as the introduction of the Patrol Police.

9.2.3 Objectives and dynamics of the paramilitary change process

The research found that the paramilitary forces and their leaders played significant roles in the domestic politics during the timeframes examined in this thesis (see chapters 3, 4 and 6). The thesis then provided a detailed account on the paramilitaries and their roles in politics and society pre- and post-independence Georgia (see chapter 8). It expanded the existing SSR literature that had not allocated sufficient scholarly attention to paramilitary forces. The case study on Georgia and the discussion in chapter 8 showed that paramilitaries are leading actors in transitional societies rather than being a sub-actor in the security sector. This way, the thesis expanded the scope of analytical units of most of the existing SSR literature and shed a light on the under-researched subject. The process tracing of the security sector change process over the extended period of timeline between 1985 and 2008 made it clear that

paramilitaries had been major security actors in the transitional period in Georgia. What factors determined and/or influenced the change in paramilitary groups? How did these changes in paramilitaries relate to SSR programmes?"

The most influential factor to shape the course of the paramilitary change was the political elites' regime security concerns, as in the case of the other security sector actors. The research on the Georgia's case revealed that the phenomenon of domestic political dynamics affecting security sector actors' change was best demonstrated in the case of the paramilitaries. (See, chapter 8) The investigation on the paramilitary change process found that the deciding factor for the disbandment of paramilitaries was an outcome of power struggle among political elites. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, paramilitary leaders played a significant role in the early transitional stage in Georgia. Security sector change was implemented in a way to remove them from power. During the early stabilisation phase under Shevardnadze, the establishing state security sector and civilian control meant for the Shevardnadze regime to remove the paramilitary heads from the state functions and politics. Paramilitary forces under the leadership of political opponents such as the Mkhedrioni and the National Guard became disbanded after their leaders lost against its political rivals in the power struggle. This patter continued even after Georgia had gained a certain degree of stability and the state paramilitary forces also followed the patterns. (See, chapter 8)

The post-Soviet transition required Georgia to transform the Soviet Internal Troops and separate military and law enforcement bodies. However, efforts for paramilitary reform advanced to the extent to dismissing the paramilitary leaders. Once the dismissal was complete, few substantial paramilitary reform efforts along with the Western standards took place. However, given the politically motivated incentive for the paramilitary reform, the reform efforts did not yield more than the removal of the paramilitary heads and the disbandment of their supporters and paramilitary groups. Paramilitary reform did not contain more normative and substantial efforts such as the demarcation of military and law enforcement paramilitaries, and the clarification of mandates. The change of the security sector was therefore driven by regime security concerns. The observation was driven from the detailed account on the change of the security

sector in Georgia found that domestic political dynamics were the major driving factor to shape the courses of paramilitary change (see chapters 5 and 7). The research found that agenda setting for change in the security sector were highly political and involved power struggle among a handful of political elites.

These domestic political factors affected the course of change more significantly than the liberal democratic principles and advices provided by the strategic partners such as NATO and the EU. The SSR assistance providers such as the EU, NATO and the OECD were not prepared or positioned to interfere in the domestic power games. The SSR implementation was heavily affected by the domestic power struggle, and its outcomes became compromised by the domestic political factors. The incentive of maintaining the Soviet-style paramilitaries was stronger than introducing the Western institutional set-up in which the military and police are separate.

Table 9 Security sector change in Georgia under the Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili regimes

Regime	Security sector change
Gamsakhurdia (1991 – 1992)	• Soviet security apparatus dissolved • Non-state paramilitary forces emerged • Georgian national security institutions began to develop • Very few external SSR assistance arrived
Shevardnadze (1992 – 2003)	• Most of non-state paramilitaries disbanded • Security sector institutions began to be professionalised • Legal framework for civilian control of armed forces placed • External SSR assistance provided mostly in defence and justice spheres • MIA, MSS and their paramilitaries left without substantial reform nor assistance
Saakashvili (2004 – 2008)*	• Remaining quasi-state paramilitaries disbanded • Substantial reform efforts including police reform and anti-corruption campaign took place • MIA and MSS influence substantially declined (MSS abolished) • External SSR assistance continued to focus on defence and justice • Civilian control of armed forces remained fragile

* Saakashvili held the presidency between 2004 and 2013. This tables covers the timeline covered by the thesis.

9.3 Implications of the findings on key debates in the wider literature

The findings in this study were derived from the single case study on Georgia and should not be considered as generalisations. Nevertheless, they provide considerations on how the analysis of the example of Georgia contributes to a better understanding of the characteristics, causation and challenges of security sector change in other transitional societies emerging from war and/or authoritarian regime. The following section introduces theoretical implications on the literature concerning the interplay between wider political transformation and security sector change process, as well as theoretical and practical implications on reform efforts for the overall security sector and paramilitaries.

9.3.1 Theoretical implications

This study contributes theory on the relation between security sector actors and political developments and asserts the following points.

First, local actors are influential agents in the security sector change process in transitional societies rather than mere recipients of international assistance. The examination on Georgia's security sector actors provides nuanced findings on local actors which have increasingly received scholarly attention in the context of liberal peacebuilding critiques (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2008; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2010; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). The Georgia case suggests that political dynamics among political elites is a key factor for security sector change. Even where reform efforts informed by liberal democratic values take place, the political dynamics is a dominant factor to determine the course of security sector change. The study on Georgia shows that the driving factors for security sector change are embedded in a handful of political elites in power, and not based on policy strategy and security needs. The study also demonstrates that local security sector actors do not form a monolithic group; rather, it is a diverse group of actors with varying socioeconomic and political interests and roles, often with conflicting relations among themselves. The investigation on Georgia's security sector change process extends critical

peacebuilding literature by providing detailed examination of local actors and their actual roles (Donais, 2008; Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mannitz, 2014). Furthermore, the study contributes to scholarship on security sector actors in authoritarian societies by providing some evidence that security sector actors, particularly paramilitaries, play multi-faceted roles in regime security maintenance (Cook, 2007; Davis and Pereira, 2003; Kolkowicz and Korbonski, 1982; Nassif, 2013; Quinlivan, 1999).

Second, liberal democratic values do not necessarily draw a distinct line between the international community and local actors and have the former impose these values on the local actors. One of main critiques on liberal peacebuilding debate lies in the 'top-down' approach of the international community. Acknowledging the roles of local institutions, they argue against intervening with liberal democratic values in a 'top-down' approach (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). The investigation on Georgia indicates that such an international-local dichotomy did not quite exist. Instead, the research showed complex and nuanced dynamics among local actors. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, liberal democratic values did not draw a distinct line between the international community and local actors. Rather, the Georgian political leaders such as Shevardnadze and Saakashvili chose to employ liberal democratic norms to advance certain policy agendas. Furthermore, it was not only the top-level Georgian leadership that held to the liberal democratic norms. Civil society in Georgia had a number of institutions advocating for human rights and other liberal democratic values and some of them took part in policy development concerning security sector change.

Third, the international assistance provided in the security sector is not necessarily based on liberal democratic norms. As discussed in chapter 2, the international community's so-called liberal peacebuilding interventions have gathered a wide range of critiques on its 'norm-based' approach (Chandler, 2017, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2010; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). However, the close examination of various reform efforts in the security sector in Georgia reveals that most of the international assistance in Georgia was provided based on strategic interests of the assistance providers rather than on liberal democratic norms. The overall emphasis of the international assistance in the

field of combat training in the defence and border control spheres discussed in chapters 5 and 7 is an illustrative example.

Fourth, paramilitaries play significant political roles in environments where democratic control of security sector actors remains incomplete, regardless of their statutory status. This research expands scholarship on paramilitaries by providing the case study from the former Soviet Union country that the existing paramilitary study has rarely covered. The focus on Georgia's paramilitaries the research provided an extensive example of how irregular armed forces interacted with politics and state formation in societies other than Latin America and Northern Ireland on which the majority of the existing paramilitary studies have been conducted.

As discussed in chapter 2, the earlier literature on paramilitaries have applied the state-focused understanding of paramilitaries based on the assumption that paramilitaries are assumed non-state entities which closely collaborate with a state (Aliyev, 2016; Carey et al., 2013; Mazzei, 2009). The investigation on paramilitaries in Georgia shows that the assumption does not always apply in transitional societies. In Georgia, paramilitaries operated in a state that experienced drastic socio-political transformation, including a near state-collapse in early 1990. The case study on Georgia revealed that paramilitaries could take many forms in terms of its relation to a state. chapter 8 illustrated that there were three types of paramilitaries, i.e., non-state, quasi-state and state paramilitaries in Georgia. Furthermore, the case study on Georgia shows that it was quasi-state paramilitaries that became the most influential political actors at some point, and that, for this reason, how to transform them became a crucial issue in the course of stabilising Georgia.

The challenge of the quasi-paramilitary change leads to another analytical gap in the paramilitary studies relates to empirical issues that conflict-affected societies often face in post-conflict settings: what are the exact drivers for paramilitaries to transform, and how do they transform? In order for exploring those questions, this research carried out a more comprehensive overview of different types of paramilitaries including non-state, quasi-state and state paramilitaries in societies emerging from conflict. The research showed that their transformation trajectory

patterns differ depending on the key deciding factor i.e., the paramilitary leaders' relation with the political regime.

9.3.2 Policy implications

The research advances the understanding of the security sector actors on the analytical focal points suggested by Schroeder and Chappuis: focus on local agency and domestic political systems; focus on interaction dynamics between external and domestic actors; and focus on non-traditional methodological approaches (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014). The research have two main policy implications for policy makers and practitioners engaged in reforming of the security sector in transitional societies.

First, the case in Georgia suggests that SSR strategy development needs to be well aware of political implication/incentives for more effective implementation of SSR. This concurs to the critical SSR scholars such as Schroeder and Chappuis (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014) on the point that the SSR study a need to adopt the dynamic approach to understanding the security sector actors, their dynamics and inter-relation with an overall political process, instead of regarding them as mere technical entities but political ones. To understand the actual dynamics of security sector and its reform requires placing the security sector actors and its reform process in a political context, rather than treating them as technical issues independent of the socio-political surroundings.

Second, the SSR policy discourse and practice need to consider an additional unit for SSR implementation: paramilitaries. This research shows that paramilitary forces are the one of the main security sector actors in transitional societies. By contrast, the current reform efforts by the international community focus on the military and police and paramilitary forces remain hardly touched by reform, as some empirical research suggest. In order to avoid paramilitaries from restoring authoritarian and/or coercive security apparatus, SSR policy should address paramilitaries and political incentives that may resist or drive paramilitary reform.

9.4 Suggestions for future research

While the pre-existing research on paramilitaries introduced above focuses on definitions of paramilitaries, especially from their association with states, the research in this thesis examined the process in which paramilitaries are transforming and what driving factors interact with and/or influence their change. Instead of describing the temporary and time-limited conditions and status of paramilitaries, this research took a longer timeframe for its analysis to look at certain paramilitary groups in Georgia and how they have evolved and transformed over an extended period of time and various political developments. The research on Georgia and other conflict-affected countries above suggest controversial characteristics of paramilitary change in transitional societies in which influential paramilitaries are often left without any substantial reform efforts to make paramilitaries accountable for the people not the regime in transitional societies.

Despite this, as the examples from Georgia and the other transitional countries showed in this study, the current body of knowledge on the relation between the security sector actors and political developments has not sufficiently investigated the paramilitary sphere. To fill in the knowledge gap, the following research directions could contribute to better understanding of paramilitaries in transitional societies emerging from war and/or authoritarianism.

The research in this thesis contributed to the literature on the relation between security sector actors and political developments by providing a detailed account on the chronical investigation of security sector change in Georgia, the former Soviet Union country, and how the change of security sector actors including paramilitaries interacted with the overall political development process. The former Soviet Union is one of the least researched geographical areas within the field of research exploring the relation between the security sector and political developments. Although this research on Georgia was a contribution to filling in the geographical gap in the literature that has rarely covers the former Soviet Union countries, it will be useful to conduct further research on the other Soviet Union countries. In doing so, the focus on paramilitary would be useful because

paramilitary is a security sector actor predominant in the former Soviet Union sphere in which the state paramilitary forces, Internal Troops, have played a significant role in maintaining public order and state stability. Such research on the former Soviet Union countries with a focus on paramilitary would be also helpful to understand security sector actors and their change process in other societies which share similar socio-political background with the former Soviet Union countries.

This research also contributes to the paramilitary literature by providing detailed accounts on paramilitaries in Georgia. It is useful for future research to examine paramilitaries in varying geographical areas. The paramilitary literature has been limited in terms of the geography coverage. Most of the existing research has been conducted on specific paramilitary groups in a limited range of countries such as Colombia and Ireland. Research on the paramilitaries in Georgia in this thesis thus provided the paramilitary research with a new geographic perspective. Recently, paramilitaries have been actively engaging in violence in the eastern European countries such as Ukraine (Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016). Further research should be carried out to examine the former Soviet Union countries and the eastern European countries which have shown change patterns of the security sector actors, and especially paramilitaries, similar to those in Georgia. Studying paramilitaries in these countries would be useful to better understand their dynamics of change and implement more democratic change of security sector actors in transitional countries.

Appendix 1 Note on the field research methods

The field research employed and triangulated various methods of data collection. Data collection was carried out through a) semi- and un-structured interviews and participatory observation and b) focus group interviews with community members. Field research activities conducted in 2002 received financial support from Akino Yutaka Eurasia Fund. Field research activities conducted in 2005 received financial support from the United Nations University's Akino Memorial Research Fellowship.

a) Interviews and participatory observation

Semi- and un-structured interviews were conducted with Georgian parliamentarians, officials from the security sector agencies including the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, State Security and Defence. Relevant personnel from external agencies, local journalists and non-governmental organisations were also interviewed. While the majority of the key informants chose to be anonymous, the following key informants agreed to be referred to:

1. Mr Levan Berdzenishvili, Member of the Parliament, Republican Party
2. Mr David Darchiashvili, Executive Director, Open Society Institute
3. Ms Sabine Freizer, International Crisis Group, Caucasus Project Director
4. Ms Tamara Pataraia, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
5. Mr Levan Ramishvili, Liberty Institute, Chairman
6. Mr Nika Rurua, Member of the Parliament, Deputy Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security
7. Ms Dato Sikharulidze, Deputy Minister of Defence
8. Mr Shota Utiashvili, Head of Analysis Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs
9. Mr Paata Zakareishvili, Center for Development and Co-operation

b) Focus group interviews

Focus group interviews were conducted to collect and analyse data in a bottom-up approach. Sample data were collected from three communities of Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and Zugdidi, considering geographical and social variables as

discussed in chapter 1. In each of the communities, focus group interviews were conducted with a group of men and a group of women. The total number of the participants is 51 (26 men and 25 women). Workshops were held for each social group separately to avoid either of the gender groups dominate the other.

The focus group interview methods were informed by participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques to generate raw data directly from the local community members. Entry points to the communities were established by the time of arrival to the communities through contacting and interviewing with relevant local organisations in the region.

Upon the arrival, I trained three facilitators chosen by a local civil society organisation on PRA tools. The facilitators included one female collaborator who facilitated the female groups, and one male collaborator who facilitated the male groups. It was these Georgian facilitators who facilitated focus group interviews while I was present at the workshop venue and observing the participants and workshop proceedings. In addition to the training on PRA, the facilitators and I discussed the overall research questions and specific research questions of this research. I provided them a list of guiding questions to be asked at the focus group interviews.

The language used in the focus group interviews were either Georgian or Russian. The participants in Zugdidi responded mostly in Georgian, while the participants in Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli used both Russian and Georgian. Transcripts of workshop discussions were translated to English later by the female facilitator. I followed up the data collection by data reduction, including write-ups of field notes, transcripts of workshop discussions and interviews.

The focus group interview arrangement with the low facilitators has both advantages and disadvantages. The presence of the female and male facilitators enabled to explore sensitive issues including GBV in communities. Using Georgian (and Russian for those whose first language was not Georgian) was necessary to conduct interactive discussions, the presence of the two local facilitators was indispensable.

The arrangement of having the local facilitators facilitate focus group interviews has its disadvantage. If I had facilitated the interview workshops, I could have had more control in how to guide group discussions and may have been able to ask more specific questions. However, this was not possible with the two local collaborators being the main facilitators. The translated interview scripts may not have conveyed every detail and nuance expressed by the participants, either.

Despite these disadvantages, applying PRA techniques in the research was found useful as it explored local security challenges and dynamics in communities as discussed in this research.

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